Numerical similarity measures are used to describe the relative ranks of the similarity of objects or cases in many artificial intelligent systems. These measures are usually absolute and contextindependent. On the other hand, humans perceive context-dependent similarity. That is, the ranking of similarity between pairs of objects is varying under a changing context. We consider this problem as the construction of numerical formulas that satisfy certain axioms and criteria. An entropy-related formula is proposed and its implementation in a changing environment is considered. A demonstration of this formula on a well-known context-dependent similarity assessment is given.

The role of inferencing with uncertainty is becoming more important in rule-based expert systems (ES), since knowledge given by a human expert is often uncertain or imprecise. We have succeeded in designing a VLSI chip which can perform an entire inference process based on fuzzy logic. The design of the VLSI fuzzy inference engine emphasizes simplicity, extensibility, and efficiency (operational speed and layout area). It is fabricated in 2.5 um CMOS technology. The inference engine consists of three major components; a rule set memory, an inference processor, and a controller. In this implementation, a rule set memory is realized by a read only memory (ROM). The controller consists of two counters. In the inference processor, one data path is laid out for each rule. The number of the inference rule can be increased adding more data paths to the inference processor. All rules are executed in parallel, but each rule is processed serially. The logical structure of fuzzy inference proposed in the current paper maps nicely onto the VLSI structure. A two-phase nonoverlapping clocking scheme is used. Timing tests indicate that the inference engine can operate at approximately 20.8 MHz. This translates to an execution speed of approximately 80,000 Fuzzy Logical Inferences Per Second (FLIPS), and indicates that the inference engine is suitable for a demanding real-time application. The potential applications include decision-making in the area of command and control for intelligent robot systems, process control, missile and aircraft guidance, and other high performance machines.

Much artificial intelligence research focuses on the problem of deducing the validity of unobservable propositions or hypotheses from observable evidence.! Many of the knowledge representation techniques designed for this problem encode the relationship between evidence and hypothesis in a directed manner. Moreover, the direction in which evidence is stored is typically from evidence to hypothesis.

This paper studies the underlying rationality of those languages on the syntax and calculus grounds. Some implications of the theorem to the relationship between the CF and the Bayesian languages and the Dempster-Shafer Theory of Evidence are presented. In order for a computer program to be a plausible --odel of a (mora or less) rational process of human expertise, the program should be capable of representing beliefs in a language that is (more or less) calibrated with a well-specified normative criterion, e.g. the axioms of Subjective Probability [15], the Theory of Confir.nation Tversky, the building blocks· of a probabilistic language are syntax, calculus, and semantics [18]. The-- is a set of numbers, co--only referred to as Degrees of Belief (e.g. standard probabilities or Certainty Factors), which are used to parameterize uncertain facts, inexact rules, and competing hypotheses.

A learning algorithm is presented which given the structure of a causal tree, will estimate its link probabilities by sequential measurements on the leaves only. Internal nodes of the tree represent conceptual (hidden) variables inaccessible to observation. The method described is incremental, local, efficient, and remains robust to measurement imprecisions.

One purpose -- quite a few thinkers would say the main purpose -- of seeking knowledge about the world is to enhance our ability to make good decisions. An item of knowledge that can make no conceivable difference with regard to anything we might do would strike many as frivolous. Whether or not we want to be philosophical pragmatists in this strong sense with regard to everything we might want to enquire about, it seems a perfectly appropriate attitude to adopt toward artificial knowledge systems. If is granted that we are ultimately concerned with decisions, then some constraints are imposed on our measures of uncertainty at the level of decision making. If our measure of uncertainty is real-valued, then it isn't hard to show that it must satisfy the classical probability axioms. For example, if an act has a real-valued utility U(E) if the event E obtains, and the same real-valued utility if the denial of E obtains, so that U(E) = U(-E), then the expected utility of that act must be U(E), and that must be the same as the uncertainty-weighted average of the returns of the act, p-U(E) + q-U('E), where p and q represent the uncertainty of E and-E respectively. But then we must have p + q = 1.

This paper describes the incorporation of uncertainty in diagnostic reasoning based on the set covering model of Reggia et. al. extended to what in the Artificial Intelligence dichotomy between deep and compiled (shallow, surface) knowledge based diagnosis may be viewed as the generic form at the compiled end of the spectrum. A major undercurrent in this is advocating the need for a strong underlying model and an integrated set of support tools for carrying such a model in order to deal with uncertainty.

In our previous series of studies to investigate the role of evidential reasoning in the RUBRIC system for full-text document retrieval (Tong et al., 1985; Tong and Shapiro, 1985; Tong and Appelbaum, 1987), we identified the important role that problem structure plays in the overall performance of the system. In this paper, we focus on these structural elements (which we now call "semantic structure") and show how explicit consideration of their properties reduces what previously were seen as difficult evidential reasoning problems to more tractable questions.

In an earlier paper, a new theory of measurefree "conditional" objects was presented. In this paper, emphasis is placed upon the motivation of the theory. The central part of this motivation is established through an example involving a knowledge-based system. In order to evaluate combination of evidence for this system, using observed data, auxiliary at tribute and diagnosis variables, and inference rules connecting them, one must first choose an appropriate algebraic logic description pair (ALDP): a formal language or syntax followed by a compatible logic or semantic evaluation (or model). Three common choices- for this highly non-unique choice - are briefly discussed, the logics being Classical Logic, Fuzzy Logic, and Probability Logic. In all three,the key operator representing implication for the inference rules is interpreted as the often-used disjunction of a negation (b => a) = (b'v a), for any events a,b. However, another reasonable interpretation of the implication operator is through the familiar form of probabilistic conditioning. But, it can be shown - quite surprisingly - that the ALDP corresponding to Probability Logic cannot be used as a rigorous basis for this interpretation! To fill this gap, a new ALDP is constructed consisting of "conditional objects", extending ordinary Probability Logic, and compatible with the desired conditional probability interpretation of inference rules. It is shown also that this choice of ALDP leads to feasible computations for the combination of evidence evaluation in the example. In addition, a number of basic properties of conditional objects and the resulting Conditional Probability Logic are given, including a characterization property and a developed calculus of relations.

Decision tree induction systems are being used for knowledge acquisition in noisy domains. This paper develops a subjective Bayesian interpretation of the task tackled by these systems and the heuristic methods they use. It is argued that decision tree systems implicitly incorporate a prior belief that the simpler (in terms of decision tree complexity) of two hypotheses be preferred, all else being equal, and that they perform a greedy search of the space of decision rules to find one in which there is strong posterior belief. A number of improvements to these systems are then suggested.