Distributed online optimization and game have been increasingly researched in the last decade, mostly motivated by its wide applications in sensor networks, robotics (e.g., distributed target tracking and formation control), smart grids, deep learning, and so forth. In these problems, there is a network of agents who may be cooperative (i.e., distributed online optimization) or noncooperative (i.e., online game) through local information exchanges. And the local cost function of each agent is often time-varying in dynamic and even adversarial environments. At each time, a decision must be made by each agent based on historical information at hand without knowing future information on cost functions. For these problems, a comprehensive survey is still lacking. This paper aims to provide a thorough overview of distributed online optimization and game from the perspective of problem settings, communication, computation, algorithms, and performances. In addition, some potential future directions are also discussed.

This paper proposes a novel methodology for addressing the simulation-reality gap for multi-robot swarm systems. Rather than immediately try to shrink or `bridge the gap' anytime a real-world experiment failed that worked in simulation, we characterize conditions under which this is actually necessary. When these conditions are not satisfied, we show how very simple simulators can still be used to both (i) design new multi-robot systems, and (ii) guide real-world swarming experiments towards certain emergent behaviors when the gap is very large. The key ideas are an iterative simulator-in-the-design-loop in which real-world experiments, simulator modifications, and simulated experiments are intimately coupled in a way that minds the gap without needing to shrink it, as well as the use of minimally viable phase diagrams to guide real world experiments. We demonstrate the usefulness of our methods on deploying a real multi-robot swarm system to successfully exhibit an emergent milling behavior.

In the assignment problem, the goal is to assign indivisible items to agents who have ordinal preferences, efficiently and fairly, in a strategyproof manner. In practice, first-choice maximality, i.e., assigning a maximal number of agents their top items, is often identified as an important efficiency criterion and measure of agents' satisfaction. In this paper, we propose a natural and intuitive efficiency property, favoring-eagerness-for-remaining-items (FERI), which requires that each item is allocated to an agent who ranks it highest among remaining items, thereby implying first-choice maximality. Using FERI as a heuristic, we design mechanisms that satisfy ex-post or ex-ante variants of FERI together with combinations of other desirable properties of efficiency (Pareto-efficiency), fairness (strong equal treatment of equals and sd-weak-envy-freeness), and strategyproofness (sd-weak-strategyproofness). We also explore the limits of FERI mechanisms in providing stronger efficiency, fairness, or strategyproofness guarantees through impossibility results.

Privacy-aware multiagent systems must protect agents' sensitive data while simultaneously ensuring that agents accomplish their shared objectives. Towards this goal, we propose a framework to privatize inter-agent communications in cooperative multiagent decision-making problems. We study sequential decision-making problems formulated as cooperative Markov games with reach-avoid objectives. We apply a differential privacy mechanism to privatize agents' communicated symbolic state trajectories, and then we analyze tradeoffs between the strength of privacy and the team's performance. For a given level of privacy, this tradeoff is shown to depend critically upon the total correlation among agents' state-action processes. We synthesize policies that are robust to privacy by reducing the value of the total correlation. Numerical experiments demonstrate that the team's performance under these policies decreases by only 3 percent when comparing private versus non-private implementations of communication. By contrast, the team's performance decreases by roughly 86 percent when using baseline policies that ignore total correlation and only optimize team performance.

In this paper, we investigate Nash-regret minimization in congestion games, a class of games with benign theoretical structure and broad real-world applications. We first propose a centralized algorithm based on the optimism in the face of uncertainty principle for congestion games with (semi-)bandit feedback, and obtain finite-sample guarantees. Then we propose a decentralized algorithm via a novel combination of the Frank-Wolfe method and G-optimal design. By exploiting the structure of the congestion game, we show the sample complexity of both algorithms depends only polynomially on the number of players and the number of facilities, but not the size of the action set, which can be exponentially large in terms of the number of facilities. We further define a new problem class, Markov congestion games, which allows us to model the non-stationarity in congestion games. We propose a centralized algorithm for Markov congestion games, whose sample complexity again has only polynomial dependence on all relevant problem parameters, but not the size of the action set.

Recent work in iterative voting has defined the additive dynamic price of anarchy (ADPoA) as the difference in social welfare between the truthful and worst-case equilibrium profiles resulting from repeated strategic manipulations. While iterative plurality has been shown to only return alternatives with at most one less initial votes than the truthful winner, it is less understood how agents' welfare changes in equilibrium. To this end, we differentiate agents' utility from their manipulation mechanism and determine iterative plurality's ADPoA in the worst- and average-cases. We first prove that the worst-case ADPoA is linear in the number of agents. To overcome this negative result, we study the average-case ADPoA and prove that equilibrium winners have a constant order welfare advantage over the truthful winner in expectation. Our positive results illustrate the prospect for social welfare to increase due to strategic manipulation.

Counterexample guided abstraction refinement (CEGAR) represents a powerful symbolic technique for various tasks such as model checking and reachability analysis. Recently, CEGAR combined with Boolean satisfiability (SAT) has been applied for multi-agent path finding (MAPF), a problem where the task is to navigate agents from their start positions to given individual goal positions so that the agents do not collide with each other. The recent CEGAR approach used the initial abstraction of the MAPF problem where collisions between agents were omitted and were eliminated in subsequent abstraction refinements. We propose in this work a novel CEGAR-style solver for MAPF based on SAT in which some abstractions are deliberately left non-refined. This adds the necessity to post-process the answers obtained from the underlying SAT solver as these answers slightly differ from the correct MAPF solutions. Non-refining however yields order-of-magnitude smaller SAT encodings than those of the previous approach and speeds up the overall solving process making the SAT-based solver for MAPF competitive again in relevant benchmarks.

Disclaimer: The paper presented here is part of discontinued issue of Game AI Pro 4 This work presents an implementation of a social architecture model for authoring Non-Player Character (NPC) in open world games inspired in academic research on agentbased modeling. Believable NPC authoring is burdensome in terms of rich dialogue and responsive behaviors.

Conflict-Based Search is one of the most popular methods for multi-agent path finding. Though it is complete and optimal, it does not scale well. Recent works have been proposed to accelerate it by introducing various heuristics. However, whether these heuristics can apply to non-grid-based problem settings while maintaining their effectiveness remains an open question. In this work, we find that the answer is prone to be no. To this end, we propose a learning-based component, i.e., the Graph Transformer, as a heuristic function to accelerate the planning. The proposed method is provably complete and bounded-suboptimal with any desired factor. We conduct extensive experiments on two environments with dense graphs. Results show that the proposed Graph Transformer can be trained in problem instances with relatively few agents and generalizes well to a larger number of agents, while achieving better performance than state-of-the-art methods.

Future generations of mobile networks are expected to contain more and more antennas with growing complexity and more parameters. Optimizing these parameters is necessary for ensuring the good performance of the network. The scale of mobile networks makes it challenging to optimize antenna parameters using manual intervention or hand-engineered strategies. Reinforcement learning is a promising technique to address this challenge but existing methods often use local optimizations to scale to large network deployments. We propose a new multi-agent reinforcement learning algorithm to optimize mobile network configurations globally. By using a value decomposition approach, our algorithm can be trained from a global reward function instead of relying on an ad-hoc decomposition of the network performance across the different cells. The algorithm uses a graph neural network architecture which generalizes to different network topologies and learns coordination behaviors. We empirically demonstrate the performance of the algorithm on an antenna tilt tuning problem and a joint tilt and power control problem in a simulated environment.