Multi-agent reinforcement learning has recently shown great promise as an approach to networked system control. Arguably, one of the most difficult and important tasks for which large scale networked system control is applicable is common-pool resource management.

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V alue factorisation is a useful technique for multi-agent reinforcement learning (MARL) in global reward game, however, its underlying mechanism is not yet fully understood. This paper studies a theoretical framework for value factorisation with interpretability via Shapley value theory.

This chapter gives an introduction to agent-oriented programming in JavaScript. It provides an example-based walk-through of how to implement abstractions for reasoning loop agents in vanilla JavaScript. The initial example is used as a stepping stone for explaining how to implement slightly more advanced agents and multi-agent systems using JS-son, a JavaScript library for agent-oriented programming. In this context, the chapter also explains how to integrate reasoning loop agents with generative AI technologies--specifically, large language models. Finally, application scenarios in several technology ecosystems and future research directions are sketched.

Computer-use agents (CUAs) hold promise for automating everyday digital tasks, but their unreliability and high variance hinder their application to long-horizon, complex tasks. We introduce Behavior Best-of-N (bBoN), a method that scales over agents by generating multiple rollouts and selecting among them using behavior narratives that describe the agents' rollouts. It enables both wide exploration and principled trajectory selection, substantially improving robustness and success rates. On OSWorld, our bBoN scaling method establishes a new state of the art (SoTA) at 69.9%, significantly outperforming prior methods and approaching human-level performance at 72%, with comprehensive ablations validating key design choices. We further demonstrate strong generalization results to different operating systems on WindowsAgentArena and AndroidWorld. Crucially, our results highlight the unreasonable effectiveness of scaling CUAs, when you do it right: effective scaling requires structured trajectory understanding and selection, and bBoN provides a practical framework to achieve this.

This paper presents a novel, structured decision support framework that systematically aligns diverse artificial intelligence (AI) agent architectures, reactive, cognitive, hybrid, and learning, with the comprehensive National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) Cybersecurity Framework (CSF) 2.0. By integrating agent theory with industry guidelines, this framework provides a transparent and stepwise methodology for selecting and deploying AI solutions to address contemporary cyber threats. Employing a granular decomposition of NIST CSF 2.0 functions into specific tasks, the study links essential AI agent properties such as autonomy, adaptive learning, and real-time responsiveness to each subcategory's security requirements. In addition, it outlines graduated levels of autonomy (assisted, augmented, and fully autonomous) to accommodate organisations at varying stages of cybersecurity maturity. This holistic approach transcends isolated AI applications, providing a unified detection, incident response, and governance strategy. Through conceptual validation, the framework demonstrates how tailored AI agent deployments can align with real-world constraints and risk profiles, enhancing situational awareness, accelerating response times, and fortifying long-term resilience via adaptive risk management. Ultimately, this research bridges the gap between theoretical AI constructs and operational cybersecurity demands, establishing a foundation for robust, empirically validated multi-agent systems that adhere to industry standards.

We define a fairness solution criterion for multi-agent decision-making problems, where agents have local interests. This new criterion aims to maximize the worst performance of agents with a consideration on the overall performance. We develop a simple linear programming approach and a more scalable game-theoretic approach for computing an optimal fairness policy. This game-theoretic approach formulates this fairness optimization as a two-player zero-sum game and employs an iterative algorithm for finding a Nash equilibrium, corresponding to an optimal fairness policy.

Making decisions in the presence of a strategic opponent requires one to take into account the opponent's ability to actively mask its intended objective. To describe such strategic situations, we introduce the non-cooperative inverse reinforcement learning (N-CIRL) formalism. The N-CIRL formalism consists of two agents with completely misaligned objectives, where only one of the agents knows the true objective function.

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