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 value-guided construal


Estimating cognitive biases with attention-aware inverse planning

Banerjee, Sounak, Cornelisse, Daphne, Gopinath, Deepak, Sumner, Emily, DeCastro, Jonathan, Rosman, Guy, Vinitsky, Eugene, Ho, Mark K.

arXiv.org Artificial Intelligence

People's goal-directed behaviors are influenced by their cognitive biases, and autonomous systems that interact with people should be aware of this. For example, people's attention to objects in their environment will be biased in a way that systematically affects how they perform everyday tasks such as driving to work. Here, building on recent work in computational cognitive science, we formally articulate the attention-aware inverse planning problem, in which the goal is to estimate a person's attentional biases from their actions. We demonstrate how attention-aware inverse planning systematically differs from standard inverse reinforcement learning and how cognitive biases can be inferred from behavior. Finally, we present an approach to attention-aware inverse planning that combines deep reinforcement learning with computational cognitive modeling. We use this approach to infer the attentional strategies of RL agents in real-life driving scenarios selected from the Waymo Open Dataset, demonstrating the scalability of estimating cognitive biases with attention-aware inverse planning.


Control of mental representations in human planning

Ho, Mark K., Abel, David, Correa, Carlos G., Littman, Michael L., Cohen, Jonathan D., Griffiths, Thomas L.

arXiv.org Artificial Intelligence

One of the most striking features of human cognition is the capacity to plan. Two aspects of human planning stand out: its efficiency, even in complex environments, and its flexibility, even in changing environments. Efficiency is especially impressive because directly computing an optimal plan is intractable, even for modestly complex tasks, and yet people successfully solve myriad everyday problems despite limited cognitive resources. Standard accounts in psychology, economics, and artificial intelligence have suggested this is because people have a mental representation of a task and then use heuristics to plan in that representation. However, this approach generally assumes that mental representations are fixed. Here, we propose that mental representations can be controlled and that this provides opportunities to adaptively simplify problems so they can be more easily reasoned about -- a process we refer to as construal. We construct a formal model of this process and, in a series of large, pre-registered behavioral experiments, show both that construal is subject to online cognitive control and that people form value-guided construals that optimally balance the complexity of a representation and its utility for planning and acting. These results demonstrate how strategically perceiving and conceiving problems facilitates the effective use of limited cognitive resources.