Ontology-based data access (OBDA) is a new paradigm aiming at accessing and managing data by means of an ontology, i.e., a conceptual representation of the domain of interest in the underlying information system. In the last years, this new paradigm has been used for providing users with abstract (independent from technological and system-oriented aspects), effective, and reasoning-intensive mechanisms for querying the data residing at the information system sources. In this paper we argue that OBDA, besides querying data, provides the right principles for devising a formal approach to data quality. In particular, we concentrate on one of the most important dimensions considered both in the literature and in the practice of data quality, namely consistency. We define a general framework for data consistency in OBDA, and present algorithms and complexity analysis for several relevant tasks related to the problem of checking data quality under this dimension, both at the extensional level (content of the data sources), and at the intensional level (schema of the data sources).

In this paper we consider the setting of graph-structured data that evolves as a result of operations carried out by users or applications. We study different reasoning problems, which range from ensuring the satisfaction of a given set of integrity constraints after a given sequence of updates, to deciding the (non-)existence of a sequence of actions that would take the data to an (un)desirable state, starting either from a specific data instance or from an incomplete description of it. We consider a simple action language in which actions are finite sequences of insertions and deletions of nodes and labels, and use Description Logics for describing integrity constraints and (partial) states of the data. We then formalize the data management problems mentioned above as a static verification problem and several planning problems. We provide algorithms and tight complexity bounds for the formalized problems, both for an expressive DL and for a variant of DL-Lite.

We present and analyze a mechanism for the Combinatorial Public Project Problem (CPPP). The problem asks to select k out of m available items, so as to maximize the social welfare for autonomous agents with combinatorial preferences (valuation functions) over subsets of items. The CPPP constitutes an abstract model for decision making by autonomous agents and has been shown to present severe computational hardness, in the design of truthful approximation mechanisms. We study a non-truthful mechanism that is, however, practically relevant to multi-agent environments, by virtue of its natural simplicity. It employs an Item Bidding interface, wherein every agent issues a separate bid for the inclusion of each distinct item in the outcome; the k items with the highest sums of bids are chosen and agents are charged according to a VCG-based payment rule. For fairly expressive classes of the agents' valuation functions, we establish existence of socially optimal pure Nash and strong equilibria, that are resilient to coordinated deviations of subsets of agents. Subsequently we derive tight worst-case bounds on the approximation of the optimum social welfare achieved in equilibrium. We show that the mechanism's performance improves with the number of agents that can coordinate, and reaches half of the optimum welfare at strong equilibrium.

Scoring systems are an extremely important class of election systems. A length-m (so-called) scoring vector applies only to m-candidate elections. To handle general elections, one must use a family of vectors, one per length. The most elegant approach to making sure such families are "family-like'' is the recently introduced notion of (polynomial-time uniform) pure scoring rules, where each scoring vector is obtained from its precursor by adding one new coefficient. We obtain the first dichotomy theorem for pure scoring rules for a control problem. In particular, for constructive control by adding voters (CCAV), we show that CCAV is solvable in polynomial time for k-approval with k<=3, k-veto with k<=2, every pure scoring rule in which only the two top-rated candidates gain nonzero scores, and a particular rule that is a "hybrid" of 1-approval and 1-veto. For all other pure scoring rules, CCAV is NP-complete. We also investigate the descriptive richness of different models for defining pure scoring rules, proving how more rule-generation time gives more rules, proving that rationals give more rules than do the natural numbers, and proving that some restrictions previously thought to be "w.l.o.g." in fact do lose generality.

In other words, there is no perfect voting rule that one domains may admit efficient algorithms for social choice could always use, independently of the circumstances. However, problems that are hard for general preferences. This observation this result holds under the assumption that there are no has recently led to a new wave of interest in constraints on the voters' preferences. Thus, a common strategy restricted domains within the computational social choice to circumvent Arrow's theorem is to consider restricted community (Conitzer 2009; Walsh 2007; Faliszewski et al. preference domains, i.e., assume that the voters' preferences 2011; Brandt et al. 2010; Faliszewski, Hemaspaandra, and have additional structure. It may then be possible to show Hemaspaandra 2011; Betzler, Slinko, and Uhlmann 2013; that various negative consequences of Arrow's theorem do Cornaz, Galand, and Spanjaard 2012; 2013; Skowron et al. not hold.

The Fisher market model is one of the most fundamental resource allocation models in economics. In a Fisher market, the prices and allocations of goods are determined according to the preferences and budgets of buyers to clear the market. In a Fisher market game, however, buyers are strategic and report their preferences over goods; the market-clearing prices and allocations are then determined based on their reported preferences rather than their real preferences. We show that the Fisher market game always has a pure Nash equilibrium, for buyers with linear, Leontief, and Cobb-Douglas utility functions, which are three representative classes of utility functions in the important Constant Elasticity of Substitution (CES) family. Furthermore, to quantify the social efficiency, we prove Price of Anarchy bounds for the game when the utility functions of buyers fall into these three classes respectively.

Efficiency--no agent can be made better off without making another one worse off--and strategyproofness--no agent can obtain a more preferred outcome by misrepresenting his preferences--are two cornerstones of economics and ubiquitous in important areas such as voting, auctions, or matching markets. Within the context of random assignment, Bogomolnaia and Moulin have shown that two particular notions of efficiency and strategyproofness based on stochastic dominance are incompatible. However, there are various other possibilities of lifting preferences over alternatives to preferences over lotteries apart from stochastic dominance. In this paper, we give an overview of common preference extensions, propose two new ones, and show that the above-mentioned incompatibility can be extended to various other notions of strategyproofness and efficiency in randomized social choice.

The Game Description Language GDL is the standard input language for general game-playing systems. While players can gain a lot of traction by an efficient inference algorithm for GDL, state-of-the-art reasoners suffer from a variant of a classical KR problem, the inferential frame problem. We present a method by which general game players can transform any given game description into a representation that solves this problem. Our experimental results demonstrate that with the help of automatically generated domain knowledge, a significant speedup can thus be obtained for the majority of the game descriptions from the AAAI competition.

We study techniques to incentivize self-interested agents to form socially desirable solutions in scenarios where they benefit from mutual coordination. Towards this end, we consider coordination games where agents have different intrinsic preferences but they stand to gain if others choose the same strategy as them. For non-trivial versions of our game, stable solutions like Nash Equilibrium may not exist, or may be socially inefficient even when they do exist. This motivates us to focus on designing efficient algorithms to compute (almost) stable solutions like Approximate Equilibrium that can be realized if agents are provided some additional incentives. Our results apply in many settings like adoption of new products, project selection, and group formation, where a central authority can direct agents towards a strategy but agents may defect if they have better alternatives. We show that for any given instance, we can either compute a high quality approximate equilibrium or a near-optimal solution that can be stabilized by providing small payments to some players. Our results imply that a little influence is necessary in order to ensure that selfish players coordinate and form socially efficient solutions.

Sustainable energy systems of the future will no longer be able to rely on the current paradigm that energy supply follows demand. Many of the renewable energy resources do not produce power on demand, and therefore there is a need for new market structures that motivate sustainable behaviors by participants. The Power Trading Agent Competition (Power TAC) is a new annual competition that focuses on the design and operation of future retail power markets, specifically in smart grid environments with renewable energy production, smart metering, and autonomous agents acting on behalf of customers and retailers. It uses a rich, open-source simulation platform that is based on real-world data and state-of-the-art customer models. Its purpose is to help researchers understand the dynamics of customer and retailer decision-making, as well as the robustness of proposed market designs. This paper introduces TacTex'13, the champion agent from the inaugural competition in 2013. TacTex'13 learns and adapts to the environment in which it operates, by heavily relying on reinforcement learning and prediction methods. This paper describes the constituent components of TacTex'13 and examines its success through analysis of competition results and subsequent controlled experiments.