An important goal in artificial intelligence is to create agents that can both interact naturally with humans and learn from their feedback. Here we demonstrate how to use reinforcement learning from human feedback (RLHF) to improve upon simulated, embodied agents trained to a base level of competency with imitation learning. First, we collected data of humans interacting with agents in a simulated 3D world. We then asked annotators to record moments where they believed that agents either progressed toward or regressed from their human-instructed goal. Using this annotation data we leveraged a novel method - which we call "Inter-temporal Bradley-Terry" (IBT) modelling - to build a reward model that captures human judgments. Agents trained to optimise rewards delivered from IBT reward models improved with respect to all of our metrics, including subsequent human judgment during live interactions with agents. Altogether our results demonstrate how one can successfully leverage human judgments to improve agent behaviour, allowing us to use reinforcement learning in complex, embodied domains without programmatic reward functions. Videos of agent behaviour may be found at https://youtu.be/v_Z9F2_eKk4.

It is expected that autonomous vehicles(AVs) and heterogeneous human-driven vehicles(HVs) will coexist on the same road. The safety and reliability of AVs will depend on their social awareness and their ability to engage in complex social interactions in a socially accepted manner. However, AVs are still inefficient in terms of cooperating with HVs and struggle to understand and adapt to human behavior, which is particularly challenging in mixed autonomy. In a road shared by AVs and HVs, the social preferences or individual traits of HVs are unknown to the AVs and different from AVs, which are expected to follow a policy, HVs are particularly difficult to forecast since they do not necessarily follow a stationary policy. To address these challenges, we frame the mixed-autonomy problem as a multi-agent reinforcement learning (MARL) problem and propose an approach that allows AVs to learn the decision-making of HVs implicitly from experience, account for all vehicles' interests, and safely adapt to other traffic situations. In contrast with existing works, we quantify AVs' social preferences and propose a distributed reward structure that introduces altruism into their decision-making process, allowing the altruistic AVs to learn to establish coalitions and influence the behavior of HVs.

The energy transition potentially poses an existential risk for major international oil companies (IOCs) if they fail to adapt to low-carbon business models. Projections of energy futures, however, are met with diverging assumptions on its scale and pace, causing disagreement among IOC decision-makers and their stakeholders over what the business model of an incumbent fossil fuel company should be. In this work, we used deep multi-agent reinforcement learning to solve an energy systems wargame wherein players simulate IOC decision-making, including hydrocarbon and low-carbon investments decisions, dividend policies, and capital structure measures, through an uncertain energy transition to explore critical and non-linear governance questions, from leveraged transitions to reserve replacements. Adversarial play facilitated by state-of-the-art algorithms revealed decision-making strategies robust to energy transition uncertainty and against multiple IOCs. In all games, robust strategies emerged in the form of low-carbon business models as a result of early transition-oriented movement. IOCs adopting such strategies outperformed business-as-usual and delayed transition strategies regardless of hydrocarbon demand projections. In addition to maximizing value, these strategies benefit greater society by contributing substantial amounts of capital necessary to accelerate the global low-carbon energy transition. Our findings point towards the need for lenders and investors to effectively mobilize transition-oriented finance and engage with IOCs to ensure responsible reallocation of capital towards low-carbon business models that would enable the emergence of fossil fuel incumbents as future low-carbon leaders.

In this paper, we study the problem of distributed estimation with an emphasis on communication-efficiency. The proposed algorithm is based on a windowed maximum a posteriori (MAP) estimation problem, wherein each agent in the network locally computes a Kalman-like filter estimate that approximates the centralized MAP solution. Information sharing among agents is restricted to their neighbors only, with guarantees on overall estimate consistency provided via logarithmic opinion pooling. The problem is efficiently distributed using the alternating direction method of multipliers (ADMM), whose overall communication usage is further reduced by a value of information (VoI) censoring mechanism, wherein agents only transmit their primal-dual iterates when deemed valuable to do so. The proposed censoring mechanism is mission-aware, enabling a globally efficient use of communication resources while guaranteeing possibly different local estimation requirements. To illustrate the validity of the approach we perform simulations in a target tracking scenario.

The COVID-19 pandemic created enormous public health and socioeconomic challenges. The health effects of vaccination and non-pharmaceutical interventions (NPIs) were often contrasted with significant social and economic costs. We describe a general framework aimed to derive adaptive cost-effective interventions, adequate for both recent and emerging pandemic threats. We also quantify the net health benefits and propose a reinforcement learning approach to optimise adaptive NPIs. The approach utilises an agent-based model simulating pandemic responses in Australia, and accounts for a heterogeneous population with variable levels of compliance fluctuating over time and across individuals. Our analysis shows that a significant net health benefit may be attained by adaptive NPIs formed by partial social distancing measures, coupled with moderate levels of the society's willingness to pay for health gains (health losses averted). We demonstrate that a socially acceptable balance between health effects and incurred economic costs is achievable over a long term, despite possible early setbacks.

Over the past decade, there has been a surge of interest in the transport community in the application of agent-based simulation models to evaluate flexible transit solutions characterized by different degrees of short-term flexibility in routing and scheduling. A central modeling decision in the development of an agent-based simulation model for the evaluation of flexible transit is how one chooses to represent the mode- and route-choices of travelers. The real-time adaptive behavior of travelers is intuitively important to model in the presence of a flexible transit service, where the routing and scheduling of vehicles is highly dependent on supply-demand dynamics at a closer to real-time temporal resolution. We propose a utility-based transit route-choice model with representation of within-day adaptive travel behavior and between-day learning where station-based fixed-transit, flexible-transit, and active-mode alternatives may be dynamically combined in a single path. To enable experimentation, this route-choice model is implemented within an agent-based dynamic public transit simulation framework. Model properties are first explored in a choice between fixed- and flexible-transit modes for a toy network. The framework is then applied to illustrate level-of-service trade-offs and analyze traveler mode choices within a mixed fixed- and flexible transit system in a case study based on a real-life branched transit service in Stockholm, Sweden.

In this paper, we consider a large-scale instance of the classical Pickup-and-Delivery Vehicle Routing Problem (PDVRP) that must be solved by a network of mobile cooperating robots. Robots must self-coordinate and self-allocate a set of pickup/delivery tasks while minimizing a given cost figure. This results in a large, challenging Mixed-Integer Linear Problem that must be cooperatively solved % without a central coordinator. We propose a distributed algorithm based on a primal decomposition approach that provides a feasible solution to the problem in finite time. An interesting feature of the proposed scheme is that each robot computes only its own block of solution, thereby preserving privacy of sensible information. The algorithm also exhibits attractive scalability properties that guarantee solvability of the problem even in large networks. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first attempt to provide a scalable distributed solution to the problem. The algorithm is first tested through Gazebo simulations on a ROS~2 platform, highlighting the effectiveness of the proposed solution. Finally, experiments on a real testbed with a team of ground and aerial robots are provided.

AI agents designed to collaborate with people benefit from models that enable them to anticipate human behavior. However, realistic models tend to require vast amounts of human data, which is often hard to collect. A good prior or initialization could make for more data-efficient training, but what makes for a good prior on human behavior? Our work leverages a very simple assumption: people generally act closer to optimal than to random chance. We show that using optimal behavior as a prior for human models makes these models vastly more data-efficient and able to generalize to new environments. Our intuition is that such a prior enables the training to focus one's precious real-world data on capturing the subtle nuances of human suboptimality, instead of on the basics of how to do the task in the first place. We also show that using these improved human models often leads to better human-AI collaboration performance compared to using models based on real human data alone.

Envy-freeness is a widely studied notion in resource allocation, capturing some aspects of fairness. The notion of envy being inherently subjective though, it might be the case that an agent envies another agent, but that from the other agents' point of view, she has no reason to do so. The difficulty here is to define the notion of objectivity, since no ground-truth can properly serve as a basis of this definition. A natural approach is to consider the judgement of the other agents as a proxy for objectivity. Building on previous work by Parijs (who introduced "unanimous envy") we propose the notion of approval envy: an agent ai experiences approval envy towards aj if she is envious of aj, and sufficiently many agents agree that this should be the case, from their own perspectives. Another thoroughly studied notion in resource allocation is proportionality. The same variant can be studied, opening natural questions regarding the links between these two notions. We exhibit several properties of these notions. Computing the minimal threshold guaranteeing approval envy and approval non-proportionality clearly inherits well-known intractable results from envy-freeness and proportionality, but (i) we identify some tractable cases such as house allocation; and (ii) we provide a general method based on a mixed integer programming encoding of the problem, which proves to be efficient in practice. This allows us in particular to show experimentally that existence of such allocations, with a rather small threshold, is very often observed.

Institutions and investors are constantly faced with the challenge of appropriately distributing endowments. No budget is limitless and optimising overall spending without sacrificing positive outcomes has been approached and resolved using several heuristics. To date, prior works have failed to consider how to encourage fairness in a population where social diversity is ubiquitous, and in which investors can only partially observe the population. Herein, by incorporating social diversity in the Ultimatum game through heterogeneous graphs, we investigate the effects of several interference mechanisms which assume incomplete information and flexible standards of fairness. We quantify the role of diversity and show how it reduces the need for information gathering, allowing us to relax a strict, costly interference process. Furthermore, we find that the influence of certain individuals, expressed by different network centrality measures, can be exploited to further reduce spending if minimal fairness requirements are lowered. Our results indicate that diversity changes and opens up novel mechanisms available to institutions wishing to promote fairness. Overall, our analysis provides novel insights to guide institutional policies in socially diverse complex systems.