During his eight years as community alert and warning manager in Sonoma County, California, Sam Wallis has repeatedly watched wildfires roar through the cities and small towns he protects. Often with little warning, fires have razed homes and charred the area's picturesque hillsides, valleys and vineyards just north of San Francisco. Wallis had to evacuate his own home last year. And in 2017 his property was strewn with wind-blown debris from the deadly, 37,000-acre Tubbs Fire, one of the most destructive in California's history. "The Tubbs Fire was the seminal event, an absolutely massive and fast-moving fire that we had no way of tracking," Wallis says.

Among the many adverse impacts of climate change in the most vulnerable countries, climate change–induced displacement increasingly caused by extreme weather events is a serious concern, particularly in densely populated Asian countries. Reports by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) project a grim picture for South Asia, the most populous region on Earth, home to about one-quarter of global population, with the highest poverty incidence. A combination of poor socioeconomic indicators and increased frequency and intensity of cyclones and floods renders the region extremely vulnerable. Meanwhile, slow-onset climate hazards, such as sea level rise, salinity intrusion, water stress, and crop failures gradually turn into larger disasters. Within South Asia, Bangladesh stands as the most vulnerable: 4.1 million people were displaced as a result of climate disasters in 2019 (2.5% of the population), 13.3 million people could be displaced by climate change by 2050, and 18% of its coastland will remain inundated by 2080 ([ 1 ][1]). We describe how, faced with such natural and human-made adversities, Bangladesh can stand as a model of disaster management, adaptation, and resilience. The Paris Agreement goal of keeping the temperature rise at 1.5°C or well below 2°C compared to pre-industrial times may not be achieved, given the lack of ambitious mitigation. As a result, the number of people estimated to be displaced by slow-onset events will stand at ∼22.5 million by 2030 and ∼34.4 million by 2050 ([ 2 ][2]). A combination of sudden and slow-onset climate events, which affect all elements of the environment, becomes the main driver of environmental displacement. Migration is an adaptation strategy. An estimated half a million people move to Dhaka, the capital city of Bangladesh, each year. Migration of this magnitude presents a challenge for Bangladesh given its small land area (147,570 km2) and high population density (∼1100/km2). There is simply little space for retreat: Bangladesh's population is half that of the United States, living on ∼1.5% of the land area of the United States. Usually, three pathways can be discerned with respect to how displaced people are settled: autonomous relocation by displaced individuals (without much government support), government-supported temporary settlement, and planned relocation. In Bangladesh, the first option overwhelms, followed by efforts for temporary settlement, until the government rehabilitates their former residences. Planned relocation or managed retreat in response to climate change ([ 3 ][3]) is not yet happening widely because of space and resource constraints. ![Figure][4] Building migrant-friendly, climate-resilient cities in Bangladesh The map shows some activities being undertaken to build migrant-friendly and climate-resilient cities in Bangladesh. Descriptions of activities are based on publicly available information about the programs, and on discussions with representatives of the NGO BRAC. GRAPHIC: N. DESAI/ SCIENCE Since the founding of Bangladesh in 1971, and even earlier in Pakistan, government-planned relocation of people displaced by riverbank erosion has fueled ethnic conflicts in the Chittagong Hill Tracts in the southeast part of the country, because the move was not backed by consultations with tribal communities. About 100,000 of more than a million Rohingya refugees in Bangladesh, fleeing persecution in Myanmar, are being relocated to Bhasan Char, an island in the Bay of Bengal. In land-hungry Bangladesh, most of the 30+ such Chars/mudflats in the bay are already inhabited at different degrees by people displaced by riverbank erosion and climate change. Despite these odds, Bangladesh is a leader in economic growth among developing countries and in mainstreaming climate change into its development strategy. Partially in response to scientific findings, the National Strategy on the Management of Disaster and Climate Induced Internal Displacement (N SMDCIID) adopted in 2015 incorporated disaster risk reduction and rights-based approaches, so that vulnerable communities can enjoy their basic rights to livelihood, food, health, and housing. The Strategy is built on an integrated Displacement Management Framework, in line with the migration management cycle of the International Organization of Migration (IOM). This Framework elaborates responses during the three phases of mobility management: pre-displacement [disaster risk reduction (DRR)], displacement (emergency), and post-displacement (rehabilitation/relocation). Under the Strategy, the government has initiated support for livelihood opportunities, housing, and human development of displaced people in vulnerable hotspots. It is likely that the government-supported community mobilization and disaster management and DRR policies, both before and after adoption of this Strategy, were helpful in lessening the number of casualties from the supercyclone Amphan in May 2020. One way to address displacements under increasing urbanization across the world could be the establishment of peri-urban growth centers and transformation of cities and towns to be migrant-friendly. This option appears practicable for populous countries such as Bangladesh, having little space for retreat from vulnerable hotspots. To achieve this, institutional changes in a city need to be fostered by research, planning, design, and capacity building. Examples from cities such as Durban, Quito, Semarang, and Malé indicate that cities may need to develop general as well as sector-based strategies to manage effective climate change adaptation ([ 4 ][5]). This warrants the linking of adaptation planning and implementation to city priorities. Cities must have access to reliable information and opportunities to share experiences through local, regional, national, and international networks ([ 4 ][5]). National and local governments should develop migrant-friendly plans along three lines: building of resilient hardware, such as low-cost housing, industries for employment generation, and other infrastructure; software, such as legal, policy, and institutional frameworks; and “heart-ware”—the promotion of awareness, reflecting values and ethics. The basic parameters for safe and orderly movement for migrants are to ensure employment, social protection, access to education, housing, health services, utilities, etc. Although government support is important, engagement of the private sector, nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), civil society, and university-led research can strengthen municipal adaptation efforts. This is what the International Centre for Climate Change and Development (ICCCAD) in Bangladesh has been doing—to facilitate the transformation of smaller peripheral towns to be migrant-friendly as a climate adaptation strategy (see the figure). Our work has multiple purposes: to shift the tide of migration away from Dhaka and other large cities toward smaller towns, and to decentralize climate-resilient development and facilitate planning for basic services and amenities. In Bangladesh, a majority of those displaced by climate change prefer non-migration from their ancestral roots ([ 5 ][6]) if they are provided support for improving their livelihood, housing, etc. Settlement of displaced people in a town nearer to their ancestral home allows them to maintain psychological kinship and cultural comforts. On the basis of such local context and needs, each migrant-friendly town needs its own development and adaptation plans to address climate risks and economic opportunities. The NGO BRAC has initially identified about 20 towns and municipalities, considering their economic potential and climate stress, to determine whether they can absorb a sizeable number of displaced people. A number of satellite towns adjacent to economic hubs, such as relatively elevated sea and river ports and export processing zones (EPZs), can potentially employ millions of migrants. Investment in manufacturing and/or services is generating jobs through public, private, and community partnerships, such as private investments, government support, and microfinancing from BRAC and Grameen Bank. ICCCAD has formal agreements with many ministries and agencies including the Local Government Engineering Department (LGED), the agency for building and maintenance of rural infrastructure. ICCCAD has been working as an advisor and co-implementer of programs with all stakeholders, including mayors in two small towns in coastal Bangladesh, Mongla and Noapara (see the figure). It is helping town authorities in planning and implementing initiatives that are intended to be hospitable to incoming settlers, so that they can gradually be mainstreamed into citizenship ([ 6 ][7]). The process is based on a participatory, consultative process involving the municipal authorities, host community leaders, and settlers. The Strategy (NSMDCIID) includes options such as supporting livelihood for new settlers and skill development, both in displacement hotspots and in new settlements. Although these towns do not yet have adaptation plans as such, the programs consider risk-informed and socially conducive adaptation measures. BRAC with its Climate Bridge Fund is also currently implementing different programs in five cities: Khulna, Rajshahi, Satkhira, Barisal, and Sirajgonj. For programs under implementation in these cities, the target groups are incoming migrants, who crowd the slums. The activities undertaken in these cities are similar, with some specific activities in each town (see the figure). Most of the new settlers have moved from rural areas rendered inhospitable as a consequence of slow and sudden-onset climate impacts. ICCCAD started facilitating this program 3 years ago with a strategy of learning by doing. Among the lessons learned: (i) Vibrant economic activities in these rapidly growing towns are absorbing increasing numbers of migrants from vulnerable hotspots, and (ii) migrants with energy and agency are engaging themselves in different small businesses, with government support and microcredits from Grameen Bank and BRAC. The fact that an overwhelming share of those displaced by climate change around the world resettle internally indicates that adaptation in-country is the most viable option. The global community dealing with disaster displacement, including the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), primarily recommends this option. However, it requires adequate international support, which developed countries are obligated to deliver (with the language “shall provide”) under the UNFCCC and the Paris Agreement. Unfortunately, adaptation finance continues to remain the “poor cousin” of mitigation, the ratio remaining 20:80 despite repeated pledges by developed countries and agencies. For domestic resource mobilization, some countries (for example, Fiji) have introduced an adaptation levy on all goods and services produced and consumed in the country. There are limits to relocation in-country; sudden and slow-onset events sometimes trigger cross-border movement of individuals seeking jobs and protection. The UN Commission on Human Rights argues for looking at such mobility from a human-rights perspective (i.e., the space for realizing the basic human rights of livelihood, health, housing, etc.). Currently, those displaced by climate change suffer an international protection deficit, not qualifying as “refugees” under the 1951 Geneva Convention. Consideration of those displaced by climate change began in 2008 under the UNFCCC, with research and advocacy. The Cancun Adaptation Framework (Decision 1./CP16, paragraph 14f ) provides for different types of climate-induced human mobility (displacement, migration, and planned relocation), different scales of mobility (national, regional, and international), and different actions (research, cooperation, and coordination). This decision recognized migration as an adaptation strategy. The Nansen Initiative in 2011–2012 focused on promoting research and planned relocation. The Paris Agreement established a Task Force on Displacement under the Warsaw International Mechanism, with mandates to make recommendations for averting, minimizing, and addressing climate change–induced displacement. Finally, the Global Compact on Safe, Orderly, Regular and Responsive Migration was adopted in 2018 as the first multilateral framework to cooperate on migration, including in response to climate change. Many major countries and think tanks started looking at climate displacement through a lens of national security, with its characterization as a “threat multiplier,” and a number of nationally determined contributions under the Paris Agreement refer to those displaced by climate change as potentially fueling national and regional conflicts ([ 7 ][8]). However, climate security can be looked at either from a conflict perspective or from a lens of vulnerability-focused human and global security ([ 8 ][9]). The “conflict view” proponents call for closing the borders, but still the result of such a policy ends up being a humanitarian disaster, caused primarily by actions beyond the control of those being displaced or of their home countries. Should we see more of these displaced and disgruntled youth as victims in the hands of human traffickers? If not, we then argue—viewing this displacement in terms of vulnerability-focused human security—that planned relocation internationally can be an effective way forward under paragraph 14f of the Cancun agreement. As multilateral processes are typically very cumbersome and painstakingly slow, bilateral action can be more rapid and effective, and may then gradually feed into regional and global initiatives. For example, the Seasonal Migrant Worker Program in Australia and New Zealand, or New Zealand's Climate Visa Program ([ 9 ][10]), attract migrants from the Pacific Small Island States (although these initiatives are not solely meant for absorbing migrants displaced by climate change). Canada and the United States offered immigration opportunities to typhoon Haiyan victims, but these were based on kinship relations ([ 10 ][11]). Although the EU does not have a common policy, Finland and Sweden changed their earlier liberal policies on climate-induced displacement after the refugee influx from Syria ([ 11 ][12]). There are also provisions of circular migration, as between Spain and Colombia. The IOM continues recommending such migration between developed and developing countries as an adaptation response to climate-induced vulnerability. The Bangladesh Strategy recommends such options as well. Many developed countries already suffer from demographic deficits, with negative growth, and increasingly aging cohorts. The rhetoric in many of these counties, which often is anti-immigrant, cannot change the reality that these countries will need more and more young and skilled labor. Using projected needs of specific skills, developed countries could thus enter into bilateral agreements with climate-vulnerable countries, where those displaced by climate change may be trained in jointly supported educational and training institutions, either for permanent or for circular migration. For example, under the “Triple Win” program, Germany recruits nurses from Serbia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, and the Philippines to meet their nursing shortage, while reducing unemployment and contributing to economic development in the countries of origin ([ 12 ][13]). It is only just and fair for developed-country emitters of greenhouse gases to take some responsibility under Article 3.1 of the UNFCCC for their disproportionate contributions to generating this increasing number of people displaced by climate change. Lessons suggest that migration to rich countries can have strong positive impacts on labor market, GDP growth, and public revenue for host countries ([ 13 ][14], [ 14 ][15]). Mig ration is also typically positive for countries of origin, through remittance, transfer of technology, skills, domestic consumption and GDP growth, housing, children's education, and more. In 2017, low- and middle-income countries received more than $466 billion in remittances, three times the amount of official aid ([ 15 ][16]). This presents an important indicator of the effects that bilateral agreements on migration of climate-displaced people may have on promoting many different Sustainable Development Goals. Such migration should be framed as a win-win option, not as climate humanitarianism ([ 10 ][11]). The Bangladesh Strategy (NSMDCIID) argues for creating “opportunities for international labor migration by one or few members of families from the displacement hotspots” (p. 115). Older and underage family members and spouses can stay behind and rebuild their lives with remittance support. We believe this option of selective, not wholesale, relocation as a pragmatic policy can be scaled gradually, as warranted by projected demands of skills over time in developed countries. This relocation is based on bilateral planning and preparation, unlike the conventional, voluntary migration of skilled labor to industrial countries. This option is challenging, though mutually rewarding. However, acceptance of this proposal by Western democracies depends on whether they are ready to embrace and enjoy more of “smart/pooled” sovereignty, with enlightened self-interests under climate-induced vulnerability interdependence, rather than holding on to a centuries-old “Westphalian” model of a zero-sum game in global cooperation. Many have argued that with the increasing number of global commons problems, we now live in a positive-sum world. But such a paradigm shift warrants a vigorous campaign to raise awareness among citizens in industrial countries about the “new normal” of increasing extreme and ever-growing slow-onset events. Those citizens and politicians must face the lead and obligatory responsibility their countries have assumed under the international climate regime to support adaptation in vulnerable countries. Such awareness must confront and overcome the xenophobia and anti-immigration sentiments that often surface in many countries, inhibiting the enjoyment of mutual dividends, which can contribute to real and sustainable global peace and security. Successful implementation of the two options raised above (migrant-friendly towns and bilateral agreements for international migration) could help to germinate coordinated implementation, as stipulated in the Cancun agreement, of global policy frameworks on climate change (UNFCCC), disaster risk reduction (Sendai Framework), and human migration (Global Compact for Migration). As many ideas and actions on planned internal or international relocation of climate change–induced displacement are relatively new in the national and global policy domains, continued research and science-policy interface are essential in order to determine the feasibility, efficacy, and scalability of these options. 1. [↵][17]1. K. Rigaud et al ., “Groundswell: Preparing for Internal Climate Migration” (World Bank, 2018). 2. [↵][18]1. H. Singh, 2. J. Faleiro, 3. T. Anderson, 4. S. Vashist , “Costs of Climate Inaction Displacement and Distress Migration” (Actionaid, 2020). 3. [↵][19]1. J. Carmin, 2. D. Roberts, 3. I. Anguelovski , “Planning Climate Resilient Cities: Early Lessons from Early Adapters” (2011), pp. 5–8. 4. [↵][20]1. S. Weerasinghe et al ., “Planned Relocation, Disasters and Climate Change: Consolidating Good Practices and Preparing for the Future” (UNHCR, 2014). 5. [↵][21]1. B. Mallick, 2. K. G. Rogers, 3. Z. Sultana , Ambio 10.1007/s13280-021-01552-8 (2021). 6. [↵][22]1. S. S. Alam, 2. S. Huq, 3. F. Islam, 4. H. M. A. Hoque , “Building Climate-Resilient, Migrant-Friendly Cities and Towns” (International Centre for Climate Change and Development, 2018). 7. [↵][23]1. E. Wright, 2. D. Tänzler, 3. L. Rüttinger , “Migration, Environment and Climate Change: Responding via Climate Change Adaptation Policy” (German Environment Agency, 2020). 8. [↵][24]1. M. R. Khan , Toward a Binding Climate Change Adaptation Regime: A Proposed Framework (Routledge, 2014), chapter 6. 9. [↵][25]1. H. Dempster , “New Zealand's ‘Climate Refugee’ Visas: Lessons for the Rest of the World” (Centre for Global Development, Washington, DC, 2020). 10. [↵][26]1. D. M. S. Matias , Clim. Change 160, 143 (2020). [OpenUrl][27] 11. [↵][28]1. A. Kraler, 2. K. Caitlin, 3. M. Wagner , “Climate Change and Migration: Legal and Policy Challenges and Responses to Environmentally-Induced Migration” (European Union, 2020). 12. [↵][29]German Development Agency, “Sustainable Recruitment of Nurses (Triple Win)” (2019); [www.giz.de/en/worldwide/41533.html][30]. 13. [↵][31]1. E.-j. Quak , “The effects of economic integration of migrants on the economy of host countries” (Institute of Development Studies, London, 2016). 14. [↵][32]1. V. Grossmann , “How Immigration Affects Investment and Productivity in Host and Home Countries” (IZA, 2016); . 15. [↵][33]World Bank, “Record high remittances to low- and middle-income countries in 2017” (2018); [www.worldbank.org/en/news/press-release/2018/04/23/record-high-remittances-to-low-and-middle-income-countries-in-2017][34]. 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Climate change is leading to systemic and existential impacts, and evidence is mounting that these can result in the displacement of human populations. There is a rapidly growing demand for comprehensive risk assessments that include displacement and its associated costs to inform humanitarian response and national planning and coordination. However, owing to complex causation, missing and incomplete data, and the political nature of the issue, the longer-term economic impacts of disaster- and climate-related displacement remain largely hidden. Current approaches are rarely ex ante and prospective and do not consider systemic risk management. Not surprisingly, response-based approaches have shown mixed results, repeatedly demanding substantial resources while not addressing the root causes of displacement. Climate change is not only affecting the intensity, frequency, and duration of hazards that trigger displacement but is also eroding already fragile livelihoods and ecosystems, acting as an aggravator of existing vulnerability and contributing to chronic poverty and conflict in affected countries ([ 1 ][1]). Although disaster risk reduction as a cross-sectoral issue has gained considerable attention over the past two decades, disaster displacement risk is still not fully integrated in national policies and planning. Out of 46 countries included in the 2020 Internal Displacement Index, most acknowledge disaster displacement in principle and have climate policies or national adaptation plans in place. However, only 27 recognize the link between the gradual impacts of climate change and displacement ([ 2 ][2]). With an evidence-based, longer-term vision and investments, climate-related displacement— the forced movement of people in response to a hazard—can be averted and replaced by a range of measures such as planned relocation that is voluntary (at least to a large degree) and financially supported, or by building the resilience of at-risk populations, reducing vulnerability to such an extent that moving is not required. What is missing is a risk-informed framework for country-led, forward-looking approaches to make the case for substantial investment in effective risk reduction, durable solutions for those displaced, and the prevention of new displacement. Applied risk science, using probabilistic models and large empirical datasets compiled over the years, combined with insights from local empirical research and community assessments, now offers the opportunity for a step change in informed decision-making. For example, the shift from deterministic disaster risk assessments, based on historical data, to state-of-the-art probabilistic modeling used by the insurance industry, calibrated with historical data but including randomness to encompass all possible scenarios, presents a notable advance in risk science that is yet to be fully applied to displacement risk. New tools and risk modeling platforms, such as CLIMADA run by ETH Zürich or CAPRA of the World Bank, can now be adapted for displacement risk assessments. Further, assessing the social and economic cost of displacement can provide incentives for transformational action and change, from mere response to disaster displacement to proactively addressing vulnerability and exposure, thereby reducing displacement risk. Disaster displacement is a global reality and everyday occurrence. Millions of disaster displacements have been systematically recorded since 2008—on average, 24.5 million new movements every year ([ 3 ][3]). Weather-related hazards account for almost 90% of all these displacements ([ 2 ][2]), with climate change and the increasing concentration of populations in areas exposed to storms and floods, coupled with socioeconomic drivers of vulnerability, meaning that more people are at risk of being displaced. Demographic, historical, political, and socioeconomic factors determine whether people can withstand the impacts of a physical hazard or environmental stressor or have to leave their homes. Climate change interacts with all of these factors, particularly where resources and the capacities of humans and systems are already stretched ([ 4 ][4]). For example, sea level rise results in loss of land in coastal areas and low-lying atolls of island states, forcing communities to retreat or leave the land altogether. Salinization can reduce crop yields, undermine arable land and freshwater availability, and force people to move. Increasing temperatures affect soil moisture and degradation, which make the soil susceptible to nutrient loss and erosion, thereby destroying the livelihood basis for rural communities. Glacial retreat and melt, loss of biodiversity, and land and forest degradation mean decreased ecosystem services and provisioning services, pushing people to move. Because climate change can also alter the intensity, frequency, and duration of hazard events, climate anomalies and more devastating sudden-onset disasters may follow. Most of the impacts of climate change only result in displacement for those vulnerable to them. This essential point is repeatedly forgotten, with important policy implications ([ 5 ][5]). A prosperous farmer with access to drip irrigation and fertilizers, reliable buyers, loans, and insurance will not be as affected by changes in rainfall patterns as a smallholder subsistence farmer relying on the regularity of seasonal rains or a pastoralist in search of pasture for his herd. An urban dweller with an office job and regular income will not need to leave his home because of the loss of mangroves, which are providing sustenance to millions in coastal communities. Nonetheless, although individual vulnerability leads to a risk of adverse displacement outcomes, disaster and climate risks are increasingly becoming systemic because high-level and widespread impacts may ripple through social and economic networks, incurring further adverse micro and macro impacts and disruptions ([ 6 ][6]). Climate change is thus a displacement trigger in its own right (e.g., loss of coastlines through sea level rise and coastal erosion), a visible aggravator (e.g., when livelihoods are eroded because of soil degradation and loss of ecosystem services), and a hidden aggravator (e.g., increasing the intensity of cyclonic winds and shifting rainfall patterns that result in floods). But the impacts of climate change interact with broader changes in the physical and social environment, resulting in potentially rising costs associated with future displacement. ![Figure][7] Global disaster displacement risk relative to population size Average Annual Displacement (AAD) risk is a compact metric that represents the estimated effect, accumulated over a long time frame, of future small to medium and extreme events and estimates the likely displacement associated with them on a yearly basis for sudden-onset hazards such as tsunamis, cyclonic winds, storm surges, and riverine floods. See ([ 10 ][8]) for details. Each country's AAD risk relative to its population size is shown (expected annual displacements / 10,000 people). Country income group classification from the World Bank. GRAPHIC: N. DESAI/ SCIENCE BASED ON B. DESAI ET AL. Disaster displacement often undermines the welfare and well-being of affected individuals and communities and can also incur a substantial social and economic burden on countries. Although many countries have begun to plan for t he risk of extreme events in one way or another, governments typically do not formally account for displacement risk and their associated costs in national development plans and annual budgets of line ministries. Even without taking into account the aggravating forces of climate change, there is growing evidence that displacement not only severely disrupts the lives of those forced to flee their homes but also has an economic impact on local communities and national economies ([ 7 ][9]). The direct cost of providing every internally displaced person (totaling more than 55 million in 2020) with support for housing, education, health, and security has been estimated at US$370 per person per year, accumulating to more than US$20.5 billion for 2020 ([ 2 ][2]). These figures are mostly based on information available from protracted conflict-related displacement situations because the economic impacts of displacements linked with disasters and climate change usually go unrecorded. A key knowledge gap exists here because only limited event-based or nationally aggregated data is available on how long people remain displaced after a disaster, despite ample evidence that this type of displacement is often long-term and can become protracted ([ 2 ][2]). These impacts can add up to billions of dollars worldwide. Each time one person is displaced, even for a few days, costs arise for transportation, shelter, food and nonfood items, and the loss of income if the person cannot continue their usual work. Adding in long-term consequences, such as lack of schooling, training, and on-the-job experience, increases this economic impact. These costs should be on national balance sheets but are instead most often borne by communities themselves, by local governments that have to divert already limited development funds to response, and by humanitarian actors. In the face of increasingly severe disaster- and climate-related displacement, these costs are only set to rise. The highest economic impacts usually stem from the loss of income and the need to provide displaced people with shelter and health care. Disaster-resilient housing and livelihoods, as well as strong primary health care systems, are also where investments are needed most ahead of disaster events to reduce displacement and enable lasting solutions. By nature of its mandate, humanitarian response is not set up to invest in resilient livelihoods or infrastructure and service development. It is not only low-income nations that are at risk of economic impacts due to displacement. During the 2019–2020 bushfires in Australia, the loss of economic production as a result of people missing just one day of work during displacement was estimated to be about US$510 per person ([ 8 ][10]). These costs add up, particularly if a disaster causes considerable housing destruction, which may delay people from returning to their homes for months. The cost of covering housing needs resulting from Australia's Black Summer bushfires was estimated to be between US$44 million and US$52 million for a year, posing a substantial financial burden, given that previous recovery efforts indicate that it can take people between 1 and 4 years to rebuild their homes ([ 8 ][10]). These numbers and examples from across the globe highlight that we need to get better at understanding and assessing the nature and scale of disaster displacement risk. The coverage and detail of relevant datasets have improved, and various models and approaches exist at regional and global scales, although their time frames, methods, and resulting estimates vary enormously. For example, the World Bank, using a gravity model and new data on climate change, water availability, and crop production, has estimated that slow-onset climate hazards such as water scarcity and declining crop yields could lead to more than 100 million additional internal migrants in Latin America, South Asia, and sub-Saharan Africa by 2050 should neither accelerating climate impacts nor unequal development be adequately addressed ([ 9 ][11]). In many such assessments, there is a strong focus on environmental stressors and hazards, and on climate change's impacts on their intensity and frequency. This may have potentially resulted in inflated numbers and certainly in an inflated perception regarding the role of climate change in the dynamics of human mobility and forced movements today and in the coming decades. Estimates from a probabilistic model that takes housing rendered uninhabitable as a proxy for displacement in sudden-onset disasters, such as floods and cyclones, suggest that an average of around 14 million displacements can be expected each year (a conservative approach that is highly likely to be an underestimate) ([ 10 ][8]). This displacement risk is heavily concentrated in the Asia-Pacific region, where both exposure and vulnerability are high. Even in relative terms—that is, numbers of potential displacements in relation to population size—displacement risk is high not only for South and East Asia but also for Pacific and other small island states (see the first figure). Climate change as well as changes in population size and composition and of key social and economic indicators all affect how this displacement risk may change in the future. According to probabilistic, spatially explicit risk modeling that uses ensembles of climate models and hydrodynamic modeling to quantify flood hazard, is calibrated on past events, and incorporates commonly used climate change and development scenarios, rapidly increasing exposure due to population growth may be the largest driver of displacement risk in the future ([ 11 ][12]). Nevertheless, this strong role of population size should not overshadow the fact that the substantial increase related to climate change is not trivial (see the second figure). New assessments show that we can expect a 50% increase in displacement risk related to floods for each degree of temperature increase ([ 11 ][12]). Although, currently, various epistemic uncertainties need to be reckoned with, such projections serve to illustrate the future burden to consider in a rapidly warming and changing climate. Beyond probabilistic and deterministic disaster displacement risk models, there are other modeling approaches that can increasingly be put to the task. Agent-based network models can assess individual-level impacts and costs through a bottom-up methodology that can reflect how shocks to one part of a system (community, economy, country, or region) can cascade through the whole system and also spill over into other systems ([ 12 ][13]). Further, a system dynamics approach can describe in a relatively comprehensive manner the relationships between a wide range of dimensions and indicators, although it requires granular datasets that are often unavailable and is highly cost- and labor-intensive to develop. ![Figure][7] Change in flood displacement risk Shaded areas show different scenarios of flood displacement risk based on a range of climate and hydrological models, relative to historical baseline. The width of the shading represents an estimate of the uncertainty induced by natural climate variability and limitations in current understanding of the climate system and hydrological systems. Dashed lines show the average values across models. Historical baseline is defined by the average flood hazard frequency and intensity from 1976 to 2005, combined with population data for 2000. RCPs reflect different trajectories of variation in atmospheric GHG concentrations. SSPs reflect different scenarios of global socioeconomic development. Modified from ([ 11 ][12]). GRAPHIC: KELLIE HOLOSKI/ SCIENCE BASED ON KAM ET AL. ([ 11 ][12]) Finally, integrating risk estimates with analysis of public finance allows quantification of the relevance and “additionality” of internal displacement impacts on governments' (and often donors') budgets. First attempts at undertaking this analysis, adapting the International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis (IIASA) catastrophe simulation model (CatSim) in support of public financing strategies in pre- and postdisaster contexts, have shown that the cost of internal displacement can substantially increase national and global budget gaps (fiscal gaps) and the chance of budget crises ([ 13 ][14]). F or example, in Bangladesh, a disaster with a return period of 50 years can be expected to incur costs related to internal displacement of nearly US$4.1 billion per year of subsequent displacement; a smaller magnitude but more frequent disaster with a return period of 10 years would incur more than US$1 billion. The estimated possible amount of funding that the country may be able to divert from existing development budgets and credit buffers adds up to just over US$1 billion of fiscal resilience, which means that Bangladesh is likely to be unable to cover the costs associated with internal displacement for events that occur every 10 years on average. Further estimates of such costs can provide the basis for making the case for preventive action and for developing appropriate financial instruments such as national reserve funds, enhanced social protection schemes, and catastrophe bonds, as well as regional or global sovereign insurance pools ([ 14 ][15]). Beyond these first steps in developing basic estimates of the costs, further work is required to better understand who bears these and how benefits from improved policies would be distributed across different segments of society. Comprehensive risk assessments that account for displacement risk and estimate its economic costs signal a need to improve coordination on budget allocations and cooperation in program execution across ministries and public and private sectors. This would enable the explicit inclusion of these contingent risks into budget stress-testing procedures and other risk-management planning processes. It would also provide incentives for managing risk with an ex ante approach, because it anticipates the ex post consequences and trade-offs involved in responding to shocks ([ 13 ][14]). Risk assessments should help communities and local and national governments grappling with immediate displacement risk or the prospect of intensifying natural hazards or loss of territory or habitats. More financing must be made available for localized, granular displacement risk assessments, which municipalities can use to inform urban development plans, zoning regulations, and local building codes and for forward-looking, long-term planning for relocation where necessary. Recent attempts at providing a measure for displacement risk and its impacts are only the first step. In the coming years, further investment should build on the promises of longer-term risk modeling and couple its results with impact assessments so that countries can build displacement estimates into their multiyear development plans ([ 15 ][16]). Understanding needs and priorities in the decision-making processes of affected populations, institutional capacities, and socioeconomic dynamics, even if less systematically assessed, will be at least as important at indicating what the future holds. Given the scope and complexity of the problem, a pluralistic methodological setup is required to contribute to a better understanding of displacement risk and to inform effective policy and response under a broad range of circumstances. 1. [↵][17]Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), Climate Change 2014: Synthesis Report. Contribution of Working Groups I, II and III to the Fifth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, Core Writing Team, Eds. (IPCC, 2014). 2. [↵][18]Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre (IDMC), Global Report on Internal Displacement 2021 (2021); [www.internal-displacement.org/global-report/grid2021][19]. 3. [↵][20]IDMC, Global Internal Displacement Database; [www.internal-displacement.org/database][21]. 4. [↵][22]1. M. Brzoska, 2. C. Fröhlich , Migr. Dev. 5, 190 (2016). [OpenUrl][23][CrossRef][24] 5. [↵][25]Economics of Climate Adaptation (ECA), “Shaping climate-resilient development: A framework for decision-making. A report of the Economics of Climate Adaptation Working Group” (ECA, 2009); [www.ethz.ch/content/dam/ethz/special-interest/usys/ied/wcr-dam/documents/Economics\_of\_Climate\_Adaptation\_ECA.pdf][26]. 6. [↵][27]1. C. Raymond et al ., Nat. Clim. Chang. 10, 611 (2020). [OpenUrl][28] 7. [↵][29]1. S. Ambrus 1. C. Cazabat, 2. L. Yasukawa , “Unveiling the cost of internal displacement. 2020 report,” S. Ambrus, Ed. (IDMC, 2020); [www.internal-displacement.org/sites/default/files/publications/documents/IDMC\_CostEstimate\_final.pdf][30]. 8. [↵][31]1. J. Lennard 1. E. du Parc, 2. L. Yasukawa , “The 2019–2020 Australian bushfires: From temporary evacuation to longer-term displacement,” J. Lennard, Ed. (IDMC, 2020); [www.internal-displacement.org/sites/default/files/publications/documents/Australian%20bushfires_Final.pdf][32]. 9. [↵][33]1. K. K. Rigaud et al ., “Groundswell: Preparing for internal climate migration” (World Bank, 2018); . 10. [↵][34]IDMC, “Global disaster displacement risk – A baseline for future work” (2017); [www.internal-displacement.org/publications/global-disaster-displacement-risk-a-baseline-for-future-work][35]. 11. [↵][36]1. P. M. Kam et al ., Environ. Res. Lett. 16, 044026 (2020). [OpenUrl][37] 12. [↵][38]1. A. Naqvi, 2. F. Gaupp, 3. S. Hochrainer-Stigler , OR Spectrum 42, 727 (2020). [OpenUrl][39] 13. [↵][40]IDMC, IIASA, “Points of no return: Estimating governments' fiscal resilience to internal displacement” (IDMC, 2020); [www.internal-displacement.org/sites/default/files/publications/documents/201903-fiscal-risk-paper.pdf][41]. 14. [↵][42]1. J. Linnerooth-Bayer, 2. S. Hochrainer-Stigler , Clim. Change 133, 85 (2015). [OpenUrl][43] 15. [↵][44]1. S. Hochrainer-Stigler et al ., Int. J. Disaster Risk Reduct. 24, 482 (2017). 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Although relocation of human populations is nothing new, global environmental changes such as climate change, sea level rise, and land use change are increasing the likelihood of relocation for potentially millions of people, especially in coastal regions. Globally, sea level rise alone could place 340 million people on land projected to be below annual flood levels by 2050 ([ 1 ][1]). The need for relocation will increase because of such risks, the lack of funding for protection and accommodation strategies, and/or the reality that sea walls and other measures will eventually be ineffective. Thus, current approaches to planned relocation such as buyouts for individual households are likely to be “woefully inadequate” in the future ([ 2 ][2]). We discuss how science, governance, and their interactions need to evolve to make planned relocation a strategic option that leaves people, communities, and the environment better off. The starting point is to acknowledge that relocation involves a physical transition away from locations exposed to global change hazards, as well as the need for transformation of institutions, social networks, cultural associations, economic relationships, and other aspects of a community's way of life. Given that relocation is a life-altering change, organizations such as the United Nations (UN) High Commission on Refugees mandate that it needs to be planned and implemented with meaningful engagement of affected parties and carried out to improve (or at least maintain) their quality of life. To ensure responsiveness to changing conditions and preferences, relocation should be part of a flexible, nested, and interconnected set of adaptation strategies that also include coping (reactive, short-term risk-reduction measures) and incremental adjustments (measures to increase resistance and/or resilience) ([ 3 ][3]). How to combine these different measures into a strategic portfolio of policies and actions places demands on science and governance to support open-ended adaptive planning processes that manage trade-offs across interests, uncertainties in knowledge, and institutional ambiguity created by overlapping jurisdictions, authorities, and expertise. Planned relocation is a complex social dilemma that involves many structural, perceptual, economic, and interpersonal dynamics that discourage collective action. It will involve resolving fraught questions such as what decision processes are used, who relocates (and when), how are they compensated, where will they move, what assistance is provided (and to whom) in receiving communities, how abandoned wastes and environmental legacies are remediated, and how agreements are monitored and enforced. There is no single best approach to move a community—stakeholders with conflicting objectives will see it differently even when they share basic world views. The interaction of social and environmental triggers and lack of a preferred pathway make planned retreat similar to other global change dilemmas. But the potential scope, existential character of needed transformations, and complexity of governance challenges make it especially demanding. Despite the immensity of the challenge, it is vital now to constructively engage science and governance to plan physical transitions and socioeconomic transformations that reduce risk and make people, communities, and the environment better off. Here, we offer several ideas for improving governance partnerships in developing strategies for planned relocation. ### Eliminate perverse incentives and establish inclusive governance Existing institutions and processes of governance will be stretched to address the challenges of planning and implementing relocation in a way that meets basic humanitarian principles and good practices. This is because current mixes of policies, institutions, and relationships are responsible for producing the prevailing distribution of privilege and vulnerability in society. Although climate change plays a role, it amplifies present challenges that are an amalgam of past governance, entrenched inequities, and norms. The sheer potential scale of relocation globally is beyond anything our modern global society has experienced. For example, the megacity Jakarta is actively considering relocation because of growing climate hazards, aquifer subsidence, and the density of a highly vulnerable low-income population. These challenges are not limited to the developing world, as evidenced by the mounting annual damages and recovery costs of climate extremes on populations in the United States. Improving governance will require addressing structural inequalities and many perverse incentives and behavioral dynamics that continue to drive people to settle in areas exposed to hazards. Innovations are needed to address organizational silos, poor planning and risk communication, psychological attachments to place, and dependence on continued occupation for tax revenues. These challenges can be exacerbated with well-intentioned coping strategies (e.g., the “levee effect” that reduces accurate perception of risk). In the United States, for example, federal programs including subsidization of beach nourishment, the National Flood Insurance Program, and the federalization of natural disaster recovery encourage settlement of risky areas. Planned relocation toolkits ([ 4 ][4]) are beginning to emerge that orient the challenge within domestic legal frameworks and international organizations (e.g., the UN Office for Disaster Risk Reduction) and the experiences garnered from existing national efforts (e.g., Fiji's efforts to move 46 villages). Making and implementing decisions in which communities voluntarily relocate will require inclusive, deliberative processes that emphasize transparency, engagement, trust building, accountability, and an interactive approach for engaging with science. Policy or legislative frameworks are critical to defining long-term targets and providing credible commitments to maintain the continuity of objectives across institutions and political mandates ([ 5 ][5]). Strategies will need to accommodate changing circumstances (new scientific evidence, technological change, new preferences) and the management of implementation tactics based on expert advice, monitoring and reporting, and accountability. In most countries, new institutions and funding are required to improve access to expert advice, coordination, and consultation. Governance frameworks for relocation will need to include periodic communication about future risks, engagement with private sector and civil society, and oversight mechanisms to monitor and enforce the implementation of agreed plans. ### Diverse perspectives in problem framing Defining the problem and its context is the central challenge posed by planned relocation. Framing a problem establishes what is prioritized (and what is treated as unimportant), what the objectives are, and what questions will be asked and answered. Framing is often contested, and to avoid marginalizing communities, it needs to incorporate diverse perspectives, start from the specific local context of ongoing systemic challenges, enhance stakeholders' agency, and bring together diverse sources of knowledge ([ 6 ][6], [ 7 ][7]). It is particularly challenging to carefully analyze the diverse stakeholders and the types of knowledge that are pivotal to understanding and framing planned relocation (e.g., capturing perspectives from the relocating, receiving, and remaining populations). Problem framing could consider the need for expertise, tactical engagement, and sustained advocacy to catalyze plans into transformative actions ([ 6 ][6], [ 8 ][8]). In addition, emerging innovations in computational social science and “coproduction” of research (in which stakeholder communities are involved in different aspects of the scientific process) offer opportunities for formalizing stakeholder analysis. Analyses could improve stakeholder identification, categorization, and relationship (power) mapping. ### Account for power dynamics Decades of research in planning, public administration, sustainability science, and science and technology studies have examined how to improve the relevance and effectiveness of science to inform planning and policy for a wide range of social, environmental, and sustainability challenges. Several prominent strands of this work focus on coproduction as being more than a means to produce science, providing a mechanism to generate public goods, services, and institutions ([ 7 ][7]). Accordingly, the design of coproduction processes is not just about how the interactions of policy-makers, stakeholders, and scientists affect the usability of science. It is also about the process of social change—how epistemologies, social and cultural norms, institutions and policies, and power relationships among communities and stakeholders interact to determine who is involved in the process, which types of knowledge are seen as legitimate, what is produced, and what outcomes result. For challenges as fraught as planned relocation, this more expansive approach provides a foundation for codeveloping knowledge and action. It requires engaging multiple perspectives on values and knowledge where the actors involved in coproduction of planned retreat must work together to explore normative and political differences inherent in their different visions of the future ([ 6 ][6]). A critique of coproduction processes is that they can depoliticize discourse by using scientific arguments to evoke universalized ideas of what is “best.” They can be structured as if all participants have an equal role when in fact governments, large nongovernmental organizations, and economic interests have disproportionate power and greater opportunities for participation ([ 7 ][7]). This is not just a process issue but can also affect the outcomes of coproduction—for example, favoring the use of narrow cost-benefit framings that conclude that protective measures such as beach nourishment or construction of sea walls are economically justified only for high-value assets. Empirically informed awareness of the diverse roles and dimensions of power in coproduction and social change offers an avenue for rebalancing problematic relationships that lead to inequality or exclusion, or at least avoiding their unintended consequences ([ 7 ][7]). Modest steps such as providing funding to enable underserved communities to participate in coproduction, or formalizing the participation of Indigenous advisory councils, can also help level the playing field ([ 9 ][9]). ### Diversify knowledge sources and types To support planned relocation, science needs to deliver not just technical solutions but also knowledge of how to relocate and transform communities, including the willingness and capacities of different groups and institutions to support fundamental change over time ([ 6 ][6]). Providing this knowledge will require a transdisciplinary approach to research that broadens the array of scientific disciplines and other sources of knowledge engaged. Government bodies and stakeholders (e.g., real estate interests, businesses, community-based organizations) will need to be integrated into research not just as “users” but as knowledge holders and experts in community needs, preferences, norms, and evolving capacity to implement solutions. When relocation involves Indigenous communities, rather than integrating traditional knowledge into Western science, scientists involved in coproduction arrangements should foster mutual respect on the multiple ways of knowing, by engaging in tribal avenues, such as regional newsletters and talking circles at tribal meetings ([ 9 ][9], [ 10 ][10]). Informing social and economic transformation will require research into the capacities and values of different populations and institutions. This requires understanding issues such as what will motivate people to make changes, the capacity of individuals and institutions to act on their preferences, and how current conditions and path dependencies affect the viability of future options ([ 6 ][6]). It will be necessary to “think critically about outcomes as well as processes, about institutional and process designs, [and] about power and performance” ([ 11 ][11]). ### Sample from a range of plausible futures to evaluate decision options Science can better inform action if it stops trying to predict inherently unpredictable phenomena. Currently, many decision-makers frame their questions to scientists as “what will happen,” and scientists respond with “projections” (possibilities based on assumptions about future radiative forcing), which are often used as predictions. This framing, in addition to putting science in the dangerous position of speculating, is not necessarily as helpful to decision-makers as “what if” questions about the consequences of options under many plausible futures. Science can be more useful by changing the objective of collaboration from “predict then act” to the exploration of hypothetical questions about what short-term actions would be consistent with long-term objectives and perform well under a diverse range of plausible futures ([ 12 ][12]). As a specific example, the State of Louisiana has been confronting sea level rise, land subsidence, accelerating losses of coastal lands, and increasing risks from storm surge. The state has initiated an innovative and collaborative planning process that budgets $50 billion in a portfolio of projects to be adaptively implemented over the next 50 years ([ 13 ][13]). Unlike traditional cost-benefit–driven risk planning efforts based on a specific expected future (“what will happen”), the Louisiana master plan has engaged broad stakeholder participation to map what project investments hold immediate benefits while providing flexibility to confront a broad range of plausible future scenarios that could reshape their investment priorities as well as future stakeholder needs (“what if” planning). This approach recognizes that many types of uncertainty will impede judgment and decision-making ([ 12 ][12]). The natural stressors that can trigger the need for evacuation are uncertain because they are emergent, compounding, and cascading outcomes of complex human–environment interactions. But the implications of changes in future values and behaviors are also uncertain and arguably just as important for evaluating decision options. Even in well-documented historical instances of relocation, it is difficult to understand how outcomes emerged from the actions taken—let alone anticipate with any certainty how desired outcomes arise from future actions ([ 14 ][14]). One important opportunity is to more widely apply decision-making under deep uncertainty (DMDU) methods ([ 12 ][12]). These exploratory approaches draw on local-scale stakeholders' knowledge of the key factors and dynamics (human and natural) and provide a promising mechanism for informing planned relocation. Models and scenarios serve as focal points to build shared understanding about the potential implications of the different values and options preferred by stakeholders. ### Social learning to build local capacity Relocation is a complex process that will benefit from expanding the range of intermediaries and services available to facilitate production and application of knowledge. Those involved will need to know not only what scientifically robust sources of information are available for the hazards they face, but also how this information should be used to assess vulnerability, revise flood maps or zoning, evaluate financial risks to reset insurance rates and bond ratings, redesign infrastructure systems, update capital improvement and other plans, or establish thresholds and monitoring systems to trigger the next phase of agreed measures. Much attention has focused on providing climate scenarios and data, but to meet the needs of relocation, the range of services must be expanded. Needed services include not only identifying good practices in engineering, financial risk, and other technical analyses but also supporting transformation, capacity building, and establishment of standards for different types of deliberative and analytic processes. Research, case studies, and pilot projects are testing approaches to meet these challenges, and a useful next step is to organize evaluation and social learning to establish good practices and technical guidance. One option is to incorporate evaluation into assessments such as the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change and the US National Climate Assessment to establish a knowledge foundation for climate services. This would create standards for services delivered through international organizations, the private sector, academia, and public agencies (to ensure availability of services for underserved, low-income communities) ([ 15 ][15]). Another is an open-source wiki for climate solutions that would enable a more diverse range of knowledge holders to interact and curate guidance on good practices on an ongoing basis, emphasizing sources of credible information. Another opportunity is to expand the use of intermediaries—individuals and institutions that facilitate interactions between stakeholders and experts ([ 8 ][8]). Many intermediary skillsets are necessary for the different stages of deliberative planning, financing, tactical implementation, and ex-post monitoring of relocation actions. Given the potential for contested needs and values, it is important that intermediaries be aware of how they can unintentionally affect power relationships or outcomes—for example, by using types of knowledge, analysis metrics, or visualizations that favor the perspectives of one group or another. A “critical pragmatic approach” highlights the importance of this awareness and of designing and critically evaluating deliberative processes where conflicts between parties are not reduced to simple consensus-driven debates ([ 11 ][11]). A variety of measures are needed to increase the number and efficacy of intermediaries, including professional certification; greater recognition, including in promotion and tenure processes; and increased funding. ### Harness emerging innovations in community science and data analytics Innovations in community science, sensing, and data analytics hold great promise in providing insights for planned relocation if privacy, equity, and other concerns such as maladaptive applications of generic algorithmic or sensing tools are addressed ([ 15 ][15]). Combining these innovations with monitoring investments in socioeconomic data offers the potential to better capture the interdependent evolution of human and natural systems that shape the experiences and prospects of populations facing relocation. For example, high-resolution models of flooding magnitude and extent might be available for an area, but data are missing on how inequities in agency and justice interact with exposure to hazards to shape the prospects of using planned relocation to improve people's lives. These innovations will increase the utility of standard modes of multidisciplinary scientific research that combine hazard predictions, engineering, financial, and other analyses to inform technical solutions that contribute to physical transitions. Additional methodological advances that have not yet been fully exploited include improved projections of hazards at various spatial scales; research on coastal habitat loss and nature-based solutions; new data sources, indicator-based assessments, and demographic modeling to identify vulnerable populations; and practice standards for using global change risk analytics in engineering and other professions. 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For decades, insurers have used such factors as age and credit score to determine the prices paid by individuals. Now many maintain that driving habits are a fairer gauge of a person's accident risk. In a deal announced early Thursday, Cambridge Mobile said it had closed on the purchase of TrueMotion for an undisclosed price. After combining, Cambridge Mobile is to provide telematics services to 21 of the 25 largest auto insurers in the U.S. based on premiums, with clients including some of the largest auto insurers in Australia, Canada, Japan, South Africa and the U.K. A pre-markets primer packed with news, trends and ideas. The deal paves the way for the two Boston-area firms to combine workforces to improve existing offerings sold to car insurers and invent new products.

Avatars: In this year's inaugural Grands Prix, the locations for which are yet to be revealed, 'telerobotic avatars' named'The Aviators' will sit in the'octocopter' race car The craft sports eight rotor blades surrounding a central carbon-fibre cockpit and is capable of going from 0-62 miles per hour in 2.8 seconds. Lewis Hamilton in a Mercedes F1 car would be able to do the same in around 2.6 seconds

The 89 people who work at Buffer, a company that makes social-media management tools, are used to having an unconventional employer. Everyone's salary, including the CEO's, is public. All employees work remotely; their only office closed down six years ago. And as a perk, Buffer pays for any books employees want to buy for themselves. So perhaps it is unsurprising that last year, when the pandemic obliterated countless workers' work-life balance and mental health, Buffer responded in a way that few other companies did: It gave employees an extra day off each week, without reducing pay--an experiment that's still running a year later. "It has been such a godsend," Essence Muhammad, a customer-support agent at Buffer, told me. Miraculously--or predictably, if you ask proponents of the four-day workweek--the company seemed to be getting the same amount of work done in less time. It had scaled back on meetings and social events, and employees increased the pace of their day. Nicole Miller, who works in human resources at Buffer, also cited "the principle of work expanding to the time you give it": When we have 40 hours of work a week, we find ways to work for 40 hours.

We provide a dataset that enables the creation of learning agents that can build knowledge graph-based world models of interactive narratives. Interactive narratives -- or text-adventure games -- are partially observable environments structured as long puzzles or quests in which an agent perceives and interacts with the world purely through textual natural language. Each individual game typically contains hundreds of locations, characters, and objects -- each with their own unique descriptions -- providing an opportunity to study the problem of giving language-based agents the structured memory necessary to operate in such worlds. Our dataset provides 24198 mappings between rich natural language observations and: (1) knowledge graphs that reflect the world state in the form of a map; (2) natural language actions that are guaranteed to cause a change in that particular world state. The training data is collected across 27 games in multiple genres and contains a further 7836 heldout instances over 9 additional games in the test set. We further provide baseline models using rules-based, question-answering, and sequence learning approaches in addition to an analysis of the data and corresponding learning tasks.

Reasoning about the behaviour of physical objects is a key capability of agents operating in physical worlds. Humans are very experienced in physical reasoning while it remains a major challenge for AI. To facilitate research addressing this problem, several benchmarks have been proposed recently. However, these benchmarks do not enable us to measure an agent's granular physical reasoning capabilities when solving a complex reasoning task. In this paper, we propose a new benchmark for physical reasoning that allows us to test individual physical reasoning capabilities. Inspired by how humans acquire these capabilities, we propose a general hierarchy of physical reasoning capabilities with increasing complexity. Our benchmark tests capabilities according to this hierarchy through generated physical reasoning tasks in the video game Angry Birds. This benchmark enables us to conduct a comprehensive agent evaluation by measuring the agent's granular physical reasoning capabilities. We conduct an evaluation with human players, learning agents, and heuristic agents and determine their capabilities. Our evaluation shows that learning agents, with good local generalization ability, still struggle to learn the underlying physical reasoning capabilities and perform worse than current state-of-the-art heuristic agents and humans. We believe that this benchmark will encourage researchers to develop intelligent agents with advanced, human-like physical reasoning capabilities. URL: https://github.com/Cheng-Xue/Hi-Phy

World models improve a learning agent's ability to efficiently operate in interactive and situated environments. This work focuses on the task of building world models of text-based game environments. Text-based games, or interactive narratives, are reinforcement learning environments in which agents perceive and interact with the world using textual natural language. These environments contain long, multi-step puzzles or quests woven through a world that is filled with hundreds of characters, locations, and objects. Our world model learns to simultaneously: (1) predict changes in the world caused by an agent's actions when representing the world as a knowledge graph; and (2) generate the set of contextually relevant natural language actions required to operate in the world. We frame this task as a Set of Sequences generation problem by exploiting the inherent structure of knowledge graphs and actions and introduce both a transformer-based multi-task architecture and a loss function to train it. A zero-shot ablation study on never-before-seen textual worlds shows that our methodology significantly outperforms existing textual world modeling techniques as well as the importance of each of our contributions.