Calibrated trust in automated systems (Lee and See 2004) is critical for their safe and seamless integration into society. Users should only rely on a system recommendation when it is actually correct and reject it when it is factually wrong. One requirement to achieve this goal is an accurate trustworthiness assessment, ensuring that the user's perception of the system's trustworthiness aligns with its actual trustworthiness, allowing users to make informed decisions about the extent to which they can rely on the system (Schlicker et al. 2022). We propose six design guidelines to help designers optimize for accurate trustworthiness assessments, thus fostering ethical and responsible human-automation interactions. The proposed guidelines are derived from existing literature in various fields, such as human-computer interaction, cognitive psychology, automation research, user-experience design, and ethics. We are incorporating key principles from the field of pragmatics, specifically the cultivation of common ground (H. H. Clark 1996) and Gricean communication maxims (Grice 1975). These principles are essential for the design of automated systems because the user's perception of the system's trustworthiness is shaped by both environmental contexts, such as organizational culture or societal norms, and by situational context, including the specific circumstances or scenarios in which the interaction occurs (Hoff and Bashir 2015). Our proposed guidelines provide actionable insights for designers to create automated systems that make relevant trustworthiness cues available. This would ideally foster calibrated trust and more satisfactory, productive, and safe interactions between humans and automated systems. Furthermore, the proposed heuristics might work as a tool for evaluating to what extent existing systems enable users to accurately assess a system's trustworthiness.

This article redefines arbitrariness not as a normative flaw or a symptom of domination, but as a foundational functional mechanism structuring human systems and interactions. Diverging from critical traditions that conflate arbitrariness with injustice, it posits arbitrariness as a semiotic trait: a property enabling systems - linguistic, legal, or social - to operate effectively while withholding their internal rationale. Building on Ferdinand de Saussure's concept of l'arbitraire du signe, the analysis extends this principle beyond language to demonstrate its cross-domain applicability, particularly in law and social dynamics. The paper introduces the "Motivation -> Constatability -> Contestability" chain, arguing that motivation functions as a crucial interface rendering an act's logic vulnerable to intersubjective contestation. When this chain is broken through mechanisms like "immotivization" or "Conflict Lateralization" (exemplified by "the blur of the wolf drowned in the fish"), acts produce binding effects without exposing their rationale, thus precluding justiciability. This structural opacity, while appearing illogical, is a deliberate design protecting authority from accountability. Drawing on Shannon's entropy model, the paper formalizes arbitrariness as A = H(L|M) (conditional entropy). It thereby proposes a modern theory of arbitrariness as a neutral operator central to control as well as care, an overlooked dimension of interpersonal relations. While primarily developed through human social systems, this framework also illuminates a new pathway for analyzing explainability in advanced artificial intelligence systems.

Social sciences have accumulated a rich body of theories and methodologies for investigating the human mind and behaviors, while offering valuable insights into the design and understanding of Artificial Intelligence (AI) systems. Focusing on psychology as a prominent case, this study explores the interdisciplinary synergy between AI and the field by analyzing 1,006 LLM-related papers published in premier AI venues between 2023 and 2025, along with the 2,544 psychology publications they cite. Through our analysis, we identify key patterns of interdisciplinary integration, locate the psychology domains most frequently referenced, and highlight areas that remain underexplored. We further examine how psychology theories/frameworks are operationalized and interpreted, identify common types of misapplication, and offer guidance for more effective incorporation. Our work provides a comprehensive map of interdisciplinary engagement between AI and psychology, thereby facilitating deeper collaboration and advancing AI systems.

Wearable AI systems aim to provide timely assistance in daily life, but existing approaches often rely on user initiation or predefined task knowledge, neglecting users' current mental states. We introduce ProMemAssist, a smart glasses system that models a user's working memory (WM) in real-time using multi-modal sensor signals. Grounded in cognitive theories of WM, our system represents perceived information as memory items and episodes with encoding mechanisms, such as displacement and interference. This WM model informs a timing predictor that balances the value of assistance with the cost of interruption. In a user study with 12 participants completing cognitively demanding tasks, ProMemAssist delivered more selective assistance and received higher engagement compared to an LLM baseline system. Qualitative feedback highlights the benefits of WM modeling for nuanced, context-sensitive support, offering design implications for more attentive and user-aware proactive agents.

Why do we give the explanations we do? Recent work has suggested that we should think of explanation as a kind of cooperative social interaction, between a why-question-asker and an explainer. Here, we apply this perspective to consider the role that emotion plays in this social interaction. We develop a computational framework for modeling explainers who consider the emotional impact an explanation might have on a listener. We test our framework by using it to model human intuitions about how a doctor might explain to a patient why they have a disease, taking into account the patient's propensity for regret. Our model predicts human intuitions well, better than emotion-agnostic ablations, suggesting that people do indeed reason about emotion when giving explanations.

Artificial intelligence (AI) has sparked immense interest in drug discovery, but most current approaches only digitize existing high-throughput experiments. They remain constrained by conventional pipelines. As a result, they do not address the fundamental challenges of predicting drug effects in humans. Similarly, biomedical digital twins, largely grounded in real-world data and mechanistic models, are tailored for late-phase drug development and lack the resolution to model molecular interactions or their systemic consequences, limiting their impact in early-stage discovery. This disconnect between early discovery and late development is one of the main drivers of high failure rates in drug discovery. The true promise of AI lies not in augmenting current experiments but in enabling virtual experiments that are impossible in the real world: testing novel compounds directly in silico in the human body. Recent advances in AI, high-throughput perturbation assays, and single-cell and spatial omics across species now make it possible to construct programmable virtual humans: dynamic, multiscale models that simulate drug actions from molecular to phenotypic levels. By bridging the translational gap, programmable virtual humans offer a transformative path to optimize therapeutic efficacy and safety earlier than ever before. This perspective introduces the concept of programmable virtual humans, explores their roles in a new paradigm of drug discovery centered on human physiology, and outlines key opportunities, challenges, and roadmaps for their realization.

Generative agents have made significant progress in simulating human behavior, but existing frameworks often simplify emotional modeling and focus primarily on specific tasks, limiting the authenticity of the simulation. Our work proposes the Psychological-mechanism Agent (PSYA) framework, based on the Cognitive Triangle (Feeling-Thought-Action), designed to more accurately simulate human behavior. The PSYA consists of three core modules: the Feeling module (using a layer model of affect to simulate changes in short-term, medium-term, and long-term emotions), the Thought module (based on the Triple Network Model to support goal-directed and spontaneous thinking), and the Action module (optimizing agent behavior through the integration of emotions, needs and plans). To evaluate the framework's effectiveness, we conducted daily life simulations and extended the evaluation metrics to self-influence, one-influence, and group-influence, selection five classic psychological experiments for simulation. The results show that the PSYA framework generates more natural, consistent, diverse, and credible behaviors, successfully replicating human experimental outcomes. Our work provides a richer and more accurate emotional and cognitive modeling approach for generative agents and offers an alternative to human participants in psychological experiments.

Though humans seem to be remarkable learners, arguments in cognitive science and philosophy of mind have long maintained that learning something fundamentally new is impossible. Specifically, Jerry Fodor's arguments for radical concept nativism hold that most, if not all, concepts are innate and that what many call concept learning never actually leads to the acquisition of new concepts. These arguments have deeply affected cognitive science, and many believe that the counterarguments to radical concept nativism have been either unsuccessful or only apply to a narrow class of concepts. This paper first reviews the features and limitations of prior arguments. We then identify three critical points - related to issues of expressive power, conceptual structure, and concept possession - at which the arguments in favor of radical concept nativism diverge from describing actual human cognition. We use ideas from computer science and information theory to formalize the relevant ideas in ways that are arguably more scientifically productive. We conclude that, as a result, there is an important sense in which people do indeed learn new concepts.

Despite growing interest in Learning-by-Teaching (LbT), few studies have explored how this paradigm can be implemented with autonomous, peer-like social robots in real classrooms. Most prior work has relied on scripted or Wizard-of-Oz behaviors, limiting our understanding of how real-time, interactive learning can be supported by artificial agents. This study addresses this gap by introducing Interactive Reinforcement Learning (RL) as a cognitive model for teachable social robots. We conducted two between-subject experiments with 58 primary school children, who either taught a robot or practiced independently on a tablet while learning French vocabulary (memorization) and grammatical rules (inference). The robot, powered by Interactive RL, learned from the child's evaluative feedback. Children in the LbT condition achieved significantly higher retention gains compared to those in the self-practice condition, especially on the grammar task. Learners with lower prior knowledge benefited most from teaching the robot. Behavioural metrics revealed that children adapted their teaching strategies over time and engaged more deeply during inference tasks. This work makes two contributions: (1) it introduces Interactive RL as a pedagogically effective and scalable model for peer-robot learning, and (2) it demonstrates, for the first time, the feasibility of deploying multiple autonomous robots simultaneously in real classrooms. These findings extend theoretical understanding of LbT by showing that social robots can function not only as passive tutees but as adaptive partners that enhance meta-cognitive engagement and long-term learning outcomes.

Human planning is efficient -- it frugally deploys limited cognitive resources to accomplish difficult tasks -- and flexible -- adapting to novel problems and environments. Computational approaches suggest that people construct simplified mental representations of their environment, balancing the complexity of a task representation with its utility. These models imply a nested optimisation in which planning shapes perception, and perception shapes planning -- but the perceptual and attentional mechanisms governing how this interaction unfolds remain unknown. Here, we harness virtual maze navigation to characterise how spatial attention controls which aspects of a task representation enter subjective awareness and are available for planning. We find that spatial proximity governs which aspects of a maze are available for planning, and that when task-relevant information follows natural (lateralised) contours of attention, people can more easily construct simplified and useful maze representations. This influence of attention varies considerably across individuals, explaining differences in people's task representations and behaviour. Inspired by the 'spotlight of attention' analogy, we incorporate the effects of visuospatial attention into existing computational accounts of value-guided construal. Together, our work bridges computational perspectives on perception and decision-making to better understand how individuals represent their environments in aid of planning.