We describe a model for competitive online scheduling algorithms. Two servers, each with a single observable queue, compete for customers. Upon arrival, each customer strategically chooses the queue with minimal expected wait time. Each scheduler wishes to maximize its number of customers, and can strategically select which scheduling algorithm, such as First-Come-First-Served (FCFS), to use for its queue. This induces a game played by the servers and the customers. We consider a non-Bayesian setting, where servers and customers play to maximize worst-case payoffs. We show that there is a unique subgame perfect safety-level equilibrium and we describe the associated scheduling algorithm (which is not FCFS). The uniqueness result holds for both randomized and deterministic algorithms, with a different equilibrium algorithm in each case. When the goal of the servers is to minimize competitive ratio, we prove that it is an equilibrium for each server to apply FCFS: each server obtains the optimal competitive ratio of 2.

It is known that an equilibrium of an infinitely repeated two-player game (with limit average payoffs) can be computed in polynomial time, as follows: according to the folk theorem, we compute minimax strategies for both players to calculate the punishment values, and subsequently find a mixture over outcomes that exceeds these punishment values. However, for very large games, even computing minimax strategies can be prohibitive. In this paper, we propose an algorithmic framework for computing equilibria of repeated games that does not require linear programming and that does not necessarily need to inspect all payoffs of the game. This algorithm necessarily sometimes fails to compute an equilibrium, but we mathematically demonstrate that most of the time it succeeds quickly on uniformly random games, and experimentally demonstrate this for other classes of games. This also holds for games with more than two players, for which no efficient general algorithms are known.

This paper presents the results of developing subjectivity classifiers for Implicit Opinion Question (IOQ) identification. IOQs are defined as opinion questions with no opinion words. An IOQ example is "will the U.S. government pay more attention to the Pacific Rim?" Our analysis on community questions of Yahoo! Answers shows that a large proportion of opinion questions are IOQs. It is thus important to develop techniques to identify such questions. In this research, we first propose an effective framework based on mutual information and sequential pattern mining to construct an opinion lexicon that not only contains opinion words but also patterns. The discovered words and patterns are then combined with a machine learning technique to identify opinion questions. The experimental results on two datasets demonstrate the effectiveness of our approach.

We consider judgment aggregation over multiple independent issues, where the chairperson has her own opinion, and can try to bias the outcome by bundling several issues together. Since for each bundle judges must give a uniform answer on all issues, different partitions of the issues may result in an outcome that significantly differs from the "true," issue-wise, decision. We prove that the bundling problem faced by the chairperson, i.e. trying to bias the outcome towards her own opinion, is computationally difficult in the worst case. Then we study the probability that an effective bundling attack exists as the disparity between the opinions of the judges and the chair varies. We show that if every judge initially agrees with the chair on every issue with probability of at least 1/2, then there is almost always a bundling attack (i.e. a partition) where the opinion of the chair on all issues is approved. Moreover, such a partition can be found efficiently. In contrast, when the probability is lower than 1/2 then the chair cannot force her opinion using bundling even on a single issue.

We present a novel negotiation protocol to facilitate energy exchange between off-grid homes that are equipped with renewable energy generation and electricity storage. Our protocol imposes restrictions over negotiation such that it reduces the complex interdependent multi-issue negotiation to one where agents have a strategy profile in subgame perfect Nash equilibrium. We show that our negotiation protocol is tractable, concurrent, scalable and leads to Pareto-optimal outcomes in a decentralised manner. We empirically evaluate our protocol and show that, in this instance, a society of agents can (i) improve the overall utilities by 14% and (ii) reduce their overall use of the batteries by 37%.

The complexity and tight integration of electromechanical systems often makes them "brittle" and hard to modify in response to changing requirements. We aim to remedy this by capturing expert knowledge as functional blueprints, an idea inspired by regulatory processes that occur in natural morphogenesis. We then apply this knowledge in an intelligent design variation tool. When a user modifies a design, our tool uses functional blueprints to modify other components in response, thereby maintaining integration and reducing the need for costly search or constraint solving. In this paper, we refine the functional blueprint concept and discuss practical issues in applying it to electromechanical systems. We then validate our approach with a case study applying our prototype tool to create variants of a miniDroid robot and by empirical evaluation of convergence dynamics of networks of functional blueprints.

Simple diffusion processes on networks have been used to model, analyze and predict diverse phenomena such as spread of diseases, information and memes. More often than not, the underlying network data is noisy and sampled. This prompts the following natural question: how sensitive are the diffusion dynamics and subsequent conclusions to uncertainty in the network structure? In this paper, we consider two popular diffusion models: Independent cascades (IC) model and Linear threshold (LT) model. We study how the expected number of vertices that are influenced/infected, given some initial conditions, are affected by network perturbation. By rigorous analysis under the assumption of a reasonable perturbation model we establish the following main results. (1) For the IC model, we characterize the susceptibility to network perturbation in terms of the critical probability for phase transition of the network. We find the expected number of infections is quite stable, unless the the transmission probability is close to the critical probability. (2) We show that the standard LT model with uniform edge weights is relatively stable under network perturbations. (3) Empirically, the transient behavior, i.e., the time series of the number of infections, in both models appears to be more sensitive to network perturbations. We also study these questions using extensive simulations on diverse real world networks, and find that our theoretical predictions for both models match the empirical observations quite closely.

Most approaches to semantics in computational linguistics represent meaning in terms of words or abstract symbols. Grounded-language research bases the meaning of natural language on perception and/or action in the (real or virtual) world. Machine learning has become the most effective approach to constructing natural-language systems; however, current methods require a great deal of laboriously annotated training data. Ideally, a computer would be able to acquire language like a child, by being exposed to language in the context of a relevant but ambiguous environment, thereby grounding its learning in perception and action. We will review recent research in grounded language learning and discuss future directions.

List of conference committees for AAAI-13, IAAI-13, and the EAAI-13 symposium.

Editor David Leake (Indiana University, USA) Reports Editor Robert A. Morris (NASA Ames Research Center, USA) Competition Reports Coeditors Sven Koenig (University of Southern California, USA) Robert A. Morris (NASA Ames Research Center, USA) Managing Editor David M. Hamilton (The Live Oak Press, LLC, USA)