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Congruence between model and human attention reveals unique signatures of critical visual events
Current computational models of bottom-up and top-down components of attention arepredictive of eye movements across a range of stimuli and of simple, fixed visual tasks (such as visual search for a target among distractors). However, todate there exists no computational framework which can reliably mimic human gaze behavior in more complex environments and tasks, such as driving a vehicle through traffic. Here, we develop a hybrid computational/behavioral framework, combining simple models for bottom-up salience and top-down relevance, andlooking for changes in the predictive power of these components at different critical event times during 4.7 hours (500,000 video frames) of observers playing car racing and flight combat video games. This approach is motivated by our observation that the predictive strengths of the salience and relevance models exhibitreliable temporal signatures during critical event windows in the task sequence--for example, when the game player directly engages an enemy plane in a flight combat game, the predictive strength of the salience model increases significantly, while that of the relevance model decreases significantly. Our new framework combines these temporal signatures to implement several event detectors. Critically,we find that an event detector based on fused behavioral and stimulus information (in the form of the model's predictive strength) is much stronger than detectors based on behavioral information alone (eye position) or image information alone(model prediction maps). This approach to event detection, based on eye tracking combined with computational models applied to the visual input, may have useful applications as a less-invasive alternative to other event detection approaches based on neural signatures derived from EEG or fMRI recordings.
Computing Robust Counter-Strategies
Johanson, Michael, Zinkevich, Martin, Bowling, Michael
Adaptation to other initially unknown agents often requires computing an effective counter-strategy. In the Bayesian paradigm, one must find a good counter-strategy to the inferred posterior of the other agents' behavior. In the experts paradigm, one may want to choose experts that are good counter-strategies to the other agents' expected behavior. In this paper we introduce a technique for computing robust counter-strategies for adaptation in multiagent scenarios under a variety of paradigms. The strategies can take advantage of a suspected tendency in the decisions of the other agents, while bounding the worst-case performance when the tendency is not observed. The technique involves solving a modified game, and therefore can make use of recently developed algorithms for solving very large extensive games. We demonstrate the effectiveness of the technique in two-player Texas Hold'em. We show that the computed poker strategies are substantially more robust than best response counter-strategies, while still exploiting a suspected tendency. We also compose the generated strategies in an experts algorithm showing a dramatic improvement in performance over using simple best responses.
A Risk Minimization Principle for a Class of Parzen Estimators
Pelckmans, Kristiaan, Suykens, Johan, Moor, Bart D.
This paper explores the use of a Maximal Average Margin (MAM) optimality principle for the design of learning algorithms. It is shown that the application of this risk minimization principle results in a class of (computationally) simple learning machines similar to the classical Parzen window classifier. A direct relation with the Rademacher complexities is established, as such facilitating analysis and providing a notion of certainty of prediction. This analysis is related to Support Vector Machines by means of a margin transformation. The power of the MAM principle is illustrated further by application to ordinal regression tasks, resulting in an $O(n)$ algorithm able to process large datasets in reasonable time.
Collapsed Variational Inference for HDP
Teh, Yee W., Kurihara, Kenichi, Welling, Max
A wide variety of Dirichlet-multinomial'topic' models have found interesting applications inrecent years. While Gibbs sampling remains an important method of inference in such models, variational techniques have certain advantages such as easy assessment of convergence, easy optimization without the need to maintain detailed balance, a bound on the marginal likelihood, and sidestepping of issues with topic-identifiability. The most accurate variational technique thus far, namely collapsed variational latent Dirichlet allocation, did not deal with model selection nor did it include inference for hyperparameters. We address both issues by generalizing thetechnique, obtaining the first variational algorithm to deal with the hierarchical Dirichlet process and to deal with hyperparameters of Dirichlet variables.
Regret Minimization in Games with Incomplete Information
Zinkevich, Martin, Johanson, Michael, Bowling, Michael, Piccione, Carmelo
Extensive games are a powerful model of multiagent decision-making scenarios with incomplete information. Finding a Nash equilibrium for very large instances of these games has received a great deal of recent attention. In this paper, we describe a new technique for solving large games based on regret minimization. In particular, we introduce the notion of counterfactual regret, which exploits the degree of incomplete information in an extensive game. We show how minimizing counterfactual regret minimizes overall regret, and therefore in self-play can be used to compute a Nash equilibrium. We demonstrate this technique in the domain of poker, showing we can solve abstractions of limit Texas Hold'em with as many as 10