Non-transferable learning (NTL) has been proposed to protect model intellectual property (IP) by creating a "non-transferable barrier" to restrict generalization from authorized to unauthorized domains. Recently, well-designed attack, which restores the unauthorized-domain performance by fine-tuning NTL models on few authorized samples, highlights the security risks of NTL-based applications. However, such attack requires modifying model weights, thus being invalid in the black-box scenario. This raises a critical question: can we trust the security of NTL models deployed as black-box systems? In this work, we reveal the first loophole of black-box NTL models by proposing a novel attack method (dubbed as JailNTL) to jailbreak the non-transferable barrier through test-time data disguising. The main idea of JailNTL is to disguise unauthorized data so it can be identified as authorized by the NTL model, thereby bypassing the non-transferable barrier without modifying the NTL model weights. Specifically, JailNTL encourages unauthorized-domain disguising in two levels, including: (i) data-intrinsic disguising (DID) for eliminating domain discrepancy and preserving class-related content at the input-level, and (ii) model-guided disguising (MGD) for mitigating output-level statistics difference of the NTL model. Empirically, when attacking state-of-the-art (SOTA) NTL models in the black-box scenario, JailNTL achieves an accuracy increase of up to 55.7% in the unauthorized domain by using only 1% authorized samples, largely exceeding existing SOTA white-box attacks.

Model intellectual property (IP) protection has attracted growing attention as science and technology advancements stem from human intellectual labor and computational expenses. Ensuring IP safety for trainers and owners is of utmost importance, particularly in domains where ownership verification and applicability authorization are required. A notable approach to safeguarding model IP involves proactively preventing the use of well-trained models of authorized domains from unauthorized domains. In this paper, we introduce a novel Compact Un-transferable Pyramid Isolation Domain (CUPI-Domain) which serves as a barrier against illegal transfers from authorized to unauthorized domains. Drawing inspiration from human transitive inference and learning abilities, the CUPI-Domain is designed to obstruct cross-domain transfers by emphasizing the distinctive style features of the authorized domain. This emphasis leads to failure in recognizing irrelevant private style features on unauthorized domains. To this end, we propose novel CUPI-Domain generators, which select features from both authorized and CUPI-Domain as anchors. Then, we fuse the style features and semantic features of these anchors to generate labeled and style-rich CUPI-Domain. Additionally, we design external Domain-Information Memory Banks (DIMB) for storing and updating labeled pyramid features to obtain stable domain class features and domain class-wise style features. Based on the proposed whole method, the novel style and discriminative loss functions are designed to effectively enhance the distinction in style and discriminative features between authorized and unauthorized domains, respectively. Moreover, we provide two solutions for utilizing CUPI-Domain based on whether the unauthorized domain is known: target-specified CUPI-Domain and target-free CUPI-Domain.

As scientific and technological advancements result from human intellectual labor and computational costs, protecting model intellectual property (IP) has become increasingly important to encourage model creators and owners. Model IP protection involves preventing the use of well-trained models on unauthorized domains. To address this issue, we propose a novel approach called Compact Un-Transferable Isolation Domain (CUTI-domain), which acts as a barrier to block illegal transfers from authorized to unauthorized domains. Specifically, CUTI-domain blocks cross-domain transfers by highlighting the private style features of the authorized domain, leading to recognition failure on unauthorized domains with irrelevant private style features. Moreover, we provide two solutions for using CUTI-domain depending on whether the unauthorized domain is known or not: target-specified CUTI-domain and target-free CUTI-domain. Our comprehensive experimental results on four digit datasets, CIFAR10 & STL10, and VisDA-2017 dataset demonstrate that CUTI-domain can be easily implemented as a plug-and-play module with different backbones, providing an efficient solution for model IP protection.