Non-monotonic logic programming is the basis for a declarative problem solving paradigm known as answer set programming (ASP). Departing from the seminal definition by Gelfond and Lifschitz in 1988 for simple normal logic programs, various answer set semantics have been proposed for extensions. We consider two important questions: (1) Should the minimal model property, constraint monotonicity and foundedness as defined in the literature be mandatory conditions for an answer set semantics in general? (2) If not, what other properties could be considered as general principles for answer set semantics? We address the two questions. First, it seems that the three aforementioned conditions may sometimes be too strong, and we illustrate with examples that enforcing them may exclude expected answer sets. Second, we evolve the Gelfond answer set (GAS) principles for answer set construction by refining the Gelfond's rationality principle to well-supportedness, minimality w.r.t. negation by default and minimality w.r.t. epistemic negation. The principle of well-supportedness guarantees that every answer set is constructible from if-then rules obeying a level mapping and is thus free of circular justification, while the two minimality principles ensure that the formalism minimizes knowledge both at the level of answer sets and of world views. Third, to embody the refined GAS principles, we extend the notion of well-supportedness substantially to answer sets and world views, respectively. Fourth, we define new answer set semantics in terms of the refined GAS principles. Fifth, we use the refined GAS principles as an alternative baseline to intuitively assess the existing answer set semantics. Finally, we analyze the computational complexity.

Answer Set Programming (ASP) is a prominent problem-modeling and solving framework, whose solutions are called answer sets. Epistemic logic programs (ELP) extend ASP to reason about all or some answer sets. Solutions to an ELP can be seen as consequences over multiple collections of answer sets, known as world views. While the complexity of propositional programs is well studied, the non-ground case remains open. This paper establishes the complexity of non-ground ELPs. We provide a comprehensive picture for well-known program fragments, which turns out to be complete for the class NEXPTIME with access to oracles up to \Sigma^P_2. In the quantitative setting, we establish complexity results for counting complexity beyond #EXP. To mitigate high complexity, we establish results in case of bounded predicate arity, reaching up to the fourth level of the polynomial hierarchy. Finally, we provide ETH-tight runtime results for the parameter treewidth, which has applications in quantitative reasoning, where we reason on (marginal) probabilities of epistemic literals.

Not until I picked up Tony Tulathimutte's "Rejection" did I realize how fun it could be to read a book about a bunch of huge fucking losers. It sucks for them, the inept, lonely, self-obsessed, self-righteous, self-imprisoned protagonists of these linked stories, but it's a thrill for the sickos among us, the king being Tulathimutte, who gives loserdom its own rancid carnival. Tulathimutte understands the project--both his own and that of his characters--with diagnostic, comprehensive hyper-precision; as you behold his parade of marketplace failure and personal pathology, he's ten steps ahead of any reaction you could muster. Thus, you simply surrender to the sick pleasure of watching humiliating people humiliate themselves, as when a clammy self-styled feminist ally gets shut down by a girl and goes, "Grrr, friend-zoned again!" while shaking his fists at the ceiling, then creates a dating profile that includes the line "Unshakably serious about consent. These are two of the mildest ...

In this study, we investigate the capabilities and inherent biases of advanced large language models (LLMs) such as GPT-3.5 and GPT-4 in the context of debate evaluation. We discover that LLM's performance exceeds humans and surpasses the performance of state-of-the-art methods fine-tuned on extensive datasets in debate evaluation. We additionally explore and analyze biases present in LLMs, including positional bias, lexical bias, order bias, which may affect their evaluative judgments. Our findings reveal a consistent bias in both GPT-3.5 and GPT-4 towards the second candidate response presented, attributed to prompt design. We also uncover lexical biases in both GPT-3.5 and GPT-4, especially when label sets carry connotations such as numerical or sequential, highlighting the critical need for careful label verbalizer selection in prompt design. Additionally, our analysis indicates a tendency of both models to favor the debate's concluding side as the winner, suggesting an end-of-discussion bias.

In this position paper, we argue that careless reliance on AI to answer our questions and to judge our output is a violation of Grice's Maxim of Quality as well as a violation of Lemoine's legal Maxim of Innocence, performing an (unwarranted) authority fallacy, and while lacking assessment signals, committing Type II errors that result from fallacies of the inverse. What is missing in the focus on output and results of AI-generated and AI-evaluated content is, apart from paying proper tribute, the demand to follow a person's thought process (or a machine's decision processes). In deliberately avoiding Neural Networks that cannot explain how they come to their conclusions, we introduce logic-symbolic inference to handle any possible epistemics any human or artificial information processor may have. Our system can deal with various belief systems and shows how decisions may differ for what is true, false, realistic, unrealistic, literal, or anomalous. As is, stota AI such as ChatGPT is a sorcerer's apprentice.

Reiter's original proposal for default logic is unsatisfactory for open default theories because of Skolemization and grounding. In this paper, we reconsider this long-standing problem and propose a new world view semantics for first-order default logic. Roughly speaking, a world view of a first-order default theory is a maximal collection of structures satisfying the default theory where the default part is fixed by the world view itself. We show how this semantics generalizes classical first-order logic and first-order answer set programming, and we discuss its connections to Reiter's semantics and other related semantics. We also argue that first-order default logic under the world view semantics provides a rich framework for integrating classical logic based and rule based formalisms in the first-order case.

The language of epistemic specifications and epistemic logic programs extends disjunctive logic programs under the stable model semantics with modal constructs called subjective literals. Using subjective literals, it is possible to check whether a regular literal is true in every or some stable models of the program, those models, in this context also called \emph{belief sets}, being collected in a set called world view. This allows for representing, within the language, whether some proposition should be understood accordingly to the open or the closed world assumption. Several attempts for capturing the intuitions underlying the language by means of a formal semantics were given, resulting in a multitude of proposals that makes it difficult to understand the current state of the art. In this paper, we provide an overview of the inception of the field and the knowledge representation and reasoning tasks it is suitable for. We also provide a detailed analysis of properties of proposed semantics, and an outlook of challenges to be tackled by future research in the area. Under consideration in Theory and Practice of Logic Programming (TPLP)

In the context of planning and reasoning about actions and change, we call an action reversible when its effects can be reverted by applying other actions, returning to the original state. Renewed interest in this area has led to several results in the context of the PDDL language, widely used for describing planning tasks. In this paper, we propose several solutions to the computational problem of deciding the reversibility of an action. In particular, we leverage an existing translation from PDDL to Answer Set Programming (ASP), and then use several different encodings to tackle the problem of action reversibility for the STRIPS fragment of PDDL. For these, we use ASP, as well as Epistemic Logic Programming (ELP), an extension of ASP with epistemic operators, and compare and contrast their strengths and weaknesses.

Extending the popular Answer Set Programming (ASP) paradigm by introspective reasoning capacities has received increasing interest within the last years. Particular attention is given to the formalism of epistemic logic programs (ELPs) where standard rules are equipped with modal operators which allow to express conditions on literals for being known or possible, i.e., contained in all or some answer sets, respectively. ELPs thus deliver multiple collections of answer sets, known as world views. Employing ELPs for reasoning problems so far has mainly been restricted to standard decision problems (complexity analysis) and enumeration (development of systems) of world views. In this paper, we take a next step and contribute to epistemic logic programming in two ways: First, we establish quantitative reasoning for ELPs, where the acceptance of a certain set of literals depends on the number (proportion) of world views that are compatible with the set. Second, we present a novel system that is capable of efficiently solving the underlying counting problems required to answer such quantitative reasoning problems. Our system exploits the graph-based measure treewidth and works by iteratively finding and refining (graph) abstractions of an ELP program. On top of these abstractions, we apply dynamic programming that is combined with utilizing existing search-based solvers like (e)clingo for hard combinatorial subproblems that appear during solving. It turns out that our approach is competitive with existing systems that were introduced recently. This work is under consideration for acceptance in TPLP.

My first loves were international relations, economics and politics. I grew up around cigar smoking patriarchs that talked at length about the US, Russia, China and all the innovations, wars, conflicts and progress in between. I marveled at our global world and I was fascinated by where influence originated and what it could do. I was frightened by the scale of the world's superpowers and the myriad ways they affect the lives of innocent people all over the world. Nothing much has changed since those early days.