This listing is intended as an introduction to the literature on Artificial Intelligence, €”i.e., to the literature dealing with the problem of making machines behave intelligently. We have divided this area into categories and cross-indexed the references accordingly. Large bibliographies without some classification facility are next to useless. This particular field is still young, but there are already many instances in which workers have wasted much time in rediscovering (for better or for worse) schemes already reported. In the last year or two this problem has become worse, and in such a situation just about any information is better than none. This bibliography is intended to serve just that purpose-to present some information about this literature. The selection was confined mainly to publications directly concerned with construction of artificial problem-solving systems. Many peripheral areas are omitted completely or represented only by a few citations.IRE Trans. on Human Factors in Electronics, HFE-2, pages 39-55

Dr. Lucien Mehl, born 1919 in Paris, studied at the University, Paris where he obtained his degrees in Philosophy and Law, and a Diploma of Advanced Studies in Political Economy and at the National School of Administration. He is now'Maitre des Requetesi to the Council of State and Director of external training at the National School of Administration. He is a member of the International Fiscal Association, the International Cybernetics Association and the French Operational Research Society. He has published a number of articles on administrative science, law, cybernetics and operational research. LUCIEN HEEL INTRODUCTION I. It may seem an ambitious step to try to apply mechanization or automation to the legal sciences. However, a machine for processing information can be an effective aid in searching for sources of legal information, in developing legal argument, in preparing the decision of the administrator or judge, and finally in checking the coherence of solutions arrived at. In the first place, much preliminary work is needed for introducing automation in legal affairs, and so much work can only be decided upon if it is found to be of definite use. Secondly, such an undertaking is not without its risks; the jurist may lose direct contact with the sources of law and no longer have the benefit of the intellectual activity involved in searching for information. Lastly, as a result of mechanization of this kind, thought may itself become inflexible, diminishing creative power and innovative effort. Nowadays, however, machine processing of information is becoming essential; "Homo sapiens" is in fact exposed to the risk of being overwhelmed by the vast accumulation of knowledge. It is becoming increasingly difficult to gain access to the sources of ideas, and the researcher wastes valuable time and often intensive mental effort in detailed and unprofitable research, never being sure whether his investigations will be fruitful, or whether he will not bypass the essential information. Moreover, it happens that writers doing research in the same field of knowledge are unaware of one another's work; and besides this, the difficulty of finding the information required makes the researchers specialize still more. They find it hard to link up the different disciplines, because they are generally doomed to remain in ignorance of everything outside their on customary field of investigation. In legal matters, the number of laws and regulations and the scope of jurisprudence are growing on an alarming scale, and everyone is complaining about the situation - administrators and judges, as well as those dealt with under the law.

I am quite ready to subscribe to the already mentioned slogan that "whatever a human being can do,an appropriate machine can do, too"; but I do this only because.I regard the slogan as utterly trivial. At the moment, I am not talking about what maohines could do in principle but only about what actually existing or blueprinted machines could do, and it Is with regard to these that I utter my definite opinions. If someone wishes to write sciencefiction about information-processing centres of the (undetermined) future, let him do so and I shall discuss it with him over a glass of beer and even offer some startling suggestions of my own. If he is interested in improving the literature search process today, I would strongly advise him to forget about mechanizing abstracting or indexing. May I add that it is with a good amount of sorrow that I have come to this conclusion which is quite counter, to my temperament and my convictions (never published) of a few years ago.

The possible ways in which machinery might be made to show intelligent behaviour are discussed. The analogy with the human brain is used as a guiding principle. It is pointed out that the potentialities of the human intelligence can only be realized if suitable education is provided. The investigation mainly centres round an analogous teaching process applied to machines. The idea of an unorganized machine is defined, and it is suggested that the infant human cortex is of this nature. Simple examples of such machines are given, and their education by means of rewards and punishments is discussed.