A.1 Background on graph neural networks Many GNN architectures iteratively update node features following a neighborhood aggregation scheme.

Voting systems have a wide range of applications including recommender systems, web search, product design and elections. Limited by the lack of general-purpose analytical tools, it is difficult to hand-engineer desirable voting rules for each use case. For this reason, it is appealing to automatically discover voting rules geared towards each scenario. In this paper, we show that set-input neural network architectures such as Set Transformers, fully-connected graph networks and DeepSets are both theoretically and empirically well-suited for learning voting rules. In particular, we show that these network models can not only mimic a number of existing voting rules to compelling accuracy -- both position-based (such as Plurality and Borda) and comparison-based (such as Kemeny, Copeland and Maximin) -- but also discover near-optimal voting rules that maximize different social welfare functions. Furthermore, the learned voting rules generalize well to different voter utility distributions and election sizes unseen during training.

Voting systems are highly prevalent in our daily lives. Examples range from large scale democratic elections to company or family-wide decision making, recommender systems and product design[Boutilieretal.,2015].

Core-selecting combinatorial auctions (CAs) restrict the auction result in the core such that no coalitions could improve their utilities by engaging in collusion. The minimum-revenue-core (MRC) rule is a widely used core-selecting payment rule to maximize the total utilities of all bidders. However, the MRC rule can suffer from severe unfairness since it ignores individuals' utilities. To address this limitation, we propose to explore the leximin principle to achieve fairness in core-selecting CAs since the leximin principle prefers to maximize the utility of the worst-off; the resulting bidder-leximin-optimal (BLO) payment rule is then theoretically analyzed and an effective algorithm is further provided to compute the BLO outcome. Moreover, we conduct extensive experiments to show that our algorithm returns fairer utility distributions and is faster than existing algorithms of core-selecting payment rules.

We present a framework for the efficient computation of optimal Bayesian decisions under intractable likelihoods, by learning a surrogate model for the expected utility (or its distribution) as a function of the action and data spaces. We leverage recent advances in simulation-based inference and Bayesian optimization to develop active learning schemes to choose where in parameter and action spaces to simulate. This allows us to learn the optimal action in as few simulations as possible. The resulting framework is extremely simulation efficient, typically requiring fewer model calls than the associated posterior inference task alone, and a factor of $100-1000$ more efficient than Monte-Carlo based methods. Our framework opens up new capabilities for performing Bayesian decision making, particularly in the previously challenging regime where likelihoods are intractable, and simulations expensive.

Voting systems have a wide range of applications including recommender systems, web search, product design and elections. Limited by the lack of general-purpose analytical tools, it is difficult to hand-engineer desirable voting rules for each use case. For this reason, it is appealing to automatically discover voting rules geared towards each scenario. In this paper, we show that set-input neural network architectures such as Set Transformers, fully-connected graph networks and DeepSets are both theoretically and empirically well-suited for learning voting rules. In particular, we show that these network models can not only mimic a number of existing voting rules to compelling accuracy --- both position-based (such as Plurality and Borda) and comparison-based (such as Kemeny, Copeland and Maximin) --- but also discover near-optimal voting rules that maximize different social welfare functions. Furthermore, the learned voting rules generalize well to different voter utility distributions and election sizes unseen during training.

We propose a novel and flexible rank-breaking-then-composite-marginal-likelihood (RBCML) framework for learning random utility models (RUMs), which include the Plackett-Luce model. We characterize conditions for the objective function of RBCML to be strictly log-concave by proving that strict log-concavity is preserved under convolution and marginalization. We characterize necessary and sufficient conditions for RBCML to satisfy consistency and asymptotic normality. Experiments on synthetic data show that RBCML for Gaussian RUMs achieves better statistical efficiency and computational efficiency than the state-of-the-art algorithm and our RBCML for the Plackett-Luce model provides flexible tradeoffs between running time and statistical efficiency.

We tackle the problem of identifiability and efficient learning of mixtures of Random Utility Models (RUMs). We show that when the PDFs of utility distributions are symmetric, the mixture of k RUMs (denoted by k-RUM) is not identifiable when the number of alternatives m is no more than 2k-1. On the other hand, when m ≥ max{4k-2,6}, any k-RUM is generically identifiable. We then propose three algorithms for learning mixtures of RUMs: an EM-based algorithm, which we call E-GMM, a direct generalized-method-of-moments (GMM) algorithm, and a sandwich (GMM-E-GMM) algorithm that combines the other two. Experiments on synthetic data show that the sandwich algorithm achieves the highest statistical efficiency and GMM is the most computationally efficient. Experiments on real-world data at Preflib show that Gaussian k-RUMs provide better fitness than a single Gaussian RUM, the Plackett-Luce model, and mixtures of Plackett-Luce models w.r.t. commonly-used model fitness criteria. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first work on learning mixtures of general RUMs.

We introduce a new interpretation of two related notions - conditional utility and utility independence. Unlike the traditional interpretation, the new interpretation renders the notions the direct analogues of their probabilistic counterparts. To capture these notions formally, we appeal to the notion of utility distribution, introduced in previous paper. We show that utility distributions, which have a structure that is identical to that of probability distributions, can be viewed as a special case of an additive multiattribute utility functions, and show how this special case permits us to capture the novel senses of conditional utility and utility independence. Finally, we present the notion of utility networks, which do for utilities what Bayesian networks do for probabilities. Specifically, utility networks exploit the new interpretation of conditional utility and utility independence to compactly represent a utility distribution.