A fundamental shortcoming of the concept of Nash equilibrium is its computational intractability: approximating Nash equilibria in normal-form games is PPAD-hard. In this paper, inspired by the ideas of smoothed analysis, we introduce a relaxed variant of Nash equilibrium called $\sigma$-smooth Nash equilibrium, for a smoothness parameter $\sigma$. In a $\sigma$-smooth Nash equilibrium, players only need to achieve utility at least as high as their best deviation to a $\sigma$-smooth strategy, which is a distribution that does not put too much mass (as parametrized by $\sigma$) on any fixed action. We distinguish two variants of $\sigma$-smooth Nash equilibria: strong $\sigma$-smooth Nash equilibria, in which players are required to play $\sigma$-smooth strategies under equilibrium play, and weak $\sigma$-smooth Nash equilibria, where there is no such requirement. We show that both weak and strong $\sigma$-smooth Nash equilibria have superior computational properties to Nash equilibria: when $\sigma$ as well as an approximation parameter $\epsilon$ and the number of players are all constants, there is a constant-time randomized algorithm to find a weak $\epsilon$-approximate $\sigma$-smooth Nash equilibrium in normal-form games. In the same parameter regime, there is a polynomial-time deterministic algorithm to find a strong $\epsilon$-approximate $\sigma$-smooth Nash equilibrium in a normal-form game. These results stand in contrast to the optimal algorithm for computing $\epsilon$-approximate Nash equilibria, which cannot run in faster than quasipolynomial-time. We complement our upper bounds by showing that when either $\sigma$ or $\epsilon$ is an inverse polynomial, finding a weak $\epsilon$-approximate $\sigma$-smooth Nash equilibria becomes computationally intractable.

As machine learning models become more general, we need to characterise them in richer, more meaningful ways. We describe a method to infer the cognitive profile of a system from diverse experimental data. To do so, we introduce measurement layouts that model how task-instance features interact with system capabilities to affect performance. These features must be triangulated in complex ways to be able to infer capabilities from non-populational data -- a challenge for traditional psychometric and inferential tools. Using the Bayesian probabilistic programming library PyMC, we infer different cognitive profiles for agents in two scenarios: 68 actual contestants in the AnimalAI Olympics and 30 synthetic agents for O-PIAAGETS, an object permanence battery. We showcase the potential for capability-oriented evaluation.

With the ever increasing importance of web services and the Cloud as a reliable commodity to provide business value as well as consolidate IT infrastructure, electronic contracts have become very important. WS-Agreement has itself established as a well accepted container format for describing such contracts. However, the semantic interpretation of the terms contained in these contracts, as well as the process of agreeing to contracts when multiple options have to be considered (negotiation), are still pretty much dealt with on a case by case basis. In this paper we address the issues of diverging contracts and varying contract negotiation protocols by introducing the concept of a contract aware marketplace, which abstracts from the heterogeneous offers of different services providers. This allows for the automated consumption of services solely based on preferences, instead of additional restrictions such as understanding of contract terms and/or negotiation protocols. We also contribute an evaluation of several existing negotiation concepts/protocols. We think that reducing the complexity for automated contract negotiation and thus service consumption is a key for the success of future service and Cloud infrastructures.

The aim of this study is to formally express awareness for modeling practical agent communication. The notion of awareness has been proposed as a set of propositions for each agent, to which he/she pays attention, and has contributed to avoiding \textit{logical omniscience}. However, when an agent guesses another agent's knowledge states, what matters are not propositions but are accessible possible worlds. Therefore, we introduce a partition of possible worlds connected to awareness, that is an equivalence relation, to denote \textit{indistinguishable} worlds. Our logic is called Awareness Logic with Partition ($\mathcal{ALP}$). In this paper, we first show a running example to illustrate a practical social game. Thereafter, we introduce syntax and Kripke semantics of the logic and prove its completeness. Finally, we outline an idea to incorporate some epistemic actions with dynamic operators that change the state of awareness.

Modern recommender systems lie at the heart of complex ecosystems that couple the behavior of users, content providers, advertisers, and other actors. Despite this, the focus of the majority of recommender research -- and most practical recommenders of any import -- is on the local, myopic optimization of the recommendations made to individual users. This comes at a significant cost to the long-term utility that recommenders could generate for its users. We argue that explicitly modeling the incentives and behaviors of all actors in the system -- and the interactions among them induced by the recommender's policy -- is strictly necessary if one is to maximize the value the system brings to these actors and improve overall ecosystem "health". Doing so requires: optimization over long horizons using techniques such as reinforcement learning; making inevitable tradeoffs in the utility that can be generated for different actors using the methods of social choice; reducing information asymmetry, while accounting for incentives and strategic behavior, using the tools of mechanism design; better modeling of both user and item-provider behaviors by incorporating notions from behavioral economics and psychology; and exploiting recent advances in generative and foundation models to make these mechanisms interpretable and actionable. We propose a conceptual framework that encompasses these elements, and articulate a number of research challenges that emerge at the intersection of these different disciplines.

Information compression techniques are majorly employed to address the concern of reducing communication cost over peer-to-peer links. In this paper, we investigate distributed Nash equilibrium (NE) seeking problems in a class of non-cooperative games over directed graphs with information compression. To improve communication efficiency, a compressed distributed NE seeking (C-DNES) algorithm is proposed to obtain a NE for games, where the differences between decision vectors and their estimates are compressed. The proposed algorithm is compatible with a general class of compression operators, including both unbiased and biased compressors. Moreover, our approach only requires the adjacency matrix of the directed graph to be row-stochastic, in contrast to past works that relied on balancedness or specific global network parameters. It is shown that C-DNES not only inherits the advantages of conventional distributed NE algorithms, achieving linear convergence rate for games with restricted strongly monotone mappings, but also saves communication costs in terms of transmitted bits. Finally, numerical simulations illustrate the advantages of C-DNES in saving communication cost by an order of magnitude under different compressors.

While Nash equilibrium has emerged as the central game-theoretic solution concept, many important games contain several Nash equilibria and we must determine how to select between them in order to create real strategic agents. Several Nash equilibrium refinement concepts have been proposed and studied for sequential imperfect-information games, the most prominent being trembling-hand perfect equilibrium, quasi-perfect equilibrium, and recently one-sided quasi-perfect equilibrium. These concepts are robust to certain arbitrarily small mistakes, and are guaranteed to always exist; however, we argue that neither of these is the correct concept for developing strong agents in sequential games of imperfect information. We define a new equilibrium refinement concept for extensive-form games called observable perfect equilibrium in which the solution is robust over trembles in publicly-observable action probabilities (not necessarily over all action probabilities that may not be observable by opposing players). Observable perfect equilibrium correctly captures the assumption that the opponent is playing as rationally as possible given mistakes that have been observed (while previous solution concepts do not). We prove that observable perfect equilibrium is always guaranteed to exist, and demonstrate that it leads to a different solution than the prior extensive-form refinements in no-limit poker. We expect observable perfect equilibrium to be a useful equilibrium refinement concept for modeling many important imperfect-information games of interest in artificial intelligence.

The use of skills (a.k.a., options) can greatly accelerate exploration in reinforcement learning, especially when only sparse reward signals are available. While option discovery methods have been proposed for individual agents, in multi-agent reinforcement learning settings, discovering collaborative options that can coordinate the behavior of multiple agents and encourage them to visit the under-explored regions of their joint state space has not been considered. In this case, we propose Multi-agent Deep Covering Option Discovery, which constructs the multi-agent options through minimizing the expected cover time of the multiple agents' joint state space. Also, we propose a novel framework to adopt the multi-agent options in the MARL process. In practice, a multi-agent task can usually be divided into some sub-tasks, each of which can be completed by a sub-group of the agents. Therefore, our algorithm framework first leverages an attention mechanism to find collaborative agent sub-groups that would benefit most from coordinated actions. Then, a hierarchical algorithm, namely HA-MSAC, is developed to learn the multi-agent options for each sub-group to complete their sub-tasks first, and then to integrate them through a high-level policy as the solution of the whole task. This hierarchical option construction allows our framework to strike a balance between scalability and effective collaboration among the agents. The evaluation based on multi-agent collaborative tasks shows that the proposed algorithm can effectively capture the agent interactions with the attention mechanism, successfully identify multi-agent options, and significantly outperforms prior works using single-agent options or no options, in terms of both faster exploration and higher task rewards.

Many mechanisms behind the evolution of cooperation, such as reciprocity, indirect reciprocity, and altruistic punishment, require group knowledge of individual actions. But what keeps people cooperating when no one is looking? Conformist norm internalization, the tendency to abide by the behavior of the majority of the group, even when it is individually harmful, could be the answer. In this paper, we analyze a world where (1) there is group selection and punishment by indirect reciprocity but (2) many actions (half) go unobserved, and therefore unpunished. Can norm internalization fill this "observation gap" and lead to high levels of cooperation, even when agents may in principle cooperate only when likely to be caught and punished? Specifically, we seek to understand whether adding norm internalization to the strategy space in a public goods game can lead to higher levels of cooperation when both norm internalization and cooperation start out rare. We found the answer to be positive, but, interestingly, not because norm internalizers end up making up a substantial fraction of the population, nor because they cooperate much more than other agent types. Instead, norm internalizers, by polarizing, catalyzing, and stabilizing cooperation, can increase levels of cooperation of other agent types, while only making up a minority of the population themselves.

Modern autonomous systems are purposed for many challenging scenarios, where agents will face unexpected events and complicated tasks. The presence of disturbance noise with control command and unknown inputs can negatively impact robot performance. Previous research of joint input and state estimation separately studied the continuous and discrete cases without any prior information. This paper combines the continuous and discrete input cases into a unified theory based on the Expectation-Maximum (EM) algorithm. By introducing prior knowledge of events as the constraint, inequality optimization problems are formulated to determine a gain matrix or dynamic weights to realize an optimal input estimation with lower variance and more accurate decision-making. Finally, statistical results from experiments show that our algorithm owns 81\% improvement of the variance than KF and 47\% improvement than RKF in continuous space; a remarkable improvement of right decision-making probability of our input estimator in discrete space, identification ability is also analyzed by experiments.