This technical note studies the reliability limits of LLM-based multi-agent planning as a delegated decision problem. We model the LLM-based multi-agent architecture as a finite acyclic decision network in which multiple stages process shared model-context information, communicate through language interfaces with limited capacity, and may invoke human review. We show that, without new exogenous signals, any delegated network is decision-theoretically dominated by a centralized Bayes decision maker with access to the same information. In the common-evidence regime, this implies that optimizing over multi-agent directed acyclic graphs under a finite communication budget can be recast as choosing a budget-constrained stochastic experiment on the shared signal. We also characterize the loss induced by communication and information compression. Under proper scoring rules, the gap between the centralized Bayes value and the value after communication admits an expected posterior divergence representation, which reduces to conditional mutual information under logarithmic loss and to expected squared posterior error under the Brier score. These results characterize the fundamental reliability limits of delegated LLM planning. Experiments with LLMs on a controlled problem set further demonstrate these characterizations.

Prophet inequality concerns a basic optimal stopping problem and states that simple threshold stopping policies -- i.e., accepting the first reward larger than a certain threshold -- can achieve tight

Machine Learning critically relies on the assumption that the training data is representative of the unseen instances a learner faces at test time.

Contract theory studies the setting where a principal seeks to design a contract for rewarding an agent on the basis of the uncertain outcomes caused by the agent's private actions [

We consider a novel dynamic pricing and learning setting where in addition to setting prices of products in sequential rounds, the seller also ex-ante commits to'advertising schemes'. That is, in the beginning of each round the seller can decide what kind of signal they will provide to the buyer about the product's quality upon realization. Using the popular Bayesian persuasion framework to model the effect of these signals on the buyers' valuation and purchase responses, we formulate the problem of finding an optimal design of the advertising scheme along with a pricing scheme that maximizes the seller's expected revenue. Without any apriori knowledge of the buyers' demand function, our goal is to design an online algorithm that can use past purchase responses to adaptively learn the optimal pricing and advertising strategy. We study the regret of the algorithm when compared to the optimal clairvoyant price and advertising scheme.

We introduce and study the problem of detecting whether an agent is updating their prior beliefs given new evidence in an optimal way that is Bayesian, or whether they are biased towards their own prior. In our model, biased agents form posterior beliefs that are a convex combination of their prior and the Bayesian posterior, where the more biased an agent is, the closer their posterior is to the prior. Since we often cannot observe the agent's beliefs directly, we take an approach inspired by information design . Specifically, we measure an agent's bias by designing a signaling scheme and observing the actions the agent takes in response to different signals, assuming that the agent maximizes their own expected utility. Our goal is to detect bias with a minimum number of signals. Our main results include a characterization of scenarios where a single signal suffices and a computationally efficient algorithm to compute optimal signaling schemes.