Automatic speech recognition (ASR) technology has been developed to such a level that off-the-shelf distributed speech recognition services are available (free of cost), which allow researchers to integrate speech into their applications with little development effort or expert knowledge leading to better results compared with previously used open-source tools. Often, however, such services do not accept language models or grammars but process free speech from any domain. While results are very good given the enormous size of the search space, results frequently contain out-of-domain words or constructs that cannot be understood by subsequent domain-dependent natural language understanding (NLU) components. We present a versatile post-processing technique based on phonetic distance that integrates domain knowledge with open-domain ASR results, leading to improved ASR performance. Notably, our technique is able to make use of domain restrictions using various degrees of domain knowledge, ranging from pure vocabulary restrictions via grammars or N-Grams to restrictions of the acceptable utterances. We present results for a variety of corpora (mainly from human-robot interaction) where our combined approach significantly outperforms Google ASR as well as a plain open-source ASR solution.

SenticNet is a publicly available semantic and affective resource for concept-level sentiment analysis. Rather than using graph-mining and dimensionality-reduction techniques, SenticNet 3 makes use of "energy flows" to connect various parts of extended common and common-sense knowledge representations to one another. SenticNet 3 models nuanced semantics and sentics (that is, the conceptual and affective information associated with multi-word natural language expressions), representing information with a symbolic opacity of an intermediate nature between that of neural networks and typical symbolic systems.

A large number of interdependent issues in complex contract negotiation poses a significant challenge for current approaches, which becomes even more apparent when negotiation problems scale up. To address this challenge, we present a structured anytime search process with an agenda management mechanism using a hierarchical negotiation model, where agents search at various levels during the negotiation with the guidance of a mediator. This structured negotiation process increases computational efficiency, making negotiations scalable for large number of interdependent issues. To validate the contributions of our approach, 1) we developed our proposed negotiation model using a hierarchical problem structure and a constraint-based preference model for real-world applications; 2) we defined a scenario matrix to capture various characteristics of negotiation scenarios and developed a scenario generator that produces test cases according to this matrix; and 3) we performed an extensive set of experiments to study the performance of this structured negotiation protocol and the influence of different scenario parameters, and investigated the Pareto efficiency and social welfare optimality of the negotiation outcomes. The experimental result supports the hypothesis that this hierarchical negotiation approach greatly improves scalability with the complexity of the negotiation scenarios.

Among the many deployment areas of Stackelberg Security games, a major area involves games played out in space and time, which includes applications in multiple mobile defender resources protecting multiple mobile targets. Previous algorithms for such spatio-temporal security games fail to scale-up and little is known ofthe computational complexity properties of these problems.This paper provides a novel oracle-based algorithmic framework for a systematic study of different problem variants of computing optimal (minimax) strategies in spatio-temporal security games. Our framework enables efficient computation of a minimax strategy when the problem admits a polynomial-time oracle. Furthermore,for the cases in which efficient oracles are difficultto find, we propose approximations or prove hardness results.

Recent work has shown that diverse teams can outperform a uniform team made of copies of the best agent. However, there are fundamental questions that were not asked before. When should we use diverse or uniform teams? How does the performance change as the action space or the teams get larger? Hence, we present a new model of diversity for teams, that is more general than previous models. We prove that the performance of a diverse team improves as the size of the action space gets larger. Concerning the size of the diverse team, we show that the performance converges exponentially fast to the optimal one as we increase the number of agents. We present synthetic experiments that allow us to gain further insights: even though a diverse team outperforms a uniform team when the size of the action space increases, the uniform team will eventually again play better than the diverse team for a large enough action space. We verify our predictions in a system of Go playing agents, where we show a diverse team that improves in performance as the board size increases, and eventually overcomes a uniform team.

This paper presents a theoretical as well as empirical study on the evolution of cooperation on complex social networks, following the continuous action iterated prisoner's dilemma (CAIPD) model. In particular, convergence to network-wide agreement is proven for both evolutionary networks with fixed interaction dynamics, as well as for coevolutionary networks where these dynamics change over time. Moreover, an extension to the CAIPD model is proposed that allows to model influence on the evolution of cooperation in social networks. As such, this work contributes to a better understanding of behavioral change on social networks, and provides a first step towards their active control.

We consider a classic social choice problem in an online setting. In each round, a decision maker observes a single agent's preferences overa set of $m$ candidates, and must choose whether to irrevocably add a candidate to a selection set of limited cardinality $k$. Each agent's (positional) score depends on the candidates in the set when he arrives, and the decision-maker's goal is to maximize average (over all agents) score. We prove that no algorithm (even randomized) can achieve an approximationfactor better than $O(\frac{\log\log m}{\log m})$. In contrast, if the agents arrive in random order, we present a $(1 - \frac{1}{e} - o(1))$-approximatealgorithm, matching a lower bound for the off-line problem.We show that improved performance is possible for natural input distributionsor scoring rules. Finally, if the algorithm is permitted to revoke decisions at a fixedcost, we apply regret-minimization techniques to achieve approximation $1 - \frac{1}{e} - o(1)$ even for arbitrary inputs.

A model of the problem of charging and discharging electrical vehicles as a congestion game is presented. A generalization of congestion games - feedback congestion games (FCG) - is introduced. The charging of grid-integrated vehicles, which can also discharge energy back to the grid, is a natural FCG application. FCGs are proven to be exact potential games and therefore converge to a pure-strategy Nash equilibrium by an iterated better-response process. A compact representation and an algorithm that enable efficient best-response search are presented. A detailed empirical evaluation assesses the performance of the iterated best-response process. The evaluation considers the quality of the resulting solutions and the rate of convergence to a stable state. The effect of allowing to also discharge batteries using FCG is compared to scenarios that only include charging and is found to dramatically improve the predictability of the achieved solutions as well as the balancing of load.

Stability is a central concept in exchange-based mechanismdesign. It imposes a fundamental requirement that no subsetof agents could beneficially deviate from the outcome pre-scribed by the mechanism. However, deployment of stabilityin an exchange mechanism presents at least two challenges.First, it reduces social welfare and sometimes prevents themechanism from producing a solution. Second, it might incurcomputational cost to clear the mechanism.In this paper, we propose an alternative notion of stability,coined internal stability, under which we analyze the socialwelfare bounds and computational complexity. Our contribu-tions are as follows: for both pairwise matchings and limited-length exchanges, for both unweighted and weighted graph-s, (1) we prove desirable tight social welfare bounds; (2) weanalyze the computational complexity for clearing the match-ings and exchanges. Extensive experiments on the kidney ex-change domain demonstrate that the optimal welfare underinternal stability is very close to the unconstrained optimal.

Open list proportional representation is an election mechanism used in many elections, including the 2012 Hong Kong Legislative Council Geographical Constituencies election. In this paper, we assume that there are just two parties in the election, and that the number of votes that a list would get is the sum of the numbers of votes that the candidates in the list would get if each of them would go alone in the election. Under these assumptions, we formulate the election as a mostly zero-sum game, and show that while the game always has a pure Nash equilibrium, it is NP-hard to compute it.