We study metric distortion in distributed voting, where nvoters are partitioned into k groups, each selecting a local representative, and a final winner is chosen from these representatives (or from the entire set of candidates). This setting models systems like U.S. presidential elections, where state-level decisions determine the national outcome. We focus on four cost objectives from Anshelevich et al. [1]: avg-avg, avg-max, max-avg, and max-max. We present improved distortion bounds for both deterministic and randomized mechanisms, offering a near-complete characterization of distortion in this model. For deterministic mechanisms, we reduce the upper bound for avg-max from 11 to 7, establish a tight lower bound of 5 for max-avg (improving on 2+ 5), and tighten the upper bound for max-max from 5 to 3. For randomized mechanisms, we consider two settings: (i) only the second stage is randomized, and (ii) both stages may be randomized. In case (i), we prove tight bounds: 5 2/k for avg-avg, 3for avg-max and max-max, and 5for max-avg. In case (ii), we show tight bounds of 3 for max-avg and max-max, and nearly tight bounds for avg-avg and avg-max within [3 2/n, 3 2/(kn)]and [3 2/n, 3], respectively, where n denotes the largest group size.

After pre-training, large language models are aligned with human preferences based on pairwise comparisons. State-of-the-art alignment methods (such as PPO-based RLHF and DPO) are built on the assumption of aligning with a single preference model, despite being deployed in settings where users have diverse preferences. As a result, it is not even clear that these alignment methods produce models that satisfy users on average -- a minimal requirement for pluralistic alignment. Drawing on social choice theory and modeling users' comparisons through individual BradleyTerry (BT) models, we introduce an alignment method's distortion: the worst-case ratio between the optimal achievable average utility, and the average utility of the learned policy. The notion of distortion helps draw sharp distinctions between alignment methods: Nash Learning from Human Feedback achieves the minimax optimal distortion of (12+o(1)) β (for the BT temperature β), robustly across utility distributions, distributions of comparison pairs, and permissible KL divergences from the reference policy. RLHF and DPO, by contrast, suffer (1 o(1)) β distortion already without a KL constraint, and eΩ(β) or even unbounded distortion in the full setting, depending on how comparison pairs are sampled.

A.1 Background on graph neural networks Many GNN architectures iteratively update node features following a neighborhood aggregation scheme.

Voting systems have a wide range of applications including recommender systems, web search, product design and elections. Limited by the lack of general-purpose analytical tools, it is difficult to hand-engineer desirable voting rules for each use case. For this reason, it is appealing to automatically discover voting rules geared towards each scenario. In this paper, we show that set-input neural network architectures such as Set Transformers, fully-connected graph networks and DeepSets are both theoretically and empirically well-suited for learning voting rules. In particular, we show that these network models can not only mimic a number of existing voting rules to compelling accuracy -- both position-based (such as Plurality and Borda) and comparison-based (such as Kemeny, Copeland and Maximin) -- but also discover near-optimal voting rules that maximize different social welfare functions. Furthermore, the learned voting rules generalize well to different voter utility distributions and election sizes unseen during training.

Neural Information Processing Systems http://nips.cc/

With a rapid growth in the deployment of AI tools for making critical decisions (or aiding humans in doing so), there is a growing demand to be able to explain to the stakeholders how these tools arrive at a decision.