Objects in freely-drawn sketches often have no spatial or temporal separation, making object recognition difficult. We present a two-step stroke-grouping algorithm that first classifies individual strokes according to the type of object to which they belong, then groups strokes with like classifications into clusters representing individual objects. The first step facilitates clustering by naturally separating the strokes, and both steps fluidly integrate spatial and temporal information. Our approach to grouping is unique in its formulation as an efficient classification task rather than, for example, an expensive search task. Our single-stroke classifier performs at least as well as existing single-stroke classifiers on text vs. nontext classification, and we present the first three-way single-stroke classification results. Our stroke grouping results are the first reported of their kind; our grouping algorithm correctly groups between 86% and 91% of the ink in diagrams from two domains, with between 69% and 79% of shapes being perfectly clustered.

This paper presents a computational framework for saliency maps. It employs the Earth Mover's Distance based on weighted-Histogram (EMD-wH) to measure the center-surround difference, instead of the Difference-of-Gaussian (DoG) filter used by traditional models. In addition, the model employs not only the traditional features such as colors, intensity and orientation but also the local entropy which expresses the local complexity. The major advantage of combining the local entropy map is that it can detect the salient regions which are not complex regions. Also, it uses a general framework to integrate the feature dimensions instead of summing the features directly. This model considers both local and global salient information, in contrast to the existing models that consider only one or the other. Furthermore, the "large scale bias" and "central bias" hypotheses are used in this model to select the fixation locations in the saliency map of different scales. The performance of this model is assessed by comparing their saliency maps and human fixation density. The results from this model are finally compared to those from other bottom-up models for reference.

We consider the problem of automatic vocal melody transcription: translating an audio recording of a sung melody into a musical score. While previous work has focused on finding the closest notes to the singer's tracked pitch, we instead seek to recover the melody the singer intended to sing. Often, the melody a singer intended to sing differs from what they actually sang; our hypothesis is that this occurs in a singer-specific way. For example, a given singer may often be flat in certain parts of her range, or another may have difficulty with certain intervals. We thus pursue methods for singer-specific training which use learning to combine different methods for pitch prediction. In our experiments with human subjects, we show that via a short training procedure we can learn a singer-specific pitch predictor and significantly improve transcription of intended pitch over other methods. For an average user, our method gives a 20 to 30 percent reduction in pitch classification errors with respect to a baseline method which is comparable to commercial voice transcription tools. For some users, we achieve even more dramatic reductions. Our best results come from a combination of singer-specific-learning with non-singer-specific feature selection. We also discuss the implications of our work for training more general control signals. We make our experimental data available to allow others to replicate or extend our results.

We study a problem of dynamic allocation without money. Agents have arrivals and departures and strict preferences over items. Strategyproofness requires the use of an arrival-priority serial-dictatorship (APSD) mechanism, which is ex post Pareto efficient but has poor ex ante efficiency as measured through average rank efficiency. We introduce the scoring-rule (SR) mechanism, which biases in favor of allocating items that an agent values above the population consensus. The SR mechanism is not strategyproof but has tolerable manipulability in the sense that: (i) if every agent optimally manipulates, it reduces to APSD, and (ii) it significantly outperforms APSD for rank efficiency when only a fraction of agents are strategic. The performance of SR is also robust to mistakes by agents that manipulate on the basis of inaccurate information about the popularity of items.

We study the distributed allocation of tasks to cooperating robots in real time, where each task has to be assigned to exactly one robot so that the sum of the latencies of all tasks is as small as possible. We propose a new auction-like algorithm, called Sequential Incremental-Value (SIV) auction, which assigns tasks to robots in multiple rounds. The idea behind SIV auctions is to assign as many tasks per round to robots as possible as long as their individual costs for performing these tasks are at most a given bound, which increases exponentially from round to round. Our theoretical results show that the team costs of SIV auctions are at most a constant factor larger than minimal.

Auction processes have been a well-established research Different from one-shot combinatorial auctions, the main theme in economics and recently become an emerging research issue of a dynamic auction is whether the procedure can lead topic in AI due to a set of related computational challenges to an equilibrium state (Walrasian equilibrium) at which all (Cramton et al. 2006). It is well-known that the problem the selling items are effectively allocated to the buyers (equilibrium of winner determination in a combinatorial auction is allocation) and the price of each bundle of items NPcomplete (Rothkopf et al. 1998; Sandholm 2002). However, gives the buyers their best values (equilibrium price). It most of the discussions on the computational issues has been observed that without certain assumptions on buyers' of combinatorial auctions are based on one-shot sealed-bid value functions, there is no guarantee for a dynamic mechanisms. This paper aims to make a contribution towards auction to converge toward an equilibrium (Gul and Stacchetti the discussions on dynamic procedures of combinatorial 1999). Kelso and Crawford (1982) proposed a condition, auctions.

We consider settings in which voters vote in sequence, each voter knows the votes of the earlier voters and the preferences of the later voters, and voters are strategic. This can be modeled as an extensive-form game of perfect information, which we call a Stackelberg voting game. We first propose a dynamic-programming algorithm for finding the backward-induction outcome for any Stackelberg voting game when the rule is anonymous; this algorithm is efficient if the number of alternatives is no more than a constant. We show how to use compilation functions to further reduce the time and space requirements. Our main theoretical results are paradoxes for the backward-induction outcomes of Stackelberg voting games. We show that for any n ≥ 5 and any voting rule that satisfies nonimposition and with a low domination index, there exists a profile consisting of n voters, such that the backward-induction outcome is ranked somewhere in the bottom two positions in almost every voter’s preferences. Moreover, this outcome loses all but one of its pairwise elections. Furthermore, we show that many common voting rules have a very low (= 1) domination index, including all majority-consistent voting rules. For the plurality and nomination rules, we show even stronger paradoxes. Finally, using our dynamic-programming algorithm, we run simulations to compare the backward-induction outcome of the Stackelberg voting game to the winner when voters vote truthfully, for the plurality and veto rules. Surprisingly, our experimental results suggest that on average, more voters prefer the backward-induction outcome.

In computational social choice, one important problem is to take the votes of a subelectorate (subset of the voters), and summarize them using a small number of bits. This needs to be done in such a way that, if all that we know is the summary, as well as the votes of voters outside the subelectorate, we can conclude which of the m alternatives wins. This corresponds to the notion of compilation complexity, the minimum number of bits required to summarize the votes for a particular rule, which was introduced by Chevaleyre et al. [IJCAI-09]. We study three different types of compilation complexity. The first, studied by Chevaleyre et al., depends on the size of the subelectorate but not on the size of the complement (the voters outside the subelectorate). The second depends on the size of the complement but not on the size of the subelectorate. The third depends on both. We first investigate the relations among the three types of compilation complexity. Then, we give upper and lower bounds on all three types of compilation complexity for the most prominent voting rules. We show that for l -approval (when l ≤ m /2), Borda, and Bucklin, the bounds for all three types are asymptotically tight, up to a multiplicative constant; for l-approval (when l > m /2), plurality with runoff, all Condorcet consistent rules that are based on unweighted majority graphs (including Copeland and voting trees), and all Condorcet consistent rules that are based on the order of pairwise elections (including ranked pairs and maximin), the bounds for all three types are asymptotically tight up to a multiplicative constant when the sizes of the subelectorate and its complement are both larger than m 1+ε for some ε > 0.

It is standard in multiagent settings to assume that agents will adopt Nash equilibrium strategies. However, studies in experimental economics demonstrate that Nash equilibrium is a poor description of human players' initial behavior in normal-form games. In this paper, we consider a wide range of widely-studied models from behavioral game theory. For what we believe is the first time, we evaluate each of these models in a meta-analysis, taking as our data set large-scale and publicly-available experimental data from the literature. We then propose modifications to the best-performing model that we believe make it more suitable for practical prediction of initial play by humans in normal-form games.

We consider a very natural problem concerned with game manipulation. Let G be a directed graph where the nodes represent players of a game, and an edge from u to v means that u can beat v in the game. (If an edge ( u, v ) is not present, one cannot match u and v. ) Given G and a "favorite" node A , is it possible to set up the bracket of a balanced single-elimination tournament so that A is guaranteed to win, if matches occur as predicted by G? We show that the problem is NP-complete for general graphs. For the case when G is a tournament graph we give several interesting conditions on the desired winner A for which there exists a balanced single-elimination tournament which A wins, and it can be found in polynomial time.