We study the problem of aggregation of Dung's abstract argumentation frameworks. Some operators for this aggregation have been proposed, as well as some rationality properties for this process. In this work we study the existing operators and new ones that we propose in light of the proposed properties, highlighting the fact that existing operators do not satisfy a lot of these properties. The conclusions are that on one hand none of the existing operators seem fully satisfactory, but on the other hand some of the properties proposed so far seem also too demanding.

Computational models of argument could play a valuable role in persuasion technologies for behaviour change (e.g. persuading a user to eat a more healthy diet, or to drink less, or to take more exercise, or to study more conscientiously, etc). For this, the system (the persuader) could present arguments to convince the user (the persuadee). In this paper, we consider asymmetric dialogues where only the system presents arguments, and the system maintains a model of the user to determine the best choice of arguments to present (including counterarguments to key arguments believed to be held by the user). The focus of the paper is on the user model, including how we update it as the dialogue progresses, and how we use it to make optimal choices for dialogue moves.

Argumentation mining aims to automatically identify structured argument data from unstructured natural language text. This challenging, multi-faceted task is recently gaining a growing attention, especially due to its many potential applications. One particularly important aspect of argumentation mining is claim identification. Most of the current approaches are engineered to address specific domains. However, argumentative sentences are often characterized by common rhetorical structures, independently of the domain. We thus propose a method that exploits structured parsing information to detect claims without resorting to contextual information, and yet achieve a performance comparable to that of state-of-the-art methods that heavily rely on the context.

In this paper we combine two of the most important areas of knowledge representation, namely belief revision and (abstract) argumentation. More precisely, we show how AGM-style expansion and revision operators can be defined for Dung's abstract argumentation frameworks (AFs). Our approach is based on a reformulation of the original AGM postulates for revision in terms of monotonic consequence relations for AFs. The latter are defined via a new family of logics, called Dung logics, which satisfy the important property that ordinary equivalence in these logics coincides with strong equivalence for the respective argumentation semantics. Based on these logics we define expansion as usual via intersection of models. We show the existence of such operators. This is far from trivial and requires to study realizability in the context of Dung logics. We then study revision operators. We show why standard approaches based on a distance measure on models do not work for AFs and present an operator satisfying all postulates for a specific Dung logic.

Change in abstract argumentation frameworks (AFs) is a very active topic. Especially, the problem of enforcing a set E of arguments, i.e., ensuring that E is an extension (or a subset of an extension) of a given AF F, has received a particular attention in the recent years. In this paper, we define a new family of enforcement operators, for which enforcement can be achieved by adding new arguments (and attacks) to F (as in previous approaches to enforcement), but also by questioning some attacks (and non-attacks) of F. This family includes previous enforcement operators, but also new ones for which the success of the enforcement operation is guaranteed. We show how the enforcement problem for the operators of the family can be modeled as a pseudo-Boolean optimization problem. Intensive experiments show that the method is practical and that it scales up well.

However, humans are proved to question: What is the connection between the arguments proposed behave differently, mixing rational and emotional by the participants of a debate and their emotional attitudes to guide their actions, and it has been status? Such question breaks down into the following subquestions: claimed that there exists a strong connection between (1) is the polarity of arguments and the relations the argumentation process and the emotions among them correlated with the polarity of the detected emotions?, felt by people involved in such process. In this paper, and (2) what is the relation between the kind and the we assess this claim by means of an experiment: amount of arguments proposed in a debate, and the mental during several debates people's argumentation engagement detected among the participants of the debate? in plain English is connected and compared to the emotions automatically detected from the participants. To answer these questions, we propose an empirical evaluation Our results show a correspondence between of the connection between argumentation and emotions.

The paper develops a formal theory of the degree of justification of arguments, which relies solely on the structure of an argumentation framework. The theory is based on a generalisation of Dung’s notion of acceptability, making it sensitive to the numbers of attacks and counter-attacks on arguments. Graded generalisations of argumentation semantics are then obtained and studied. The theory is applied by showing how it can arbitrate between competing preferred extensions and how it captures a specific form of accrual in instantiated argumentation.

One prominent way to deal with conflicting view-points among agents is to conduct an argumentative debate: by exchanging arguments, agents can seek to persuade each other. In this paper we investigate the problem, for an agent, of optimizing a sequence of moves to be put forward in a debate, against an opponent assumed to behave stochastically, and equipped with an unknown initial belief state. Despite the prohibitive number of states induced by a naive mapping to Markov models, we show that exploiting several features of such interaction settings allows for optimal resolution in practice, in particular: (1) as debates take place in a public space (or common ground), they can readily be modelled as Mixed Observability Markov Decision Processes, (2) as argumentation problems are highly structured, one can design optimization techniques to prune the initial instance. We report on the experimental evaluation of these techniques.

The paper analyses multi-agent strategic dialogues on possibly infinite argumentation frameworks. We develop a formal model for representing such dialogues, and introduce FO A -ATL, a first-order extension of alternating-time logic, for expressing the interplay of strategic and argumentation-theoretic properties. This setting is investigated with respect to the model checking problem, by means of a suitable notion of bisimulation. This notion of bisimulation is also used to shed light on how static properties of argumentation frameworks influence their dynamic behaviour.

Abstract dialectical frameworks (ADFs) are a powerful generalization of Dung’s abstract argumentation frameworks. ADFs allow to model argumentation scenarios such that ADF semantics then provide interpretations of the scenarios. Among the considerable number of ADF semantics, the naive-based ones are built upon the fundamental concept of conflict-freeness. Intuitively, a three-valued interpretation of an ADF’s statements is conflict-free iff all true statements can possibly be accepted, and all false statements cannot possibly be accepted. In this paper, we perform an exhaustive analysis of the computational complexity of naive-based semantics. The results are quite interesting, for some of them involve little-known classes of the so-called Boolean hierarchy (another hierarchy in between classes of the polynomial hierarchy). Furthermore in credulous and sceptical entailment, the complexity can be different depending on whether we check for truth or falsity of a specific statement.