Existing approaches to Theory of Mind (ToM) in Artificial Intelligence (AI) overemphasize prompted, or cue-based, ToM, which may limit our collective ability to develop Artificial Social Intelligence (ASI). Drawing from research in computer science, cognitive science, and related disciplines, we contrast prompted ToM with what we call spontaneous ToM -- reasoning about others' mental states that is grounded in unintentional, possibly uncontrollable cognitive functions. We argue for a principled approach to studying and developing AI ToM and suggest that a robust, or general, ASI will respond to prompts \textit{and} spontaneously engage in social reasoning.

Building on a previous foundation work (Lussange et al. 2020), this study introduces a multi-agent reinforcement learning (MARL) model simulating crypto markets, which is calibrated to the Binance's daily closing prices of $153$ cryptocurrencies that were continuously traded between 2018 and 2022. Unlike previous agent-based models (ABM) or multi-agent systems (MAS) which relied on zero-intelligence agents or single autonomous agent methodologies, our approach relies on endowing agents with reinforcement learning (RL) techniques in order to model crypto markets. This integration is designed to emulate, with a bottom-up approach to complexity inference, both individual and collective agents, ensuring robustness in the recent volatile conditions of such markets and during the COVID-19 era. A key feature of our model also lies in the fact that its autonomous agents perform asset price valuation based on two sources of information: the market prices themselves, and the approximation of the crypto assets fundamental values beyond what those market prices are. Our MAS calibration against real market data allows for an accurate emulation of crypto markets microstructure and probing key market behaviors, in both the bearish and bullish regimes of that particular time period.

Learning in games discusses the processes where multiple players learn their optimal strategies through the repetition of game plays. The dynamics of learning between two players in zero-sum games, such as matching pennies, where their benefits are competitive, have already been well analyzed. However, it is still unexplored and challenging to analyze the dynamics of learning among three players. In this study, we formulate a minimalistic game where three players compete to match their actions with one another. Although interaction among three players diversifies and complicates the Nash equilibria, we fully analyze the equilibria. We also discuss the dynamics of learning based on some famous algorithms categorized into Follow the Regularized Leader. From both theoretical and experimental aspects, we characterize the dynamics by categorizing three-player interactions into three forces to synchronize their actions, switch their actions rotationally, and seek competition.

When multiple agents interact in a common environment, each agent's actions impact others' future decisions, and noncooperative dynamic games naturally capture this coupling. In interactive motion planning, however, agents typically do not have access to a complete model of the game, e.g., due to unknown objectives of other players. Therefore, we consider the inverse game problem, in which some properties of the game are unknown a priori and must be inferred from observations. Existing maximum likelihood estimation (MLE) approaches to solve inverse games provide only point estimates of unknown parameters without quantifying uncertainty, and perform poorly when many parameter values explain the observed behavior. To address these limitations, we take a Bayesian perspective and construct posterior distributions of game parameters. To render inference tractable, we employ a variational autoencoder (VAE) with an embedded differentiable game solver. This structured VAE can be trained from an unlabeled dataset of observed interactions, naturally handles continuous, multi-modal distributions, and supports efficient sampling from the inferred posteriors without computing game solutions at runtime. Extensive evaluations in simulated driving scenarios demonstrate that the proposed approach successfully learns the prior and posterior objective distributions, provides more accurate objective estimates than MLE baselines, and facilitates safer and more efficient game-theoretic motion planning.

I described a 1999 result by Koutsoupias and Papadimitriou, regarding multi-agent systems. They studied systems in which non-cooperative agents share a common resource and proposed the ratio between the worst possible Nash equilibrium and the social optimum as a measure of the effectiveness of the system. This ratio has become known as the "Price of Anarchy," as it measures how far from optimal such non-cooperative systems can be. They showed that the price of anarchy could be arbitrarily high, depending on the complexity of the system. The Price-of-Anarchy concept has later been extended to other types of equilibria--for example, Pareto-Optimal Equilibria.b

In many collaborative settings, artificial intelligence (AI) agents must be able to adapt to new teammates that use unknown or previously unobserved strategies. While often simple for humans, this can be challenging for AI agents. For example, if an AI agent learns to drive alongside others (a training set) that only drive on one side of the road, it may struggle to adapt this experience to coordinate with drivers on the opposite side, even if their behaviours are simply flipped along the left-right symmetry. To address this we introduce symmetry-breaking augmentations (SBA), which increases diversity in the behaviour of training teammates by applying a symmetry-flipping operation. By learning a best-response to the augmented set of teammates, our agent is exposed to a wider range of behavioural conventions, improving performance when deployed with novel teammates. We demonstrate this experimentally in two settings, and show that our approach improves upon previous ad hoc teamwork results in the challenging card game Hanabi. We also propose a general metric for estimating symmetry-dependency amongst a given set of policies.

Despite the fact that beliefs are mental states that cannot be directly observed, humans talk about each others' beliefs on a regular basis, often using rich compositional language to describe what others think and know. What explains this capacity to interpret the hidden epistemic content of other minds? In this paper, we take a step towards an answer by grounding the semantics of belief statements in a Bayesian theory-of-mind: By modeling how humans jointly infer coherent sets of goals, beliefs, and plans that explain an agent's actions, then evaluating statements about the agent's beliefs against these inferences via epistemic logic, our framework provides a conceptual role semantics for belief, explaining the gradedness and compositionality of human belief attributions, as well as their intimate connection with goals and plans. We evaluate this framework by studying how humans attribute goals and beliefs while watching an agent solve a doors-and-keys gridworld puzzle that requires instrumental reasoning about hidden objects. In contrast to pure logical deduction, non-mentalizing baselines, and mentalizing that ignores the role of instrumental plans, our model provides a much better fit to human goal and belief attributions, demonstrating the importance of theory-of-mind for a semantics of belief.

This is the essence of a planning problem, and one instance of planning problems of particular import is wargaming, which is a simulated military exercise to test strategies and operational plans in a controlled environment. Within the context of planning problems, it is easy to envision a variety of applications for AI, ranging from decision support systems (DSS), intelligent opponents, scenario generation, and so on. This work will focus primarily on agents usable for the first two applications: DSS and intelligent opponents. As a result, we seek not only agents that can select a good quality action, but also agents that can analyze multi-player interactions, adapt rapidly to changing conditions, and provide interpretable insights. The U.S. Department of Defense introduced Battlespace [5] as a platform for wargaming [6].

Language agents powered by large language models (LLMs) have seen exploding development. Their capability of using language as a vehicle for thought and communication lends an incredible level of flexibility and versatility. People have quickly capitalized on this capability to connect LLMs to a wide range of external components and environments: databases, tools, the Internet, robotic embodiment, etc. Many believe an unprecedentedly powerful automation technology is emerging. However, new automation technologies come with new safety risks, especially for intricate systems like language agents. There is a surprisingly large gap between the speed and scale of their development and deployment and our understanding of their safety risks. Are we building a house of cards? In this position paper, we present the first systematic effort in mapping adversarial attacks against language agents. We first present a unified conceptual framework for agents with three major components: Perception, Brain, and Action. Under this framework, we present a comprehensive discussion and propose 12 potential attack scenarios against different components of an agent, covering different attack strategies (e.g., input manipulation, adversarial demonstrations, jailbreaking, backdoors). We also draw connections to successful attack strategies previously applied to LLMs. We emphasize the urgency to gain a thorough understanding of language agent risks before their widespread deployment.

The emergence of Large Language Models (LLMs) like ChatGPT has inspired the development of LLM-based agents capable of addressing complex, real-world tasks. However, these agents often struggle during task execution due to methodological constraints, such as error propagation and limited adaptability. To address this issue, we propose a multi-agent framework based on dynamic Task Decomposition and Agent Generation (TDAG). This framework dynamically decomposes complex tasks into smaller subtasks and assigns each to a specifically generated subagent, thereby enhancing adaptability in diverse and unpredictable real-world tasks. Simultaneously, existing benchmarks often lack the granularity needed to evaluate incremental progress in complex, multi-step tasks. In response, we introduce ItineraryBench in the context of travel planning, featuring interconnected, progressively complex tasks with a fine-grained evaluation system. ItineraryBench is designed to assess agents' abilities in memory, planning, and tool usage across tasks of varying complexity. Our experimental results reveal that TDAG significantly outperforms established baselines, showcasing its superior adaptability and context awareness in complex task scenarios.