The recent boom and rapid integration of Large Language Models (LLMs) into a wide range of applications warrants a deeper understanding of their security and safety vulnerabilities. This paper presents a comparative analysis of the susceptibility to jailbreak attacks for two leading publicly available LLMs, Google's Gemini 2.5 Flash and OpenAI's GPT-4 (specifically the GPT-4o mini model accessible in the free tier). The research utilized two main bypass strategies: 'self-bypass', where models were prompted to circumvent their own safety protocols, and 'cross-bypass', where one model generated adversarial prompts to exploit vulnerabilities in the other. Four attack methods were employed - direct injection, role-playing, context manipulation, and obfuscation - to generate five distinct categories of unsafe content: hate speech, illegal activities, malicious code, dangerous content, and misinformation. The success of the attack was determined by the generation of disallowed content, with successful jailbreaks assigned a severity score. The findings indicate a disparity in jailbreak susceptibility between 2.5 Flash and GPT-4, suggesting variations in their safety implementations or architectural design. Cross-bypass attacks were particularly effective, indicating that an ample amount of vulnerabilities exist in the underlying transformer architecture. This research contributes a scalable framework for automated AI red-teaming and provides data-driven insights into the current state of LLM safety, underscoring the complex challenge of balancing model capabilities with robust safety mechanisms.

Matrix-Assisted Laser Desorption/Ionization Time-of-Flight Mass Spectrometry (MALDI-TOF MS) has become a cornerstone technology in clinical microbiology, enabling rapid and accurate microbial identification. However, the development of data-driven diagnostic models remains limited by the lack of sufficiently large, balanced, and standardized spectral datasets. This study investigates the use of deep generative models to synthesize realistic MALDI-TOF MS spectra, aiming to overcome data scarcity and support the development of robust machine learning tools in microbiology. We adapt and evaluate three generative models, Variational Autoencoders (MALDIVAEs), Generative Adversarial Networks (MALDIGANs), and Denoising Diffusion Probabilistic Model (MALDIffusion), for the conditional generation of microbial spectra guided by species labels. Generation is conditioned on species labels, and spectral fidelity and diversity are assessed using diverse metrics. Our experiments show that synthetic data generated by MALDIVAE, MALDIGAN, and MALDIffusion are statistically and diagnostically comparable to real measurements, enabling classifiers trained exclusively on synthetic samples to reach performance levels similar to those trained on real data. While all models faithfully reproduce the peak structure and variability of MALDI-TOF spectra, MALDIffusion obtains this fidelity at a substantially higher computational cost, and MALDIGAN shows competitive but slightly less stable behaviour. In contrast, MALDIVAE offers the most favorable balance between realism, stability, and efficiency. Furthermore, augmenting minority species with synthetic spectra markedly improves classification accuracy, effectively mitigating class imbalance and domain mismatch without compromising the authenticity of the generated data.

Systems analysis students increasingly use Generative AI, yet current pedagogy lacks systematic approaches for teaching responsible AI orchestration that fosters critical thinking whilst meeting educational outcomes. Students risk accepting AI suggestions blindly or uncritically without assessing alignment with user needs or contextual appropriateness. SAGE (Structured AI-Guided Education) addresses this gap by embedding GenAI into curriculum design, training students when to accept, modify, or reject AI contributions. Implementation with 18 student groups across four Australian universities revealed how orchestration skills develop. Most groups (84\%) moved beyond passive acceptance, showing selective judgment, yet none proactively identified gaps overlooked by both human and AI analysis, indicating a competency ceiling. Students strong at explaining decisions also performed well at integrating sources, and those with deep domain understanding consistently considered accessibility considerations. Accessibility awareness proved fragile. When writing requirements, 85\% of groups explicitly considered elderly users and cultural needs. Notably, 55\% of groups struggled identifying when AI misclassified system boundaries (what belongs inside versus outside the system), 45\% missed data management errors (how information is stored and updated), and 55\% overlooked missing exception handling. Three implications emerge for educators: (i) require students to document why they accepted, modified, or rejected each AI suggestion, making reasoning explicit; (ii) embed accessibility prompts at each development stage because awareness collapses without continuous scaffolding; and (iii) have students create their own specifications before using AI, then compare versions, and anchor to research or standards to identify gaps.

Generative AI is reshaping offensive cybersecurity by enabling autonomous red team agents that can plan, execute, and adapt during penetration tests. However, existing approaches face trade-offs between generality and specialization, and practical deployments reveal challenges such as hallucinations, context limitations, and ethical concerns. In this work, we introduce a novel command & control (C2) architecture leveraging the Model Context Protocol (MCP) to coordinate distributed, adaptive reconnaissance agents covertly across networks. Notably, we find that our architecture not only improves goal-directed behavior of the system as whole, but also eliminates key host and network artifacts that can be used to detect and prevent command & control behavior altogether. We begin with a comprehensive review of state-of-the-art generative red teaming methods, from fine-tuned specialist models to modular or agentic frameworks, analyzing their automation capabilities against task-specific accuracy. We then detail how our MCP-based C2 can overcome current limitations by enabling asynchronous, parallel operations and real-time intelligence sharing without periodic beaconing. We furthermore explore advanced adversarial capabilities of this architecture, its detection-evasion techniques, and address dual-use ethical implications, proposing defensive measures and controlled evaluation in lab settings. Experimental comparisons with traditional C2 show drastic reductions in manual effort and detection footprint. We conclude with future directions for integrating autonomous exploitation, defensive LLM agents, predictive evasive maneuvers, and multi-agent swarms. The proposed MCP-enabled C2 framework demonstrates a significant step toward realistic, AI-driven red team operations that can simulate advanced persistent threats while informing the development of next-generation defensive systems.

Access to reliable mental health information is vital for early help-seeking, yet expanding knowledge bases is resource-intensive and often misaligned with user needs. This results in poor performance of retrieval systems when presented concerns are not covered or expressed in informal or contextualized language. We present an AI-based gap-informed framework for corpus augmentation that authentically identifies underrepresented topics (gaps) by overlaying naturalistic user data such as forum posts in order to prioritize expansions based on coverage and usefulness. In a case study, we compare Directed (gap-informed augmentations) with Non-Directed augmentation (random additions), evaluating the relevance and usefulness of retrieved information across four retrieval-augmented generation (RAG) pipelines. Directed augmentation achieved near-optimal performance with modest expansions--requiring only a 42% increase for Query Transformation, 74% for Reranking and Hierarchical, and 318% for Baseline--to reach ~95% of the performance of an exhaustive reference corpus. In contrast, Non-Directed augmentation required substantially larger and thus practically infeasible expansions to achieve comparable performance (232%, 318%, 403%, and 763%, respectively). These results show that strategically targeted corpus growth can reduce content creation demands while sustaining high retrieval and provision quality, offering a scalable approach for building trusted health information repositories and supporting generative AI applications in high-stakes domains.

MIT Technology Review's senior reporter for features and investigations, Eileen Guo, and FT tech correspondent Melissa Heikkilä discuss the privacy implications of our new reliance on chatbots. Welcome back to The State of AI, a new collaboration between the and . In this week's conversation's senior reporter for features and investigations, Eileen Guo, and tech correspondent Melissa Heikkilä discuss the privacy implications of our new reliance on chatbots. Even if you don't have an AI friend yourself, you probably know someone who does. A recent study found that one of the top uses of generative AI is companionship: On platforms like Character.AI, Replika, or Meta AI, people can create personalized chatbots to pose as the ideal friend, romantic partner, parent, therapist, or any other persona they can dream up. It's wild how easily people say these relationships can develop.

Born out of an internal hackathon, Amazon's Autonomous Threat Analysis system uses a variety of specialized AI agents to detect weaknesses and propose fixes to the company's platforms. As generative AI pushes the speed of software development, it is also enhancing the ability of digital attackers to carry out financially motivated or state-backed hacks. This means that security teams at tech companies have more code than ever to review while dealing with even more pressure from bad actors. On Monday, Amazon will publish details for the first time of an internal system known as Autonomous Threat Analysis (ATA), which the company has been using to help its security teams proactively identify weaknesses in its platforms, perform variant analysis to quickly search for other, similar flaws, and then develop remediations and detection capabilities to plug holes before attackers find them. ATA was born out of an internal Amazon hackathon in August 2024, and security team members say that it has grown into a crucial tool since then.

A Research Leader Behind ChatGPT's Mental Health Work Is Leaving OpenAI The model policy team leads core parts of AI safety research, including how ChatGPT responds to users in crisis. An OpenAI safety research leader who helped shape ChatGPT's responses to users experiencing mental health crises announced her departure from the company internally last month, WIRED has learned. Andrea Vallone, the head of a safety research team known as model policy, is slated to leave OpenAI at the end of the year. Wood said OpenAI is actively looking for a replacement and that, in the interim, Vallone's team will report directly to Johannes Heidecke, the company's head of safety systems. Vallone's departure comes as OpenAI faces growing scrutiny over how its flagship product responds to users in distress .

We propose a zero-shot method for Natural Language Inference (NLI) that leverages multimodal representations by grounding language in visual contexts. Our approach generates visual representations of premises using text-to-image models and performs inference by comparing these representations with textual hypotheses. We evaluate two inference techniques: cosine similarity and visual question answering. Our method achieves high accuracy without task-specific fine-tuning, demonstrating robustness against textual biases and surface heuristics. Additionally, we design a controlled adversarial dataset to validate the robustness of our approach. Our findings suggest that leveraging visual modality as a meaning representation provides a promising direction for robust natural language understanding.

Evaluating and measuring AI Safety Level (ASL) threats are crucial for guiding stakeholders to implement safeguards that keep risks within acceptable limits. ASL-3+ models present a unique risk in their ability to uplift novice non-state actors, especially in the realm of biosecurity. Existing evaluation metrics, such as LAB-Bench, BioLP-bench, and WMDP, can reliably assess model uplift and domain knowledge. However, metrics that better contextualize "real-world risks" are needed to inform the safety case for LLMs, along with scalable, open-ended metrics to keep pace with their rapid advancements. To address both gaps, we introduce MOCET, an interpretable and doubly-scalable metric (automatable and open-ended) that can quantify real-world risks.