Lifting can greatly reduce the cost of inference on first-order probabilistic graphical models, but constructing the lifted network can itself be quite costly. In online applications (e.g., video segmentation) repeatedly constructing the lifted network for each new inference can be extremely wasteful, because the evidence typically changes little from one inference to the next. The same is true in many other problems that require repeated inference, like utility maximization, MAP inference, interactive inference, parameter and structure learning, etc. In this paper, we propose an efficient algorithm for updating the structure of an existing lifted network with incremental changes to the evidence. This allows us to construct the lifted network once for the initial inference problem, and amortize the cost over the subsequent problems. Experiments on video segmentation and viral marketing problems show that the algorithm greatly reduces the cost of inference without affecting the quality of the solutions.

We study the computational complexity of the counting version of the Possible-Winner problem for elections. In the Possible-Winner problem we are given a profile of voters, each with a partial preference order, and ask if there are linear extensions of the votes such that a designated candidate wins. We also analyze a special case of Possible-Winner, the Manipulation problem. We provide polynomial-time algorithms for counting manipulations in a class of scoring protocols and in several other voting rules. We show #P-hardness of the counting variant of Possible-Winner for plurality and veto and give a simple yet general and practically useful randomized algorithm for a variant of Possible-Winner for all voting rules for which a winner can be computed in polynomial time.

Tournament solution concepts, selecting winners based on a pairwise dominance relation are an important structure often used in sports, as well as elections, and argumentation theory. Manipulation of such choice rules by coalitions of agents are a significant problem in most common rules. We deal with the problem of the manipulation of randomized choice rules by coalitions varying from a single agent, to two or more agents. We define two notions of coalitional manipulations of such choice rules based on whether or not utility is transferable. We show useful choice rules satisfying both notions of non-manipulability, and for the transferable utility case provide bounds on the level of Condorcet consistency.

In some voting situations, some new candidates may show up in the course of the process. In this case, we may want to determine which of the initial candidates are possible winners, given that a fixed number k of new candidates will be added. Focusing on scoring rules, we give complexity results for the above possible winner problem.

Modern complex games and simulations pose many challenges for an intelligent agent, including partial observability, continuous time and effects, hostile opponents, and exogenous events. We present ARTUE (Autonomous Response to Unexpected Events), a domain-independent autonomous agent that dynamically reasons about what goals to pursue in response to unexpected circumstances in these types of environments. ARTUE integrates AI research in planning, environment monitoring, explanation, goal generation, and goal management. To explain our conceptualization of the problem ARTUE addresses, we present a new conceptual framework, goal-driven autonomy, for agents that reason about their goals. We evaluate ARTUE on scenarios in the TAO Sandbox, a Navy training simulation, and demonstrate its novel architecture, which includes components for Hierarchical Task Network planning, explanation, and goal management. Our evaluation shows that ARTUE can perform well in a complex environment and that each component is necessary and contributes to the performance of the integrated system.

We consider the problem of manipulating elections via cloning candidates. In our model, a manipulator can replace each candidate c by one or more clones, i.e., new candidates that are so similar to  c  that each voter simply replaces  c  in his vote with the block of  c 's clones. The outcome of the resulting election may then depend on how each voter orders the clones within the block. We formalize what it means for a cloning manipulation to be successful (which turns out to be a surprisingly delicate issue), and, for a number of prominent voting rules, characterize the preference profiles for which a successful cloning manipulation exists. We also consider the model where there is a cost associated with producing each clone, and study the complexity of finding a minimum-cost cloning manipulation. Finally, we compare cloning with the related problem of control via adding candidates.

Law enforcement agencies frequently must allocate limited resources to protect targets embedded in a network, such as important buildings in a city road network. Since intelligent attackers may observe and exploit patterns in the allocation, it is crucial that the allocations be randomized. We cast this problem as an attacker-defender Stackelberg game: the defender’s goal is to obtain an optimal mixed strategy for allocating resources. The defender’s strategy space is exponential in the number of resources, and the attacker’s exponential in the network size. Existing algorithms are therefore useless for all but the smallest networks. We present a solution approach based on two key ideas: (i) A polynomial-sized game model obtained via an approximation of the strategy space, solved efficiently using a linear program; (ii) Two efficient techniques that map solutions from the approximate game to the original, with proofs of correctness under certain assumptions. We present in-depth experimental results, including an evaluation on part of the Mumbai road network.

Security games, and important class of Stackelberg games, are used in deployed decision-support tools in use by LAX police and the Federal Air Marshals Service. The algorithms used to solve these games find optimal randomized schedules to allocate security resources for infrastructure protection. Unfortunately, the state of the art algorithms either fail to scale or to provide a correct solution for large problems with arbitrary scheduling constraints. We introduce ASPEN, a branch-and-price approach that overcomes these limitations based on two key contributions: (i) A column-generation approach that exploits a novel network flow representation, avoiding a combinatorial explosion of schedule allocations; (ii) A branch-and-bound algorithm that generates bounds via a fast algorithm for solving security games with relaxed scheduling constraints. ASPEN is the first known method for efficiently solving massive security games with arbitrary schedules.

Within the electric power literature the transmission expansion planning problem (TNEP) refers to the problem of how to upgrade an electric power network to meet future demands. As this problem is a complex, non-linear, and non-convex optimization problem, researchers have traditionally focused on approximate models of power flows. Existing approaches are often tightly coupled to the approximation choice. Until recently, these approximations have produced results that are straight-forward to adapt to the more complex (real) problem. However, the power grid is evolving towards a state where the adaptations are no longer easy (e.g. large amounts of limited control, renewable generation) that necessitates new optimization techniques. In this paper, we propose a local search variation of the powerful Limited Discrepancy Search (LDLS) that encapsulates the complexity of power flows in a black box that may be queried for information about the quality of a proposed expansion. This allows the development of a new optimization algorithm that is independent of the underlying power model.

Current practice in Wilderness Search and Rescue (WiSAR) is analogous to an intelligent system designed to gather and analyze information to find missing persons in remote areas. The system consists of multiple parts - various tools for information management (maps, GPS, etc) distributed across personnel with different skills and responsibilities. Introducing a camera-equipped mini-UAV into this task requires autonomy and information technology that itself is an integrated intelligent system to be used by a sub-team that must be integrated into the overall intelligent system. In this paper, we identify key elements of the integration challenges along two dimensions: (a) attributes of intelligent system and (b) scale, meaning individual or group. We then present component technology that offload or supplement many responsibilities to autonomous systems, and finally describe how autonomy and information are integrated into user interfaces to better support distributed search across time and space. The integrated system was demoed for Utah County Search and Rescue personnel. A real searcher flew the UAV after minimal training and successfully located the simulated missing person in a wilderness area.