Decentralized partially observable Markov decision processes (DEC-POMDPs) are used to plan policies for multiple agents that must maximize a joint reward function but do not communicate with each other. The agents act under uncertainty about each other and the environment. This planning task arises in optimization of wireless networks, and other scenarios where communication between agents is restricted by costs or physical limits. DEC-POMDPs are a promising solution, but optimizing policies quickly becomes computationally intractable when problem size grows. Factored DEC-POMDPs allow large problems to be described in compact form, but have the same worst case complexity as non-factored DEC-POMDPs. We propose an efficient optimization algorithm for large factored infinite-horizon DEC-POMDPs. We formulate expectation-maximization based optimization into a new form, where complexity can be kept tractable by factored approximations. Our method performs well, and it can solve problems with more agents and larger state spaces than state of the art DEC-POMDP methods. We give results for factored infinite-horizon DEC-POMDP problems with up to 10 agents.

Computational complexity of voting manipulation is one of the most actively studied topics in the area of computational social choice, starting with the groundbreaking work of [Bartholdi et al., 1989]. Most of the existing work in this area, including that of [Bartholdi et al., 1989], implicitly assumes that whenever several candidates receive the top score with respect to the given voting rule, the resulting tie is broken according to a lexicographic ordering over the candidates. However, till recently, an equally appealing method of tiebreaking, namely, selecting the winner uniformly at random among all tied candidates, has not been considered in the computational social choice literature. The first paper to analyze the complexity of voting manipulation under randomized tiebreaking is [Obraztsova et al., 2011], where the authors provide polynomial-time algorithms for this problem under scoring rules and—under an additional assumption on the manipulator’s utilities—for Maximin. In this paper, we extend the results of [Obraztsova et al., 2011] by showing that finding an optimal vote under randomized tie-breaking is computationally hard for Copeland and Maximin (with general utilities), as well as for STV and Ranked Pairs, but easy for the Bucklin rule and Plurality with Runoff.

In agent-oriented programming and planning, agents' actions are typically specified in terms of postconditions, and the model of execution assumes that the environment carries the actions out exactly as specified. That is, it is assumed that the state of the environment after an action has been executed will satisfy its postcondition. In reality, however, such environments are rare: the actual execution of an action may fail, and the envisaged outcome is not met. We provide a conceptual framework for reasoning about success and failure of agents' behaviours. In particular, we propose a measure that reflects how "good" an environment is with respect to agent's capabilities and a given goal it might pursue. We also discuss which types of goals are worth pursuing, depending on the type of environment the agent is acting in.

Humans have developed jurisprudence as a mechanism to solve conflictive situations by using past experiences. Following this principle, we propose an approach to enhance a multi-agent system by adding an authority which is able to generate new regulations whenever conflicts arise. Regulations are generated by learning from previous similar situations, using a machine learning technique (based on Case-Based Reasoning) that solves new problems using previous experiences. This approach requires: to be able to gather and evaluate experiences; and to be described in such a way that similar social situations require similar regulations. As a scenario to evaluate our proposal, we use a simplified version of a traffic scenario, where agents are traveling cars. Our goals are to avoid collisions between cars and to avoid heavy traffic. These situations, when happen, lead to the synthesis of new regulations. At each simulation step, applicable regulations are evaluated in terms of their effectiveness and necessity. Overtime the system generates a set of regulations that, if followed, improve system performance (i.e. goal achievement).

Cooperation among automated agents is becoming increasingly important in various artificial intelligence applications. Coalitional (i.e., cooperative) game theory supplies conceptual and mathematical tools useful in the analysis of such interactions, and in particular in the achievement of stable outcomes among self-interested agents. Here, we study the minimal external subsidy required to stabilize the core of a coalitional game. Following the Cost of Stability (CoS) model introduced by Bachrach et al. [2009a], we give tight bounds on the required subsidy under various restrictions on the social structure of the game. We then compare the extended core induced by subsidies with the least core of the game, proving tight bounds on the ratio between the minimal subsidy and the minimal demand relaxation that each lead to stability.

Cooperative path-finding can be abstracted as computing non-colliding paths for multiple agents between their start and goal locations on a graph. This paper proposes a fast algorithm that can provide completeness guarantees for a general class of problems without any assumptions about the graph's topology. Specifically, the approach can address any solvable instance where there are at most n -2 agents in a graph of size n . The algorithm employs two primitives: a "push" operation where agents move towards their goals up to the point that no progress can be made, and a "swap" operation that allows two agents to swap positions without altering the configuration of other agents. Simulated experiments are provided on hard instances of cooperative path-finding, including comparisons against alternative methods. The results are favorable for the proposed algorithm and show that the technique scales to problems that require high levels of coordination, involving hundreds of agents.

While voting schemes provide an effective means for aggregating preferences, methods for the effective elicitation of voter preferences have received little attention. We address this problem by first considering approximate winner determination when incomplete voter preferences are provided. Exploiting natural scoring metrics, we use max regret to measure the quality or robustness of proposed winners, and develop polynomial time algorithms for computing the alternative with minimax regret for several popular voting rules. We then show how minimax regret can be used to effectively drive incremental preference/vote elicitation and devise several heuristics for this process. Despite worst-case theoretical results showing that most voting protocols require nearly complete voter preferences to determine winners, we demonstrate the practical effectiveness of regret-based elicitation for determining both approximate and exact winners on several real-world data sets.

We develop a general framework for social choice problems in which a limited number of alternatives can be recommended to an agent population. In our budgeted social choice model, this limit is determined by a budget, capturing problems that arise naturally in a variety of contexts, and spanning the continuum from pure consensus decision making (i.e., standard social choice) to fully personalized recommendation. Our approach applies a form of segmentation to social choice problems— requiring the selection of diverse options tailored to different agent types—and generalizes certain multi-winner election schemes. We show that standard rank aggregation methods perform poorly, and that optimization in our model is NP-complete; but we develop fast greedy algorithms with some theoretical guarantees. Experiments on real-world datasets demonstrate the effectiveness of our algorithms.

Algorithms for finding game-theoretic solutions are now used in several real-world security applications. This work has generally assumed a Stackelberg model where the defender commits to a mixed strategy first. In general two-player normal-form games, Stackelberg strategies are easier to compute than Nash equilibria, though it has recently been shown that in many security games, Stackelberg strategies are also Nash strategies for the defender. However, the work on security games so far assumes that the attacker attacks only a single target. In this paper, we generalize to the case where the attacker attacks multiple targets simultaneously. Here, Stackelberg and Nash strategies for the defender can be truly different. We provide a polynomial-time algorithm for finding a Nash equilibrium. The algorithm gradually increases the number of defender resources and maintains an equilibrium throughout this process. Moreover, we prove that Nash equilibria in security games with multiple attackers satisfy the interchange property, which resolves the problem of equilibrium selection in such games. On the other hand, we show that Stackelberg strategies are actually NP-hard to compute in this context. Finally, we provide experimental results.

Car pollution is one of the major causes of green-house emissions, and traffic congestion is rapidly becoming a social plague. Dynamic Ride Sharing (DRS) systems have the potential to mitigate this problem by computing plans for car drivers, e.g. commuters, allowing them to share their rides. Existing efforts in DRS are suffering from the problem that participants are abandoning the system after repeatedly failing to get a shared ride. In this paper we present an incentive compatible DRS solution based on auctions. While existing DRS systems are mainly focusing on fixed assignments that min- imize the totally travelled distance, the presented approach is adaptive to individual preferences of the participants. Furthermore, our system allows to tradeoff the minimization of Vehicle Kilometers Travelled (VKT) with the overall probability of successful ride-shares, which is an important fea- ture when bootstrapping the system. To the best of our knowledge, we are the first to present a DRS solution based on auctions using a sealed-bid second price scheme.