Agents
TanksWorld: A Multi-Agent Environment for AI Safety Research
Rivera, Corban G., Lyons, Olivia, Summitt, Arielle, Fatima, Ayman, Pak, Ji, Shao, William, Chalmers, Robert, Englander, Aryeh, Staley, Edward W., Wang, I-Jeng, Llorens, Ashley J.
The ability to create artificial intelligence (AI) capable of performing complex tasks is rapidly outpacing our ability to ensure the safe and assured operation of AI-enabled systems. Fortunately, a landscape of AI safety research is emerging in response to this asymmetry and yet there is a long way to go. In particular, recent simulation environments created to illustrate AI safety risks are relatively simple or narrowly-focused on a particular issue. Hence, we see a critical need for AI safety research environments that abstract essential aspects of complex real-world applications. In this work, we introduce the AI safety TanksWorld as an environment for AI safety research with three essential aspects: competing performance objectives, human-machine teaming, and multi-agent competition. The AI safety TanksWorld aims to accelerate the advancement of safe multi-agent decision-making algorithms by providing a software framework to support competitions with both system performance and safety objectives. As a work in progress, this paper introduces our research objectives and learning environment with reference code and baseline performance metrics to follow in a future work.
FairRec: Two-Sided Fairness for Personalized Recommendations in Two-Sided Platforms
Patro, Gourab K., Biswas, Arpita, Ganguly, Niloy, Gummadi, Krishna P., Chakraborty, Abhijnan
We investigate the problem of fair recommendation in the context of two-sided online platforms, comprising customers on one side and producers on the other. Traditionally, recommendation services in these platforms have focused on maximizing customer satisfaction by tailoring the results according to the personalized preferences of individual customers. However, our investigation reveals that such customer-centric design may lead to unfair distribution of exposure among the producers, which may adversely impact their well-being. On the other hand, a producer-centric design might become unfair to the customers. Thus, we consider fairness issues that span both customers and producers. Our approach involves a novel mapping of the fair recommendation problem to a constrained version of the problem of fairly allocating indivisible goods. Our proposed FairRec algorithm guarantees at least Maximin Share (MMS) of exposure for most of the producers and Envy-Free up to One item (EF1) fairness for every customer. Extensive evaluations over multiple real-world datasets show the effectiveness of FairRec in ensuring two-sided fairness while incurring a marginal loss in the overall recommendation quality.
Forming Diverse Teams from Sequentially Arriving People
Ahmed, Faez, Dickerson, John, Fuge, Mark
Collaborative work often benefits from having teams or organizations with heterogeneous members. In this paper, we present a method to form such diverse teams from people arriving sequentially over time. We define a monotone submodular objective function that combines the diversity and quality of a team and propose an algorithm to maximize the objective while satisfying multiple constraints. This allows us to balance both how diverse the team is and how well it can perform the task at hand. Using crowd experiments, we show that, in practice, the algorithm leads to large gains in team diversity. Using simulations, we show how to quantify the additional cost of forming diverse teams and how to address the problem of simultaneously maximizing diversity for several attributes (e.g., country of origin, gender). Our method has applications in collaborative work ranging from team formation, the assignment of workers to teams in crowdsourcing, and reviewer allocation to journal papers arriving sequentially. Our code is publicly accessible for further research.
Efficient exploration of zero-sum stochastic games
Martin, Carlos, Sandholm, Tuomas
We study the problem of how to efficiently explore zero-sum games whose payoffs and dynamics are initially unknown. The agent is given a certain number of episodes to learn as much useful information about the game as possible. During this learning, the rewards obtained in the game are fictional and thus do not count toward the evaluation of the final strategy. After this exploration phase, the agent must recommend a strategy that should be minimally exploitable by an adversary (who has complete knowledge of the environment and can thus play optimally against it). This setup is called pure exploration in the single-agent reinforcement learning literature. This is an important problem for simulation-based games in which a black-box simulator is queried with strategies to obtain samples of the players' resulting utilities [33], as opposed to the rules of the game being explicitly given. For example, in many military settings, war game simulators are used to generate strategies, and then the strategies need to be ready to deploy in case of actual war [17]. Another prevalent example is finance, where trading strategies are generated in simulation, and then they need to be ready for live trading. A third example is video games such as Dota 2 [4] and Starcraft II [31], where AIs can be trained largely through self-play.
A mean-field analysis of two-player zero-sum games
Domingo-Enrich, Carles, Jelassi, Samy, Mensch, Arthur, Rotskoff, Grant, Bruna, Joan
Finding Nash equilibria in two-player zero-sum continuous games is a central problem in machine learning, e.g. for training both GANs and robust models. The existence of pure Nash equilibria requires strong conditions which are not typically met in practice. Mixed Nash equilibria exist in greater generality and may be found using mirror descent. Yet this approach does not scale to high dimensions. To address this limitation, we parametrize mixed strategies as mixtures of particles, whose positions and weights are updated using gradient descent-ascent. We study this dynamics as an interacting gradient flow over measure spaces endowed with the Wasserstein-Fisher-Rao metric. We establish global convergence to an approximate equilibrium for the related Langevin gradient-ascent dynamic. We prove a law of large numbers that relates particle dynamics to mean-field dynamics. Our method identifies mixed equilibria in high dimensions and is demonstrably effective for training mixtures of GANs.
A Simulation Model Demonstrating the Impact of Social Aspects on Social Internet of Things
In addition to seamless connectivity and smartness, the objects in the Internet of Things (IoT) are expected to have the social capabilities -- these objects are termed as ``social objects''. In this paper, an intuitive paradigm of social interactions between these objects are argued and modeled. The impact of social behavior on the interaction pattern of social objects is studied taking Peer-to-Peer (P2P) resource sharing as an example application. The model proposed in this paper studies the implications of competitive vs. cooperative social paradigm, while peers attempt to attain the shared resources / services. The simulation results divulge that the social capabilities of the peers impart a significant increase in the quality of interactions between social objects. Through an agent-based simulation study, it is proved that cooperative strategy is more efficient than competitive strategy. Moreover, cooperation with an underpinning on real-life networking structure and mobility does not negatively impact the efficiency of the system at all; rather it helps.
Optimizing Traffic Lights with Multi-agent Deep Reinforcement Learning and V2X communication
Hussain, Azhar, Wang, Tong, Jiahua, Cao
We consider a system to optimize duration of traffic signals using multi-agent deep reinforcement learning and Vehicle-to-Everything (V2X) communication. This system aims at analyzing independent and shared rewards for multi-agents to control duration of traffic lights. A learning agent traffic light gets information along its lanes within a circular V2X coverage. The duration cycles of traffic light are modeled as Markov decision Processes. We investigate four variations of reward functions. The first two are unshared-rewards: based on waiting number, and waiting time of vehicles between two cycles of traffic light. The third and fourth functions are: shared-rewards based on waiting cars, and waiting time for all agents. Each agent has a memory for optimization through target network and prioritized experience replay. We evaluate multi-agents through the Simulation of Urban MObility (SUMO) simulator. The results prove effectiveness of the proposed system to optimize traffic signals and reduce average waiting cars to 41.5 % as compared to the traditional periodic traffic control system.
Performance Analysis of Combine Harvester using Hybrid Model of Artificial Neural Networks Particle Swarm Optimization
Nadai, Laszlo, Imre, Felde, Ardabili, Sina, Gundoshmian, Tarahom Mesri, Gergo, Pinter, Mosavi, Amir
Novel applications of artificial intelligence for tuning the parameters of industrial machines for optimal performance are emerging at a fast pace. Tuning the combine harvesters and improving the machine performance can dramatically minimize the wastes during harvesting, and it is also beneficial to machine maintenance. Literature includes several soft computing, machine learning and optimization methods that had been used to model the function of harvesters of various crops. Due to the complexity of the problem, machine learning methods had been recently proposed to predict the optimal performance with promising results. In this paper, through proposing a novel hybrid machine learning model based on artificial neural networks integrated with particle swarm optimization (ANN-PSO), the performance analysis of a common combine harvester is presented. The hybridization of machine learning methods with soft computing techniques has recently shown promising results to improve the performance of the combine harvesters. This research aims at improving the results further by providing more stable models with higher accuracy.
Finite-Time Last-Iterate Convergence for Multi-Agent Learning in Games
Lin, Tianyi, Zhou, Zhengyuan, Mertikopoulos, Panayotis, Jordan, Michael I.
We consider multi-agent learning via online gradient descent (OGD) in a class of games called $\lambda$-cocoercive games, a broad class of games that admits many Nash equilibria and that properly includes strongly monotone games. We characterize the finite-time last-iterate convergence rate for joint OGD learning on $\lambda$-cocoercive games; further, building on this result, we develop a fully adaptive OGD learning algorithm that does not require any knowledge of the problem parameter (e.g., the cocoercive constant $\lambda$) and show, via a novel double-stopping-time technique, that this adaptive algorithm achieves the same finite-time last-iterate convergence rate as its non-adaptive counterpart. Subsequently, we extend OGD learning to the noisy gradient feedback case and establish last-iterate convergence results---first qualitative almost sure convergence, then quantitative finite-time convergence rates---all under non-decreasing step-sizes. These results fill in several gaps in the existing multi-agent online learning literature, where three aspects---finite-time convergence rates, non-decreasing step-sizes, and fully adaptive algorithms---have not been previously explored.