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We build a model using Gaussian processes to infer a spatio-temporal vector field from observed agent trajectories. Significant landmarks or influence points in agent surroundings are jointly derived through vector calculus operations that indicate presence of sources and sinks. We evaluate these influence points by using the Kullback-Leibler divergence between the posterior and prior Laplacian of the inferred spatio-temporal vector field. Through locating significant features that influence trajectories, our model aims to give greater insight into underlying causal utility functions that determine agent decision-making. A key feature of our model is that it infers a joint Gaussian process over the observed trajectories, the time-varying vector field of utility and canonical vector calculus operators. We apply our model to both synthetic data and lion GPS data collected at the Bubye Valley Conservancy in southern Zimbabwe.

Balancing fairness and efficiency in resource allocation is a classical economic and computational problem. The price of fairness measures the worst-case loss of economic efficiency when using an inefficient but fair allocation rule; for indivisible goods in many settings, this price is unacceptably high. One such setting is kidney exchange, where needy patients swap willing but incompatible kidney donors. In this work, we close an open problem regarding the theoretical price of fairness in modern kidney exchanges. We then propose a general hybrid fairness rule that balances a strict lexicographic preference ordering over classes of agents, and a utilitarian objective that maximizes economic efficiency. We develop a utility function for this rule that favors disadvantaged groups lexicographically; but if cost to overall efficiency becomes too high, it switches to a utilitarian objective. This rule has only one parameter which is proportional to a bound on the price of fairness, and can be adjusted by policymakers. We apply this rule to real data from a large kidney exchange and show that our hybrid rule produces more reliable outcomes than other fairness rules.

Two important requirements when aggregating the preferences of multiple agents are that the outcome should be economically efficient and the aggregation mechanism should not be manipulable. In this paper, we provide a computer-aided proof of a sweeping impossibility using these two conditions for randomized aggregation mechanisms. More precisely, we show that every efficient aggregation mechanism can be manipulated for all expected utility representations of the agents' preferences. This settles an open problem and strengthens a number of existing theorems, including statements that were shown within the special domain of assignment. Our proof is obtained by formulating the claim as a satisfiability problem over predicates from real-valued arithmetic, which is then checked using an SMT (satisfiability modulo theories) solver. In order to verify the correctness of the result, a minimal unsatisfiable set of constraints returned by the SMT solver was translated back into a proof in higher-order logic, which was automatically verified by an interactive theorem prover. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first application of SMT solvers in computational social choice.

In essence, people who interact with advanced technology want to be able to trust it appropriately, and then act on that trust. In interpersonal relationships, and otherwise, humans act largely based on trust. For example, a supervisor asks a subordinate to accomplish a task based on several factors that indicate they can trust them to accomplish that task. When consumers make purchases, they do so with trust that the product will perform as promised. Likewise, when using something like an autonomous vehicle, the user must be able to trust it appropriately in order to use it properly. With the rapid advancement of the capabilities of intelligent computing technology to do tasks that were previously assumed to be too complicated for computers, there has been much recent discussion regarding how humans can trust this technology - although the connection to trust is not always made explicit, per se.

Artificial intelligence (AI) may be the next big thing for communications service providers (CSPs), but it's not clear yet exactly how they will use it or where it will have the biggest impact on their business. "Let's break it down a bit – it can be misleading," Telefónica Global Group's CIO, Phil Jordan, told attendees at the Executive Summit during TM Forum Live!. "We see clear use cases and value in cognitive and machine learning. Any decision we take in a systemic way, I have asked for a plan for when and where does that become a machine-learned activity? "It's the next transformation wave that is going to hit all of us – converting decision-making into something that isn't static rule-based," he adds. "I don't think that's a technology problem – it's here or it's coming." But is Telefónica making extensive use of AI today? "We made no use of it in the transformation," Jordan emphasized in discussing the company's massive digital transformation. "AI isn't a magic trick," he says, and it won't be useful unless operators transform their existing IT systems first. Indeed, that's the message we've been hearing from many of our members: AI is promising but it isn't reality – yet. In November we will publish an extensive Trend Analysis Report on AI and machine learning, analyzing the results of our surveys of CSPs and suppliers (choose the right one for you). Take the survey and you'll be entered into a draw for a $250 Amazon gift voucher. Certainly, new virtualized network functionality and new operational and business support systems are needed to take advantage of AI and machine learning (a form of AI), in customer facing applications such as virtual agents and chatbots and for end-to-end network and service management. "You have to teach it; you have to give the machine context all the time," Jordan explains. "You have to have a business that is ready and able to understand outcomes and go back and feed it into machine learning.

We consider the well-studied cake cutting problem in which the goal is to find an envy-free allocation based on queries from $n$ agents. The problem has received attention in computer science, mathematics, and economics. It has been a major open problem whether there exists a discrete and bounded envy-free protocol. We resolve the problem by proposing a discrete and bounded envy-free protocol for any number of agents. The maximum number of queries required by the protocol is $n^{n^{n^{n^{n^n}}}}$. We additionally show that even if we do not run our protocol to completion, it can find in at most $n^3{(n^2)}^n$ queries a partial allocation of the cake that achieves proportionality (each agent gets at least $1/n$ of the value of the whole cake) and envy-freeness. Finally we show that an envy-free partial allocation can be computed in at most $n^3{(n^2)}^n$ queries such that each agent gets a connected piece that gives the agent at least $1/(3n)$ of the value of the whole cake.

Commonsense reasoning is in principle a central problem in artificial intelligence, but it is a very difficult one. One approach that has been pursued since the earliest days of the field has been to encode commonsense knowledge as statements in a logic-based representation language and to implement commonsense reasoning as some form of logical inference. This paper surveys the use of logic-based representations of commonsense knowledge in artificial intelligence research.

For instance, one of the major problems in Casual Dining is anticipating and meeting demand for the restaurants, corporate owned or franchised. This is especially important during Limited Time Offers (LTOs). Using the eight criteria outlined above, a global, casual dining company connected to a real-time, multi-party network, and was able to rapidly achieve their objective function - excellent customer service at the lowest cost. The company constantly monitors Point-of-Sale (POS) data, and is using AI agents to recognize and predict consumption patterns of consumers. In addition, intelligent AI agents create the demand forecast and then compare it to the actual demand in real-time.

We investigate the effects of market making on market performance, focusing on allocative efficiency as well as gains from trade accrued by background traders. We employ empirical simulation-based methods to evaluate heuristic strategies for market makers as well as background investors in a variety of complex trading environments. Our market model incorporates private and common valuation elements, with dynamic fundamental value and asymmetric information. In this context, we compare the surplus achieved by background traders in strategic equilibrium, with and without a market maker. Our findings indicate that the presence of the market maker strongly tends to increase total welfare across various environments. Market-maker profit may or may not exceed the welfare gain, thus the effect on background-investor surplus is ambiguous. We find that market making tends to benefit investors in relatively thin markets, and situations where background traders are impatient, due to limited trading opportunities. The presence of additional market makers increases these benefits, as competition drives the market makers to provide liquidity at lower price spreads. A thorough sensitivity analysis indicates that these results are robust to reasonable changes in model parameters.