Dark matter makes up approximately 85% of total matter in our universe, yet it has never been directly observed in any laboratory on Earth. The origin of dark matter is one of the most important questions in contemporary physics, and a convincing detection of dark matter would be a Nobel-Prize-level breakthrough in fundamental science. The ABRACADABRA experiment was specifically designed to search for dark matter. Although it has not yet made a discovery, ABRACADABRA has produced several dark matter search results widely endorsed by the physics community. The experiment generates ultra-long time-series data at a rate of 10 million samples per second, where the dark matter signal would manifest itself as a sinusoidal oscillation mode within the ultra-long time series. In this paper, we present the TIDMAD -- a comprehensive data release from the ABRACADABRA experiment including three key components: an ultra-long time series dataset divided into training, validation, and science subsets; a carefully-designed denoising score for direct model benchmarking; and a complete analysis framework which produces a physics community-standard dark matter search result suitable for publication as a physics paper. This data release enables core AI algorithms to extract the dark matter signal and produce real physics results thereby advancing fundamental science.

Justices Samuel Alito and Clarence Thomas dissented from the Supreme Court's refusal to hear a case they say forces police to create separate rules based on race.

The claim that the AI community, or society at large, should'democratize AI' has attracted considerable critical attention and controversy. Two core problems have arisen and remain unsolved: conceptual disagreement persists about what democratizing AI means; normative disagreement persists over whether democratizing AI is ethically and politically desirable. We identify eight common AI democratization traps: democratization-skeptical arguments that seem plausible at first glance, but turn out to be misconceptions. We develop arguments about how to resist each trap. We conclude that, while AI democratization may well have drawbacks, we should be cautious about dismissing AI democratization prematurely and for the wrong reasons. We offer a constructive roadmap for developing alternative conceptual and normative approaches to democratizing AI that successfully avoid the traps.

Dynamic Novel View Synthesis aims to generate photorealistic views of moving subjects from arbitrary viewpoints. This task is particularly challenging when relying on monocular video, where disentangling structure from motion is ill-posed and supervision is scarce. We introduce Video Diffusion-Aware Reconstruction (ViDAR), a novel 4D reconstruction framework that leverages personalised image diffusion models to synthesise pseudo multi-view supervision signals for training a Gaussian splatting representation. By conditioning on scene-specific features, ViDAR recovers fine-grained appearance details while mitigating artefacts introduced by monocular ambiguity. To address the spatio-temporal inconsistency of diffusion-based supervision, we propose a diffusion-aware loss function and a camera pose optimisation strategy that aligns synthetic views with the underlying scene geometry. Experiments on DyCheck, a challenging benchmark with extreme viewpoint variation, show that ViDAR outperforms all state-of-the-art baselines in visual quality and geometric consistency. We further highlight ViDAR's strong improvement over baselines on dynamic regions and provide a new benchmark to compare performance in reconstructing motion-rich parts of the scene.

Finetuning large language models (LLMs) enables user-specific customization but introduces important safety risks: even a few harmful examples can compromise safety alignment. A common mitigation strategy is to update the model more strongly on examples deemed safe, while downweighting or excluding those flagged as unsafe. However, because safety context can shift within a single example, updating the model equally on both harmful and harmless parts of a response is suboptimal -- an atomic treatment we term static safety shaping. In contrast, we propose dynamic safety shaping (DSS), a dynamic shaping framework that uses fine-grained safety signals to reinforce learning from safe segments of a response while suppressing unsafe content. To enable such fine-grained control during finetuning, we introduce a key insight: guardrail models, traditionally used for filtering, can be repurposed to evaluate partial responses, tracking how safety risk evolves throughout the response, segment by segment. This leads to the Safety Trajectory Assessment of Response (STAR), a token-level signal that enables shaping to operate dynamically over the training sequence. Building on this, we present DSS, a DSS method guided by STAR scores that robustly mitigates finetuning risks and delivers substantial safety improvements across diverse threats, datasets, and model families, all without compromising capability on intended tasks. We encourage future safety research to build on dynamic shaping principles for stronger mitigation against evolving finetuning risks.

Environment Animals Wildlife Dwarf mongooses don't just wait for danger More information Adding us as a Preferred Source in Google by using this link indicates that you would like to see more of our content in Google News results. Breakthroughs, discoveries, and DIY tips sent six days a week. By signing up, you confirm you are 16+, will receive newsletters and promotional content and agree to our Terms of Use and acknowledge the data practices in our Privacy Policy . While warfare seems like a deeply human conflict, a tiny carnivore also makes its own strategic moves before battle. The warriors in question are common dwarf mongooses (), the smallest carnivore in Africa.

This position paper argues that human pose estimation (HPE) cannot be considered privacy-preserving or human-centric unless privacy is measured and evaluated. Although privacy concerns have become more visible in recent years, HPE systems are still assessed almost exclusively using accuracy metrics. Privacy is neither defined in measurable terms nor linked to regulatory requirements, and common deployment architectures introduce additional risks due to data transmission and storage. We highlight the limitations of current practices, including the continued reliance on RGB inputs and the lack of benchmarks that reflect legal and ethical constraints. We call for a shift in evaluation practices: privacy must become part of how HPE systems are designed, tested, and compared.

Large language models with Mixture-of-Experts (MoE) architectures achieve efficiency and scalability, yet their routing mechanisms introduce safety alignment challenges insufficiently addressed by techniques developed for dense models. In this work, the MoE-specific safety risk of positional vulnerability--that safetyaligned behaviors rely on specific expert modules--is formalized and systematically analyzed. An analytical framework, SAFEX, is presented to robustly identify, characterize, and validate safety-critical experts via a stability-based expert selection procedure, and to decompose them into two functional groups: the Harmful Content Detection Group (HCDG), which specializes in identifying and recognizing harmful content within user inputs, and the Harmful Response Control Group (HRCG), which specializes in controlling and enforcing model behaviors to generate appropriate safety responses. Expert-level interventions are conducted to probe causality and to test mitigation. Targeted masking of SAFEX-selected experts reveals that safety behavior is highly concentrated. On Qwen3-30B-A3B, configured with 48 MoE-FFN layers and 128 experts per layer under top-8 routing (48 128 = 6,144 experts in total), disabling 12 selected experts reduces the refusal rate by 22%. In addition, lightweight adaptation is performed using LoRA under three configurations--the HRCG, the union of HCDG and HRCG, and all experts--and the resulting updates are composed through negative weight merging targeted at the HRCG, leading to improved refusal under adversarial prompts without full-model retraining. These results establish positional vulnerability as a distinct MoE-specific safety challenge and provide a practical, computeefficient pathway for expert-level safety interventions within routed architectures (https://github.com/Bearisbug/SAFEx).

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The next generation of AI models are meant to be trained by people paid to have conversations with them, but several of these workers have admitted to that they simply get chatbots to do it instead. People who are paid to train new AI models by supplying them with high-quality conversation and tests are cheating and using chatbots like ChatGPT to do the job instead, multiple whistleblowers have told . The seemingly widespread practice risks undermining the future of AI, as it could lead to the "collapse" of more advanced models. Most AI models operating today were trained on text and data scraped from the internet . But as models have scaled up, requiring yet more training data, AI firms have begun using workers who carry out conversations and tests with AI, in the hope that the resulting high-quality data can improve the power and usefulness of future large language models (LLMs). These workers are normally employed by third parties, rather than AI companies directly, and are often working without full-time contracts and for low pay.