This paper studies distributed cooperative multi-agent exploration methods in settings where the exploration is costly and the overall performance measure is determined by the minimum performance achieved by any of the individual agents. Such an exploration setting is applicable to various multi-agent systems, e.g., in Dynamic Spectrum Access exploration. The goal in such problems is to optimize the process as a whole, considering the tradeoffs between the quality of the solution obtained and the cost associated with the exploration and coordination between the agents. Through the analysis of the two extreme cases where coordination is completely free and when entirely disabled, we manage to extract the solution for the general case where coordination is taken to be costly, modeled as a fee that needs to be paid for each additional coordinated agent. The strategy structure for the general case is shown to be threshold-based, and the thresholds which are analytically derived in this paper can be calculated offline, resulting in a very low online computational load.

Scaling multiagent reinforcement learning to domains with many agents is a complex problem. In particular, multiagent credit assignment becomes a key issue as the system size increases. Some multiagent systems suffer from a global reward signal that is very noisy or difficult to analyze. This makes deriving a learnable local reward signal very difficult. Difference rewards (a particular instance of reward shaping) have been used to alleviate this concern, but they remain difficult to compute in many domains. In this paper we present an approach to modeling the global reward using function approximation that allows the quick computation of local rewards. We demonstrate how this model can result in significant improvements in behavior for three congestion problems: a multiagent ``bar problem'', a complex simulation of the United States airspace, and a generic air traffic domain. We show how the model of the global reward may be either learned on- or off-line using either linear functions or neural networks. For the bar problem, we show an increase in reward of nearly 200% over learning using the global reward directly. For the air traffic problem, we show a decrease in costs of 25% over learning using the global reward directly.

We consider a multi-agent scenario where a collection of agents needs to select a common decision from a large set of decisions over which they express their preferences. This decision set has a combinatorial structure, that is, each decision is an element of the Cartesian product of the domains of some variables. Agents express their preferences over the decisions via soft constraints. We consider both sequential preference aggregation methods (they aggregate the preferences over one variable at a time) and one-step methods and we study the computational complexity of influencing them through bribery. We prove that bribery is NPcomplete for the sequential aggregation methods (based on Plurality, Approval, and Borda) for most of the cost schemes we defined, while it is polynomial for one-step Plurality.

Collusion is the practice of two or more parties deliberately cooperating to the detriment of others. While such behavior may be desirable in certain circumstances, in many it is considered dishonest and unfair. If agents otherwise hold strictly to the established rules, though, collusion can be challenging to police. In this paper, we introduce an automatic method for collusion detection in sequential games. We achieve this through a novel object, called a collusion table, that captures the effects of collusive behavior, i.e., advantage to the colluding parties, without assuming any particular pattern of behavior. We show the effectiveness of this method in the domain of poker, a popular game where collusion is prohibited.

We consider multi-agent settings where a set of agents want to take a collective decision, based on their preferences over the possible candidate options. While agents have their initial inclination, they may interact and influence each other, and therefore modify their preferences, until hopefully they reach a stable state and declare their final inclination. At that point, a voting rule is used to aggregate the agents’ preferences and generate the collective decision. Recent work has modeled the influence phenomenon in the case of voting over a single issue. Here we generalize this model to account for preferences over combinatorially structured domains including several issues. We propose a way to model influence when agents express their preferences as CP-nets. We define two procedures for aggregating preferences in this scenario, by interleaving voting and influence convergence, and study their resistance to bribery.

Representation languages for coalitional games are a key research area in algorithmic game theory. There is an inherent tradeoff between how general a language is, allowing it to capture more elaborate games, and how hard it is computationally to optimize and solve such games. One prominent such language is the simple yet expressive Weighted Graph Games (WGGs) representation (Deng and Papadimitriou, 1994), which maintains knowledge about synergies between agents in the form of an edge weighted graph. We consider the problem of finding the optimal coalition structure in WGGs. The agents in such games are vertices in a graph, and the value of a coalition is the sum of the weights of the edges present between coalition members. The optimal coalition structure is a partition of the agents to coalitions, that maximizes the sum of utilities obtained by the coalitions. We show that finding the optimal coalition structure is not only hard for general graphs, but is also intractable for restricted families such as planar graphs which are amenable for many other combinatorial problems. We then provide algorithms with constant factor approximations for planar, minor-free and bounded degree graphs.

Artifact systems are a novel paradigm for specifying and implementing business processes described in terms of interacting modules called artifacts. Artifacts consist of data and lifecycles, accounting respectively for the relational structure of the artifacts' states and their possible evolutions over time. In this paper we put forward artifact-centric multi-agent systems, a novel formalisation of artifact systems in the context of multi-agent systems operating on them. Differently from the usual process-based models of services, the semantics we give explicitly accounts for the data structures on which artifact systems are defined. We study the model checking problem for artifact-centric multi-agent systems against specifications written in a quantified version of temporal-epistemic logic expressing the knowledge of the agents in the exchange. We begin by noting that the problem is undecidable in general. We then identify two noteworthy restrictions, one syntactical and one semantical, that enable us to find bisimilar finite abstractions and therefore reduce the model checking problem to the instance on finite models. Under these assumptions we show that the model checking problem for these systems is EXPSPACE-complete. We then introduce artifact-centric programs, compact and declarative representations of the programs governing both the artifact system and the agents. We show that, while these in principle generate infinite-state systems, under natural conditions their verification problem can be solved on finite abstractions that can be effectively computed from the programs. Finally we exemplify the theoretical results of the paper through a mainstream procurement scenario from the artifact systems literature.

We introduce Game networks (G nets), a novel representation for multi-agent decision problems. Compared to other game-theoretic representations, such as strategic or extensive forms, G nets are more structured and more compact; more fundamentally, G nets constitute a computationally advantageous framework for strategic inference, as both probability and utility independencies are captured in the structure of the network and can be exploited in order to simplify the inference process. An important aspect of multi-agent reasoning is the identification of some or all of the strategic equilibria in a game; we present original convergence methods for strategic equilibrium which can take advantage of strategic separabilities in the G net structure in order to simplify the computations. Specifically, we describe a method which identifies a unique equilibrium as a function of the game payoffs, and one which identifies all equilibria.

Travel sharing, i.e., the problem of finding parts of routes which can be shared by several travellers with different points of departure and destinations, is a complex multiagent problem that requires taking into account individual agents' preferences to come up with mutually acceptable joint plans. In this paper, we apply state-of-the-art planning techniques to real-world public transportation data to evaluate the feasibility of multiagent planning techniques in this domain. The potential application value of improving travel sharing technology has great application value due to its ability to reduce the environmental impact of travelling while providing benefits to travellers at the same time. We propose a three-phase algorithm that utilises performant single-agent planners to find individual plans in a simplified domain first, then merges them using a best-response planner which ensures resulting solutions are individually rational, and then maps the resulting plan onto the full temporal planning domain to schedule actual journeys. The evaluation of our algorithm on real-world, multi-modal public transportation data for the United Kingdom shows linear scalability both in the scenario size and in the number of agents, where trade-offs have to be made between total cost improvement, the percentage of feasible timetables identified for journeys, and the prolongation of these journeys. Our system constitutes the first implementation of strategic multiagent planning algorithms in large-scale domains and provides insights into the engineering process of translating general domain-independent multiagent planning algorithms to real-world applications.

One common use for swarming agents is in social simulation. This paper reports on such a model developed to track protest activities at the May 2012 NATO summit in Chicago. The use of apoptotic stigmergic agents allows the model to run on-line, consuming two kinds of external data and reporting its results in real time.