We consider a fully cooperative multi-agent system where agents cooperate to maximize a system's utility in a partial-observable environment. We propose that multi-agent systems must have the ability to (1) communicate and understand the inter-plays between agents and (2) correctly distribute rewards based on an individual agent's contribution. In contrast, most work in this setting considers only one of the above abilities. In this study, we develop an architecture that allows for communication among agents and tailors the system's reward for each individual agent. Our architecture represents agent communication through graph convolution and applies an existing credit assignment structure, counterfactual multi-agent policy gradient (COMA), to assist agents to learn communication by back-propagation. The flexibility of the graph structure enables our method to be applicable to a variety of multi-agent systems, e.g. dynamic systems that consist of varying numbers of agents and static systems with a fixed number of agents. We evaluate our method on a range of tasks, demonstrating the advantage of marrying communication with credit assignment. In the experiments, our proposed method yields better performance than the state-of-art methods, including COMA. Moreover, we show that the communication strategies offers us insights and interpretability of the system's cooperative policies.

Should I stay or should I go now? If I go there will be trouble And if I stay it will be double So ya gotta let me know Should I stay or should I go? -- The Clash Don't we all feel like that sometimes? Unhappy about your current job but the new job pays lower. Unsure whether to invest in the stocks market or in wealth management platform? Even Spider-Man had to make to a choice between saving Mary Jane or saving a cable car of people.

You can be addicted to your Artificial Intelligence (AI) software as much as your favored fortune. And you'll feel rewarding being addicted to your AI. Because they replace the extravagance, inefficiency, and endangerment associated with business operations. Tech Oracle if you ask? Employing AI will lessen human error, mundane tasks, in turn, more time for innovation. This means you print money while remaining effortless.

Researchers have long been interested in the role that norms can play in governing agent actions in multi-agent systems. Much work has been done on formalising normative concepts from human society and adapting them for the government of open software systems, and on the simulation of normative processes in human and artificial societies. However, there has been comparatively little work on applying normative MAS mechanisms to understanding the norms in human society. This work investigates this issue in the context of international politics. Using the GDELT dataset, containing machine-encoded records of international events extracted from news reports, we extracted bilateral sequences of inter-country events and applied a Bayesian norm mining mechanism to identify norms that best explained the observed behaviour. A statistical evaluation showed that the normative model fitted the data significantly better than a probabilistic discrete event model.

This paper considers a multi-armed bandit (MAB) problem in which multiple mobile agents receive rewards by sampling from a collection of spatially dispersed stochastic processes, called bandits. The goal is to formulate a decentralized policy for each agent, in order to maximize the total cumulative reward over all agents, subject to option availability and inter-agent communication constraints. The problem formulation is motivated by applications in which a team of autonomous mobile robots cooperates to accomplish an exploration and exploitation task in an uncertain environment. Bandit locations are represented by vertices of the spatial graph. At any time, an agent's option consist of sampling the bandit at its current location, or traveling along an edge of the spatial graph to a new bandit location. Communication constraints are described by a directed, non-stationary, stochastic communication graph. At any time, agents may receive data only from their communication graph in-neighbors. For the case of a single agent on a fully connected spatial graph, it is known that the expected regret for any optimal policy is necessarily bounded below by a function that grows as the logarithm of time. A class of policies called upper confidence bound (UCB) algorithms asymptotically achieve logarithmic regret for the classical MAB problem. In this paper, we propose a UCB-based decentralized motion and option selection policy and a non-stationary stochastic communication protocol that guarantee logarithmic regret. To our knowledge, this is the first such decentralized policy for non-fully connected spatial graphs with communication constraints. When the spatial graph is fully connected and the communication graph is stationary, our decentralized algorithm matches or exceeds the best reported prior results from the literature.

Bidding and acceptance strategies have a substantial impact on the outcome of negotiations in scenarios with linear additive and nonlinear utility functions. Over the years, it has become clear that there is no single best strategy for all negotiation settings, yet many fixed strategies are still being developed. We envision a shift in the strategy design question from: What is a good strategy?, towards: What could be a good strategy? For this purpose, we developed a method leveraging automated algorithm configuration to find the best strategies for a specific set of negotiation settings. By empowering automated negotiating agents using automated algorithm configuration, we obtain a flexible negotiation agent that can be configured automatically for a rich space of opponents and negotiation scenarios. To critically assess our approach, the agent was tested in an ANAC-like bilateral automated negotiation tournament setting against past competitors. We show that our automatically configured agent outperforms all other agents, with a 5.1% increase in negotiation payoff compared to the next-best agent. We note that without our agent in the tournament, the top-ranked agent wins by a margin of only 0.01%.

Evolution gave rise to human and animal intelligence here on Earth. We argue that the path to developing artificial human-like-intelligence will pass through mimicking the evolutionary process in a nature-like simulation. In Nature, there are two processes driving the development of the brain: evolution and learning. Evolution acts slowly, across generations, and amongst other things, it defines what agents learn by changing their internal reward function. Learning acts fast, across one's lifetime, and it quickly updates agents' policy to maximise pleasure and minimise pain. The reward function is slowly aligned with the fitness function by evolution, however, as agents evolve the environment and its fitness function also change, increasing the misalignment between reward and fitness. It is extremely computationally expensive to replicate these two processes in simulation. This work proposes Evolution via Evolutionary Reward (EvER) that allows learning to single-handedly drive the search for policies with increasingly evolutionary fitness by ensuring the alignment of the reward function with the fitness function. In this search, EvER makes use of the whole state-action trajectories that agents go through their lifetime. In contrast, current evolutionary algorithms discard this information and consequently limit their potential efficiency at tackling sequential decision problems. We test our algorithm in two simple bio-inspired environments and show its superiority at generating more capable agents at surviving and reproducing their genes when compared with a state-of-the-art evolutionary algorithm.

Automated negotiation can be an efficient method for resolving conflict and redistributing resources in a coalition setting. Automated negotiation has already seen increased usage in fields such as e-commerce and power distribution in smart girds, and recent advancements in opponent modelling have proven to deliver better outcomes. However, significant barriers to more widespread adoption remain, such as lack of predictable outcome over time and user trust. Additionally, there have been many recent advancements in the field of reasoning about uncertainty, which could help alleviate both those problems. As there is no recent survey on these two fields, and specifically not on their possible intersection we aim to provide such a survey here.

Monte Carlo Tree Search (MCTS) has proven to be capable of solving challenging tasks in domains such as Go, chess and Atari. Previous research has developed parallel versions of MCTS, exploiting today's multiprocessing architectures. These studies focused on versions of MCTS for the discrete case. Our work builds upon existing parallelization strategies and extends them to continuous domains. In particular, leaf parallelization and root parallelization are studied and two final selection strategies that are required to handle continuous states in root parallelization are proposed. The evaluation of the resulting parallelized continuous MCTS is conducted using a challenging cooperative multi-agent system trajectory planning task in the domain of automated vehicles.

Automated negotiation has been used in a variety of distributed settings, such as privacy in the Internet of Things (IoT) devices and power distribution in Smart Grids. The most common protocol under which these agents negotiate is the Alternating Offers Protocol (AOP). Under this protocol, agents cannot express any additional information to each other besides a counter offer. This can lead to unnecessarily long negotiations when, for example, negotiations are impossible, risking to waste bandwidth that is a precious resource at the edge of the network. While alternative protocols exist which alleviate this problem, these solutions are too complex for low power devices, such as IoT sensors operating at the edge of the network. To improve this bottleneck, we introduce an extension to AOP called Alternating Constrained Offers Protocol (ACOP), in which agents can also express constraints to each other. This allows agents to both search the possibility space more efficiently and recognise impossible situations sooner. We empirically show that agents using ACOP can significantly reduce the number of messages a negotiation takes, independently of the strategy agents choose. In particular, we show our method significantly reduces the number of messages when an agreement is not possible. Furthermore, when an agreement is possible it reaches this agreement sooner with no negative effect on the utility.