A new trove of highly classified leaked documents from the Chinese communist government shows how Beijing operates their widespread concentration camps where they reportedly have millions of Muslims and other minorities locked-up. The International Consortium of Investigative Journalists (ICIJ) reports that the leaked documents reveal that "Chinese police are guided by a massive data collection and analysis system that uses artificial intelligence to select entire categories of Xinjiang residents for detention." The manual obtained by ICIJ gives detailed instructions on everything from deciding when to let detainees use the toilet to how to keep the camps' existence totally secret. "The China Cables reveal how the system is able to amass vast amounts of intimate personal data through warrantless manual searches, facial recognition cameras, and other means to identify candidates for detention, flagging for investigation hundreds of thousands merely for using certain popular mobile phone apps. The documents detail explicit directives to arrest Uighurs with foreign citizenship and to track Xinjiang Uighurs living abroad, some of whom have been deported back to China by authoritarian governments. Among those implicated as taking part in the global dragnet: China's embassies and consulates."

The high frequency of road accidents makes driver safety one of the biggest challenges fleet managers face each day. In the US alone, 6 million car accidents every year happen every year, with more than 40,000 motor vehicle accident-related deaths in 2017. The stats on individual crashes are just as shocking. A report by the Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OHSA) found that vehicle crashes can cost employers between $16,500 and $74,000 for each injured driver. Distracted driving refers to any behavior that takes a driver's attention off the road.

The following is the Nov. 21, 2019 Congressional Research Service report, Artificial Intelligence and National Security. Artificial intelligence (AI) is a rapidly growing field of technology with potentially significant implications for national security. As such, the U.S. Department of Defense (DOD) and other nations are developing AI applications for a range of military functions. AI research is underway in the fields of intelligence collection and analysis, logistics, cyber operations, information operations, command and control, and in a variety of semiautonomous and autonomous vehicles. Already, AI has been incorporated into military operations in Iraq and Syria.

Quantum computing is a computational paradigm with the potential to outperform classical methods for a variety of problems. Proposed recently, the Quantum Approximate Optimization Algorithm (QAOA) is considered as one of the leading candidates for demonstrating quantum advantage in the near term. QAOA is a variational hybrid quantum-classical algorithm for approximately solving combinatorial optimization problems. The quality of the solution obtained by QAOA for a given problem instance depends on the performance of the classical optimizer used to optimize the variational parameters. In this paper, we formulate the problem of finding optimal QAOA parameters as a learning task in which the knowledge gained from solving training instances can be leveraged to find high-quality solutions for unseen test instances. To this end, we develop two machine-learning-based approaches. Our first approach adopts a reinforcement learning (RL) framework to learn a policy network to optimize QAOA circuits. Our second approach adopts a kernel density estimation (KDE) technique to learn a generative model of optimal QAOA parameters. In both approaches, the training procedure is performed on small-sized problem instances that can be simulated on a classical computer; yet the learned RL policy and the generative model can be used to efficiently solve larger problems. Extensive simulations using the IBM Qiskit Aer quantum circuit simulator demonstrate that our proposed RL- and KDE-based approaches reduce the optimality gap by factors up to 30.15 when compared with other commonly used off-the-shelf optimizers.

Synthetic biology allows us to bioengineer cells to synthesize novel valuable molecules such as renewable biofuels or anticancer drugs. However, traditional synthetic biology approaches involve ad-hoc non systematic engineering practices, which lead to long development times. Here, we present the Automated Recommendation Tool ( ART), a tool that leverages machine learning and probabilistic modeling techniques to guide synthetic biology in a systematic fashion, without the need for a full mechanistic understanding of the biological system. Using sampling-based optimization, ART provides a set of recommended strains to be built in the next engineering cycle, alongside probabilistic predictions of their production levels. We demonstrate the capabilities of ART on simulated and real data sets and discuss possible difficulties in achieving satisfactory predictive power. 2 Introduction Metabolic engineering 1 enables us to bioengineer cells to synthesize novel valuable molecules such as renewable biofuels 2,3 or anticancer drugs.

Past literature has been effective in demonstrating ideological gaps in machine learning (ML) fairness definitions when considering their use in complex socio-technical systems. However, we go further to demonstrate that these definitions often misunderstand the legal concepts from which they purport to be inspired, and consequently inappropriately co-opt legal language. In this paper, we demonstrate examples of this misalignment and discuss the differences in ML terminology and their legal counterparts, as well as what both the legal and ML fairness communities can learn from these tensions. We focus this paper on U.S. anti-discrimination law since the ML fairness research community regularly references terms from this body of law.

--This research proposes a new (old) metric for evaluating goodness of fit in topic models, the coefficient of determination, or R 2 . Within the context of topic modeling, R 2 has the same interpretation that it does when used in a broader class of statistical models. Reporting R 2 with topic models addresses two current problems in topic modeling: a lack of standard cross-contextual evaluation metrics for topic modeling and ease of communication with lay audiences. The author proposes that R 2 should be reported as a standard metric when constructing topic models. I NTRODUCTION According to an often-quoted but never cited definition, "the goodness of fit of a statistical model describes how well it fits a set of observations. Measures of goodness of fit typically summarize the discrepancy between observed values and the values expected under the model in question." 1 Goodness of fit measures vary with the goals of those constructing the statistical model. Inferential goals may emphasize in-sample fit while predictive goals may emphasize out-of-sample fit. Prior information may be included in the goodness of fit measure for Bayesian models, or it may not. Goodness of fit measures may include methods to correct for model overfitting. In short, goodness of fit measures the performance of a statistical model against the ground truth of observed data. Fitting the data well is generally a necessary--though not sufficient--condition for trust in a statistical model, whatever its goals. Of course, goodness of fit is only one concern in statistical modeling.

In the last two years, more than 200 papers have been written on how machine learning (ML) systems can fail because of adversarial attacks on the algorithms and data; this number balloons if we were to incorporate papers covering non-adversarial failure modes. The spate of papers has made it difficult for ML practitioners, let alone engineers, lawyers, and policymakers, to keep up with the attacks against and defenses of ML systems. However, as these systems become more pervasive, the need to understand how they fail, whether by the hand of an adversary or due to the inherent design of a system, will only become more pressing. In order to equip software developers, security incident responders, lawyers, and policy makers with a common vernacular to talk about this problem, we developed a framework to classify failures into "Intentional failures" where the failure is caused by an active adversary attempting to subvert the system to attain her goals; and "Unintentional failures" where the failure is because an ML system produces an inherently unsafe outcome. After developing the initial version of the taxonomy last year, we worked with security and ML teams across Microsoft, 23 external partners, standards organization, and governments to understand how stakeholders would use our framework. Throughout the paper, we attempt to highlight how machine learning failure modes are meaningfully different from traditional software failures from a technology and policy perspective.

With the ever-increasing reliance on data for data-driven applications in power grids, such as event cause analysis, the authenticity of data streams has become crucially important. The data can be prone to adversarial stealthy attacks aiming to manipulate the data such that residual-based bad data detectors cannot detect them, and the perception of system operators or event classifiers changes about the actual event. This paper investigates the impact of adversarial attacks on convolutional neural network-based event cause analysis frameworks. We have successfully verified the ability of adversaries to maliciously misclassify events through stealthy data manipulations. The vulnerability assessment is studied with respect to the number of compromised measurements. Furthermore, a defense mechanism to robustify the performance of the event cause analysis is proposed. The effectiveness of adversarial attacks on changing the output of the framework is studied using the data generated by real-time digital simulator (RTDS) under different scenarios such as type of attacks and level of access to data.

We propose a generative model for adversarial attack. The model generates subtle but predictive patterns from the input. To perform an attack, it replaces the patterns of the input with those generated based on examples from some other class. We demonstrate our model by attacking CNN on MNIST. Introduction Recent researches show that machine learning models are vulnerable to adversarial attacks Szegedy et al. (2014); Goodfellow, Shlens, and Szegedy (2015).