The multi-agent pickup and delivery (MAPD) problem, in which multiple agents iteratively carry materials without collisions, has received significant attention. However, many conventional MAPD algorithms assume a specifically designed grid-like environment, such as an automated warehouse. Therefore, they have many pickup and delivery locations where agents can stay for a lengthy period, as well as plentiful detours to avoid collisions owing to the freedom of movement in a grid. By contrast, because a maze-like environment such as a search-and-rescue or construction site has fewer pickup/delivery locations and their numbers may be unbalanced, many agents concentrate on such locations resulting in inefficient operations, often becoming stuck or deadlocked. Thus, to improve the transportation efficiency even in a maze-like restricted environment, we propose a deadlock avoidance method, called standby-based deadlock avoidance (SBDA). SBDA uses standby nodes determined in real-time using the articulation-point-finding algorithm, and the agent is guaranteed to stay there for a finite amount of time. We demonstrated that our proposed method outperforms a conventional approach. We also analyzed how the parameters used for selecting standby nodes affect the performance.

Maria Gini is Professor of Computer Science and Engineering at the University of Minnesota, and has been at the forefront of the field of robotics and multi-agent systems for many years, consistently bringing AI into robotics. Her work has spanned both the design of novel algorithms and practical applications. These applications have been utilized in settings as varied as warehouses and hospitals, with uses such as surveillance, exploration, and search and rescue. Maria has been an active member and leader of the agents community since its inception. She has been a consistent mentor and role model, deeply committed to bringing diversity to the fields of AI, robotics, and computing.

Epistemic voting interprets votes as noisy signals about a ground truth. We consider contexts where the truth consists of a set of objective winners, knowing a lower and upper bound on its cardinality. A prototypical problem for this setting is the aggregation of multi-label annotations with prior knowledge on the size of the ground truth. We posit noise models, for which we define rules that output an optimal set of winners. We report on experiments on multi-label annotations (which we collected).

In a cooperative multiagent system, a collection of agents executes a joint policy in order to achieve some common objective. The successful deployment of such systems hinges on the availability of reliable inter-agent communication. However, many sources of potential disruption to communication exist in practice, such as radio interference, hardware failure, and adversarial attacks. In this work, we develop joint policies for cooperative multiagent systems that are robust to potential losses in communication. More specifically, we develop joint policies for cooperative Markov games with reach-avoid objectives. First, we propose an algorithm for the decentralized execution of joint policies during periods of communication loss. Next, we use the total correlation of the state-action process induced by a joint policy as a measure of the intrinsic dependencies between the agents. We then use this measure to lower-bound the performance of a joint policy when communication is lost. Finally, we present an algorithm that maximizes a proxy to this lower bound in order to synthesize minimum-dependency joint policies that are robust to communication loss. Numerical experiments show that the proposed minimum-dependency policies require minimal coordination between the agents while incurring little to no loss in performance; the total correlation value of the synthesized policy is one fifth of the total correlation value of the baseline policy which does not take potential communication losses into account. As a result, the performance of the minimum-dependency policies remains consistently high regardless of whether or not communication is available. By contrast, the performance of the baseline policy decreases by twenty percent when communication is lost.

Gridworlds have been long-utilised in AI research, particularly in reinforcement learning, as they provide simple yet scalable models for many real-world applications such as robot navigation, emergent behaviour, and operations research. We initiate a study of gridworlds using the mathematical framework of reconfigurable systems and state complexes due to Abrams, Ghrist & Peterson. State complexes represent all possible configurations of a system as a single geometric space, thus making them conducive to study using geometric, topological, or combinatorial methods. The main contribution of this work is a modification to the original Abrams, Ghrist & Peterson setup which we believe is more naturally-suited to the context of gridworlds. With this modification, the state complexes may exhibit geometric defects (failure of Gromov's Link Condition), however, we argue that these failures can indicate undesirable or dangerous states in the gridworld. Our results provide a novel method for seeking guaranteed safety limitations in discrete task environments with single or multiple agents, and offer potentially useful geometric and topological information for incorporation in or analysis of machine learning systems.

This work studies a dynamic mechanism design problem in which a principal delegates decision makings to a group of privately-informed agents without the monetary transfer or burning. We consider that the principal privately possesses complete knowledge about the state transitions and study how she can use her private observation to support the incentive compatibility of the delegation via informational burning, a process we refer to as the looking-forward persuasion. The delegation mechanism is formulated in which the agents form belief hierarchies due to the persuasion and play a dynamic Bayesian game. We propose a novel randomized mechanism, known as Bayesian promised delegation (BPD), in which the periodic incentive compatibility is guaranteed by persuasions and promises of future delegations. We show that the BPD can achieve the same optimal social welfare as the original mechanism in stationary Markov perfect Bayesian equilibria. A revelation-principle-like design regime is established to show that the persuasion with belief hierarchies can be fully characterized by correlating the randomization of the agents' local BPD mechanisms with the persuasion as a direct recommendation of the future promises.

CCTV-based surveillance using unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) is considered a key technology for security in smart city environments. This paper creates a case where the UAVs with CCTV-cameras fly over the city area for flexible and reliable surveillance services. UAVs should be deployed to cover a large area while minimize overlapping and shadow areas for a reliable surveillance system. However, the operation of UAVs is subject to high uncertainty, necessitating autonomous recovery systems. This work develops a multi-agent deep reinforcement learning-based management scheme for reliable industry surveillance in smart city applications. The core idea this paper employs is autonomously replenishing the UAV's deficient network requirements with communications. Via intensive simulations, our proposed algorithm outperforms the state-of-the-art algorithms in terms of surveillance coverage, user support capability, and computational costs.

In three laboratory experiments, we examine the impact of personally relevant failures (PeRFs) on perceptions of a collaborative robot. PeR is determined by how much a specific issue applies to a particular person, i.e., it affects one's own goals and values. We hypothesized that PeRFs would reduce trust in the robot and the robot's Likeability and Willingness to Use (LWtU) more than failures that are not personal to participants. To achieve PeR in human-robot interaction, we utilized three different manipulation mechanisms: A) damage to property, B) financial loss, and C) first-person versus third-person failure scenarios. In total, 132 participants engaged with a robot in person during a collaborative task of laundry sorting. All three experiments took place in the same experimental environment, carefully designed to simulate a realistic laundry sorting scenario. Results indicate that the impact of PeRFs on perceptions of the robot varied across the studies. In experiments A and B, the encounters with PeRFs reduced trust significantly relative to a no failure session. But not entirely for LWtU. In experiment C, the PeR manipulation had no impact. The work highlights challenges and adjustments needed for studying robotic failures in laboratory settings. We show that PeR manipulations affect how users perceive a failing robot. The results bring about new questions regarding failure types and their perceived severity on users' perception of the robot. Putting PeR aside, we observed differences in the way users perceive interaction failures compared (experiment C) to how they perceive technical ones (A and B).

Opponent modeling is the ability to use prior knowledge and observations in order to predict the behavior of an opponent. This survey presents a comprehensive overview of existing opponent modeling techniques for adversarial domains, many of which must address stochastic, continuous, or concurrent actions, and sparse, partially observable payoff structures. We discuss all the components of opponent modeling systems, including feature extraction, learning algorithms, and strategy abstractions. These discussions lead us to propose a new form of analysis for describing and predicting the evolution of game states over time. We then introduce a new framework that facilitates method comparison, analyze a representative selection of techniques using the proposed framework, and highlight common trends among recently proposed methods. Finally, we list several open problems and discuss future research directions inspired by AI research on opponent modeling and related research in other disciplines.

Recent evidence suggests that SARS-CoV-2, which is the virus causing a global pandemic in 2020, is predominantly transmitted via airborne aerosols in indoor environments. This calls for novel strategies when assessing and controlling a building's indoor air quality (IAQ). IAQ can generally be controlled by ventilation and/or policies to regulate human-building-interaction. However, in a building, occupants use rooms in different ways, and it may not be obvious which measure or combination of measures leads to a cost- and energy-effective solution ensuring good IAQ across the entire building. Therefore, in this article, we introduce a novel agent-based simulator, ArchABM, designed to assist in creating new or adapt existing buildings by estimating adequate room sizes, ventilation parameters and testing the effect of policies while taking into account IAQ as a result of complex human-building interaction patterns. A recently published aerosol model was adapted to calculate time-dependent carbon dioxide ($CO_2$) and virus quanta concentrations in each room and inhaled $CO_2$ and virus quanta for each occupant over a day as a measure of physiological response. ArchABM is flexible regarding the aerosol model and the building layout due to its modular architecture, which allows implementing further models, any number and size of rooms, agents, and actions reflecting human-building interaction patterns. We present a use case based on a real floor plan and working schedules adopted in our research center. This study demonstrates how advanced simulation tools can contribute to improving IAQ across a building, thereby ensuring a healthy indoor environment.