Maximum variance unfolding (MVU) is an effective heuristic for dimensionality reduction. It produces a low-dimensional representation of the data by maximizing the variance of their embeddings while preserving the local distances of the original data. We show that MVU also optimizes a statistical dependence measure which aims to retain the identity of individual observations under the distancepreserving constraints. This general view allows us to design "colored" variants of MVU, which produce low-dimensional representations for a given task, e.g.

Incorporating invariances into a learning algorithm is a common problem in machine learning.We provide a convex formulation which can deal with arbitrary loss functions and arbitrary losses. In addition, it is a drop-in replacement for most optimization algorithms for kernels, including solvers of the SVMStruct family. The advantage of our setting is that it relies on column generation instead of modifying theunderlying optimization problem directly.

Statistical tests of independence have been associated with a broad variety of dependence measures. Classical tests such as Spearman's,0 and Kendall's 7' are widely applied, however they are not

Maximum variance unfolding (MVU) is an effective heuristic for dimensionality reduction. It produces a low-dimensional representation of the data by maximizing thevariance of their embeddings while preserving the local distances of the original data. We show that MVU also optimizes a statistical dependence measure which aims to retain the identity of individual observations under the distancepreserving constraints.This general view allows us to design "colored" variants of MVU, which produce low-dimensional representations for a given task, e.g.

Guided by the goal of obtaining an optimization algorithm that is both fast and yielding good generalization, we study the descent direction maximizing the decrease in generalization error or the probability of not increasing generalization error. The surprising result is that from both the Bayesian and frequentist perspectives this can yield the natural gradient direction. Although that direction can be very expensive to compute we develop an efficient, general, online approximation to the natural gradient descent which is suited to large scale problems. We report experimental results showing much faster convergence in computation time and in number of iterations with TONGA (Topmoumoute Online natural Gradient Algorithm) than with stochastic gradient descent, even on very large datasets.

Although kernel measures of independence have been widely applied in machine learning (notably in kernel ICA), there is as yet no method to determine whether they have detected statistically significant dependence. We provide a novel test of the independence hypothesis for one particular kernel independence measure, the Hilbert-Schmidt independence criterion (HSIC).

Incorporating invariances into a learning algorithm is a common problem in machine learning. We provide a convex formulation which can deal with arbitrary loss functions and arbitrary losses. In addition, it is a drop-in replacement for most optimization algorithms for kernels, including solvers of the SVMStruct family. The advantage of our setting is that it relies on column generation instead of modifying the underlying optimization problem directly.

Shapley's impossibility result indicates that the two-person bargaining problem has no non-trivial ordinal solution with the traditional game-theoretic bargaining model. Although the result is no longer true for bargaining problems with more than two agents, none of the well known bargaining solutions are ordinal. Searching for meaningful ordinal solutions, especially for the bilateral bargaining problem, has been a challenging issue in bargaining theory for more than three decades. This paper proposes a logic-based ordinal solution to the bilateral bargaining problem. We argue that if a bargaining problem is modeled in terms of the logical relation of players' physical negotiation items, a meaningful bargaining solution can be constructed based on the ordinal structure of bargainers' preferences. We represent bargainers' demands in propositional logic and bargainers' preferences over their demands in total preorder. We show that the solution satisfies most desirable logical properties, such as individual rationality (logical version), consistency, collective rationality as well as a few typical game-theoretic properties, such as weak Pareto optimality and contraction invariance. In addition, if all players' demand sets are logically closed, the solution satisfies a fixed-point condition, which says that the outcome of a negotiation is the result of mutual belief revision. Finally, we define various decision problems in relation to our bargaining model and study their computational complexity.

This paper presents the computational logic foundations of a model of agency called the KGP (Knowledge, Goals and Plan model. This model allows the specification of heterogeneous agents that can interact with each other, and can exhibit both proactive and reactive behaviour allowing them to function in dynamic environments by adjusting their goals and plans when changes happen in such environments. KGP provides a highly modular agent architecture that integrates a collection of reasoning and physical capabilities, synthesised within transitions that update the agent's state in response to reasoning, sensing and acting. Transitions are orchestrated by cycle theories that specify the order in which transitions are executed while taking into account the dynamic context and agent preferences, as well as selection operators for providing inputs to transitions.

We address the problem of reinforcement learning in which observations may exhibit an arbitrary form of stochastic dependence on past observations and actions, i.e. environments more general than (PO)MDPs. The task for an agent is to attain the best possible asymptotic reward where the true generating environment is unknown but belongs to a known countable family of environments. We find some sufficient conditions on the class of environments under which an agent exists which attains the best asymptotic reward for any environment in the class. We analyze how tight these conditions are and how they relate to different probabilistic assumptions known in reinforcement learning and related fields, such as Markov Decision Processes and mixing conditions.