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 subspace attack


Subspace Attack: Exploiting Promising Subspaces for Query-Efficient Black-box Attacks

Neural Information Processing Systems

Unlike the white-box counterparts that are widely studied and readily accessible, adversarial examples in black-box settings are generally more Herculean on account of the difficulty of estimating gradients. Many methods achieve the task by issuing numerous queries to target classification systems, which makes the whole procedure costly and suspicious to the systems. In this paper, we aim at reducing the query complexity of black-box attacks in this category. We propose to exploit gradients of a few reference models which arguably span some promising search subspaces. Experimental results show that, in comparison with the state-of-the-arts, our method can gain up to 2x and 4x reductions in the requisite mean and medium numbers of queries with much lower failure rates even if the reference models are trained on a small and inadequate dataset disjoint to the one for training the victim model. Code and models for reproducing our results will be made publicly available.


Subspace Attack: Exploiting Promising Subspaces for Query-Efficient Black-box Attacks

Neural Information Processing Systems

Unlike the white-box counterparts that are widely studied and readily accessible, adversarial examples in black-box settings are generally more Herculean on account of the difficulty of estimating gradients. Many methods achieve the task by issuing numerous queries to target classification systems, which makes the whole procedure costly and suspicious to the systems. In this paper, we aim at reducing the query complexity of black-box attacks in this category. We propose to exploit gradients of a few reference models which arguably span some promising search subspaces. Experimental results show that, in comparison with the state-of-the-arts, our method can gain up to 2x and 4x reductions in the requisite mean and medium numbers of queries with much lower failure rates even if the reference models are trained on a small and inadequate dataset disjoint to the one for training the victim model.


Spanning Attack: Reinforce Black-box Attacks with Unlabeled Data

arXiv.org Machine Learning

It has been shown that machine learning models, especially deep neural networks, are vulnerable to small adversarial perturbations, i.e., a small carefully crafted perturbation added to the input may significantly change the prediction results (Szegedy et al., 2014; Goodfellow et al., 2015; Biggio and Roli, 2018; Fawzi et al., 2018). Therefore, the problem of finding those perturbations, also known as adversarial attacks, has become an important way to evaluate the model robustness: the more difficult to attack a given model, the more robust it is. Depending on the information an adversary can access, the adversarial attacks can be classified into white-box and black-box settings. In the white-box setting, the target model is completely exposed to the attacker, and adversarial perturbations could be easily crafted by exploiting the first-order information, i.e., gradients with respect to the input (Carlini and Wagner, 2017; Madry et al., 2018). Despite of its efficiency and effectiveness, the white-box setting is an overly strong and pessimistic threat model, and white-box attacks are usually not practical when attacking real-world machine learning systems due to the invisibility of the gradient information. Instead, we focus on the problem of black-box attacks, where the model structure and parameters (weights) are not available to the attacker.


Subspace Attack: Exploiting Promising Subspaces for Query-Efficient Black-box Attacks

Neural Information Processing Systems

Unlike the white-box counterparts that are widely studied and readily accessible, adversarial examples in black-box settings are generally more Herculean on account of the difficulty of estimating gradients. Many methods achieve the task by issuing numerous queries to target classification systems, which makes the whole procedure costly and suspicious to the systems. In this paper, we aim at reducing the query complexity of black-box attacks in this category. We propose to exploit gradients of a few reference models which arguably span some promising search subspaces. Experimental results show that, in comparison with the state-of-the-arts, our method can gain up to 2x and 4x reductions in the requisite mean and medium numbers of queries with much lower failure rates even if the reference models are trained on a small and inadequate dataset disjoint to the one for training the victim model.