Large Language Model
9b9cfd5428153ccfbd4ba34b7e007305-Paper-Conference.pdf
With advances in the quality of text-to-image (T2I) models has come interest in benchmarking their prompt faithfulness --the semantic coherence of generated images to the prompts they were conditioned on. A variety of T2I faithfulness metrics have been proposed, leveraging advances in cross-modal embeddings and vision-language models (VLMs).
c1f0b856a35986348ab3414177266f75-Paper-Conference.pdf
Large language models are now tuned to align with the goals of their creators, namely to be "helpful and harmless." These models should respond helpfully to user questions, but refuse to answer requests that could cause harm. However, adversarial users can construct inputs which circumvent attempts at alignment. In this work, we study adversarial alignment, and ask to what extent these models remain aligned when interacting with an adversarial user who constructs worst-case inputs (adversarial examples). These inputs are designed to cause the model to emit harmful content that would otherwise be prohibited. We show that existing NLP-based optimization attacks are insufficiently powerful to reliably attack aligned text models: even when current NLP-based attacks fail, we can find adversarial inputs with brute force.
Chatting Makes Perfect: Chat-based Image Retrieval Supplementary Material
In Appendix A, we start by showing more qualitative results of chats and their retrieval results, and BLIP2 chats compared to a human answerer. Next, in Appendix B, we present the few shot instructional prompts that were used by different LLMs for generating follow-up questions. Another example in Figure 2 describes two trains, searched by the text "A train that is parked next to another train". Figure 3 demonstrates a case where the description "a small and dirty kitchen with pots and food everywhere" is ambiguous, subjective to the viewer and may match many images in the corpus. In Figure 4 we show an example of a dialog between ChatIR and a human.