VoxML is a modeling language used to map natural language expressions into real-time visualizations using commonsense semantic knowledge of objects and events. Its utility has been demonstrated in embodied simulation environments and in agent-object interactions in situated multimodal human-agent collaboration and communication. It introduces the notion of object affordance (both Gibsonian and Telic) from HRI and robotics, as well as the concept of habitat (an object's context of use) for interactions between a rational agent and an object. This paper aims to specify VoxML as an annotation language in general abstract terms. It then shows how it works on annotating linguistic data that express visually perceptible human-object interactions. The annotation structures thus generated will be interpreted against the enriched minimal model created by VoxML as a modeling language while supporting the modeling purposes of VoxML linguistically.

In conventional distributed learning over a network, multiple agents collaboratively build a common machine learning model. However, due to the underlying non-i.i.d. data distribution among agents, the unified learning model becomes inefficient for each agent to process its locally accessible data. To address this problem, we propose a graph-attention-based personalized training algorithm (GATTA) for distributed deep learning. The GATTA enables each agent to train its local personalized model while exploiting its correlation with neighboring nodes and utilizing their useful information for aggregation. In particular, the personalized model in each agent is composed of a global part and a node-specific part. By treating each agent as one node in a graph and the node-specific parameters as its features, the benefits of the graph attention mechanism can be inherited. Namely, instead of aggregation based on averaging, it learns the specific weights for different neighboring nodes without requiring prior knowledge about the graph structure or the neighboring nodes' data distribution. Furthermore, relying on the weight-learning procedure, we develop a communication-efficient GATTA by skipping the transmission of information with small aggregation weights. Additionally, we theoretically analyze the convergence properties of GATTA for non-convex loss functions. Numerical results validate the excellent performances of the proposed algorithms in terms of convergence and communication cost.

We investigate both stationary and time-varying, nonmonotone generalized Nash equilibrium problems that exhibit symmetric interactions among the agents, which are known to be potential. As may happen in practical cases, however, we envision a scenario in which the formal expression of the underlying potential function is not available, and we design a semi-decentralized Nash equilibrium seeking algorithm. In the proposed two-layer scheme, a coordinator iteratively integrates the (possibly noisy and sporadic) agents' feedback to learn the pseudo-gradients of the agents, and then design personalized incentives for them. On their side, the agents receive those personalized incentives, compute a solution to an extended game, and then return feedback measurements to the coordinator. In the stationary setting, our algorithm returns a Nash equilibrium in case the coordinator is endowed with standard learning policies, while it returns a Nash equilibrium up to a constant, yet adjustable, error in the time-varying case. As a motivating application, we consider the ridehailing service provided by several companies with mobility as a service orchestration, necessary to both handle competition among firms and avoid traffic congestion, which is also adopted to run numerical experiments verifying our results.

Mechanistic simulators are an indispensable tool for epidemiology to explore the behavior of complex, dynamic infections under varying conditions and navigate uncertain environments. Agent-based models (ABMs) are an increasingly popular simulation paradigm that can represent the heterogeneity of contact interactions with granular detail and agency of individual behavior. However, conventional ABM frameworks are not differentiable and present challenges in scalability; due to which it is non-trivial to connect them to auxiliary data sources. In this paper, we introduce GradABM: a scalable, differentiable design for agent-based modeling that is amenable to gradient-based learning with automatic differentiation. GradABM can quickly simulate million-size populations in few seconds on commodity hardware, integrate with deep neural networks and ingest heterogeneous data sources. This provides an array of practical benefits for calibration, forecasting, and evaluating policy interventions. We demonstrate the efficacy of GradABM via extensive experiments with real COVID-19 and influenza datasets.

Most networks are not static objects, but instead they change over time. This observation has sparked rigorous research on temporal graphs within the last years. In temporal graphs, we have a fixed set of nodes and the connections between them are only available at certain time steps. This gives rise to a plethora of algorithmic problems on such graphs, most prominently the problem of finding temporal spanners, i.e., the computation of subgraphs that guarantee all pairs reachability via temporal paths. To the best of our knowledge, only centralized approaches for the solution of this problem are known. However, many real-world networks are not shaped by a central designer but instead they emerge and evolve by the interaction of many strategic agents. This observation is the driving force of the recent intensive research on game-theoretic network formation models. In this work we bring together these two recent research directions: temporal graphs and game-theoretic network formation. As a first step into this new realm, we focus on a simplified setting where a complete temporal host graph is given and the agents, corresponding to its nodes, selfishly create incident edges to ensure that they can reach all other nodes via temporal paths in the created network. This yields temporal spanners as equilibria of our game. We prove results on the convergence to and the existence of equilibrium networks, on the complexity of finding best agent strategies, and on the quality of the equilibria. By taking these first important steps, we uncover challenging open problems that call for an in-depth exploration of the creation of temporal graphs by strategic agents.

The ability to continuously learn and adapt to new situations is one where humans are far superior compared to AI agents. We propose an approach to knowledge transfer using behavioural strategies as a form of transferable knowledge influenced by the human cognitive ability to develop strategies. A strategy is defined as a partial sequence of events - where an event is both the result of an agent's action and changes in state - to reach some predefined event of interest. This information acts as guidance or a partial solution that an agent can generalise and use to make predictions about how to handle unknown observed phenomena. As a first step toward this goal, we develop a method for extracting strategies from an agent's existing knowledge that can be applied in multiple contexts. Our method combines observed event frequency information with local sequence alignment techniques to find patterns of significance that form a strategy. We show that our method can identify plausible strategies in three environments: Pacman, Bank Heist and a dungeon-crawling video game. Our evaluation serves as a promising first step toward extracting knowledge for generalisation and, ultimately, transfer learning.

Many practical problems can be understood as the search for a state of affairs that extends a fixed partial state of affairs, the \emph{environment}, while satisfying certain conditions that are formally specified. Such problems are found in, e.g., engineering, law or economics. We study this class of problems in a context where some of the relevant information about the environment is not known by the user at the start of the search. During the search, the user may consider tentative solutions that make implicit hypotheses about these unknowns. To ensure that the solution is appropriate, these hypotheses must be verified by observing the environment. Furthermore, we assume that, in addition to knowledge of what constitutes a solution, knowledge of general laws of the environment is also present. We formally define partial solutions with enough verified facts to guarantee the existence of complete and appropriate solutions. Additionally, we propose an interactive system to assist the user in their search by determining 1) which hypotheses implicit in a tentative solution must be verified in the environment, and 2) which observations can bring useful information for the search. We present an efficient method to over-approximate the set of relevant information, and evaluate our implementation.

In many real-world settings agents engage in strategic interactions with multiple opposing agents who can employ a wide variety of strategies. The standard approach for designing agents for such settings is to compute or approximate a relevant game-theoretic solution concept such as Nash equilibrium and then follow the prescribed strategy. However, such a strategy ignores any observations of opponents' play, which may indicate shortcomings that can be exploited. We present an approach for opponent modeling in multiplayer imperfect-information games where we collect observations of opponents' play through repeated interactions. We run experiments against a wide variety of real opponents and exact Nash equilibrium strategies in three-player Kuhn poker and show that our algorithm significantly outperforms all of the agents, including the exact Nash equilibrium strategies.

In this paper, we propose and consider the problem of cooperative language acquisition as a particular form of the ad hoc team play problem. We then present a probabilistic model for inferring a speaker's intentions and a listener's semantics from observing communications between a team of language-users. This model builds on the assumptions that speakers are engaged in positive signalling and listeners are exhibiting positive listening, which is to say the messages convey hidden information from the listener, that then causes them to change their behaviour. Further, it accounts for potential sub-optimality in the speaker's ability to convey the right information (according to the given task). Finally, we discuss further work for testing and developing this framework.

Offloading computation to nearby edge/fog computing nodes, including the ones carried by moving vehicles, e.g., vehicular fog nodes (VFN), has proved to be a promising approach for enabling low-latency and compute-intensive mobility applications, such as cooperative and autonomous driving. This work considers vehicular fog computing scenarios where the clients of computation offloading services try to minimize their own costs while deciding which VFNs to offload their tasks. We focus on decentralized multi-agent decision-making in a repeated unknown game where each agent, e.g., service client, can observe only its own action and realized cost. In other words, each agent is unaware of the game composition or even the existence of opponents. We apply a completely uncoupled learning rule to generalize the decentralized decision-making algorithm presented in \cite{Cho2021} for the multi-agent case. The multi-agent solution proposed in this work can capture the unknown offloading cost variations susceptive to resource congestion under an adversarial framework where each agent may take implicit cost estimation and suitable resource choice adapting to the dynamics associated with volatile supply and demand. According to the evaluation via simulation, this work reveals that such individual perturbations for robustness to uncertainty and adaptation to dynamicity ensure a certain level of optimality in terms of social welfare, e.g., converging the actual sequence of play with unknown and asymmetric attributes and lowering the correspondent cost in social welfare due to the self-interested behaviors of agents.