We consider a game-theoretical multi-agent learning problem where the feedback information can be lost during the learning process and rewards are given by a broad class of games known as variationally stable games. We propose a simple variant of the classical online gradient descent algorithm, called reweighted online gradient descent (ROGD) and show that in variationally stable games, if each agent adopts ROGD, then almost sure convergence to the set of Nash equilibria is guaranteed, even when the feedback loss is asynchronous and arbitrarily corrrelated among agents. We then extend the framework to deal with unknown feedback loss probabilities by using an estimator (constructed from past data) in its replacement. Finally, we further extend the framework to accomodate both asynchronous loss and stochastic rewards and establish that multi-agent ROGD learning still converges to the set of Nash equilibria in such settings. Together, these results contribute to the broad lanscape of multi-agent online learning by significantly relaxing the feedback information that is required to achieve desirable outcomes.

Decentralized (PO)MDPs provide an expressive framework for sequential decision making in a multiagent system. Given their computational complexity, recent research has focused on tractable yet practical subclasses of Dec-POMDPs. We address such a subclass called CDec-POMDP where the collective behavior of a population of agents affects the joint-reward and environment dynamics. Our main contribution is an actor-critic (AC) reinforcement learning method for optimizing CDec-POMDP policies. Vanilla AC has slow convergence for larger problems.

There has been a resurgence of interest in multiagent reinforcement learning (MARL), due partly to the recent success of deep neural networks. The simplest form of MARL is independent reinforcement learning (InRL), where each agent treats all of its experience as part of its (non stationary) environment. In this paper, we first observe that policies learned using InRL can overfit to the other agents' policies during training, failing to sufficiently generalize during execution. We introduce a new metric, joint-policy correlation, to quantify this effect. We describe a meta-algorithm for general MARL, based on approximate best responses to mixtures of policies generated using deep reinforcement learning, and empirical game theoretic analysis to compute meta-strategies for policy selection.

We describe a novel approach for computing collision-free \emph{global} trajectories for $p$ agents with specified initial and final configurations, based on an improved version of the alternating direction method of multipliers (ADMM) algorithm. Compared with existing methods, our approach is naturally parallelizable and allows for incorporating different cost functionals with only minor adjustments. We apply our method to classical challenging instances and observe that its computational requirements scale well with $p$ for several cost functionals. We also show that a specialization of our algorithm can be used for {\em local} motion planning by solving the problem of joint optimization in velocity space. Papers published at the Neural Information Processing Systems Conference.

Humanity faces numerous problems of common-pool resource appropriation. This class of multi-agent social dilemma includes the problems of ensuring sustainable use of fresh water, common fisheries, grazing pastures, and irrigation systems. Abstract models of common-pool resource appropriation based on non-cooperative game theory predict that self-interested agents will generally fail to find socially positive equilibria---a phenomenon called the tragedy of the commons. However, in reality, human societies are sometimes able to discover and implement stable cooperative solutions. Decades of behavioral game theory research have sought to uncover aspects of human behavior that make this possible. Most of that work was based on laboratory experiments where participants only make a single choice: how much to appropriate.

Optimization of parameterized policies for reinforcement learning (RL) is an important and challenging problem in artificial intelligence. Among the most common approaches are algorithms based on gradient ascent of a score function representing discounted return. In this paper, we examine the role of these policy gradient and actor-critic algorithms in partially-observable multiagent environments. We show several candidate policy update rules and relate them to a foundation of regret minimization and multiagent learning techniques for the one-shot and tabular cases, leading to previously unknown convergence guarantees. We apply our method to model-free multiagent reinforcement learning in adversarial sequential decision problems (zero-sum imperfect information games), using RL-style function approximation.

Learning cooperative policies for multi-agent systems is often challenged by partial observability and a lack of coordination. In some settings, the structure of a problem allows a distributed solution with limited communication. Here, we consider a scenario where no communication is available, and instead we learn local policies for all agents that collectively mimic the solution to a centralized multi-agent static optimization problem. Our main contribution is an information theoretic framework based on rate distortion theory which facilitates analysis of how well the resulting fully decentralized policies are able to reconstruct the optimal solution. Moreover, this framework provides a natural extension that addresses which nodes an agent should communicate with to improve the performance of its individual policy.

Multi-agent predictive modeling is an essential step for understanding physical, social and team-play systems. Recently, Interaction Networks (INs) were proposed for the task of modeling multi-agent physical systems. One of the drawbacks of INs is scaling with the number of interactions in the system (typically quadratic or higher order in the number of agents). In this paper we introduce VAIN, a novel attentional architecture for multi-agent predictive modeling that scales linearly with the number of agents. We show that VAIN is effective for multi-agent predictive modeling.

Many tasks in AI require the collaboration of multiple agents. Typically, the communication protocol between agents is manually specified and not altered during training. In this paper we explore a simple neural model, called CommNet, that uses continuous communication for fully cooperative tasks. The model consists of multiple agents and the communication between them is learned alongside their policy. We apply this model to a diverse set of tasks, demonstrating the ability of the agents to learn to communicate amongst themselves, yielding improved performance over non-communicative agents and baselines.

We define a fairness solution criterion for multi-agent decision-making problems, where agents have local interests. This new criterion aims to maximize the worst performance of agents with consideration on the overall performance. We develop a simple linear programming approach and a more scalable game-theoretic approach for computing an optimal fairness policy. This game-theoretic approach formulates this fairness optimization as a two-player, zero-sum game and employs an iterative algorithm for finding a Nash equilibrium, corresponding to an optimal fairness policy. Our experiments on resource allocation problems show that this fairness criterion provides a more favorable solution than the utilitarian criterion, and that our game-theoretic approach is significantly faster than linear programming.