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 stackelberg planning


On the Computational Complexity of Stackelberg Planning and Meta-Operator Verification: Technical Report

arXiv.org Artificial Intelligence

Stackelberg planning is a recently introduced single-turn two-player adversarial planning model, where two players are acting in a joint classical planning task, the objective of the first player being hampering the second player from achieving its goal. This places the Stackelberg planning problem somewhere between classical planning and general combinatorial two-player games. But, where exactly? All investigations of Stackelberg planning so far focused on practical aspects. We close this gap by conducting the first theoretical complexity analysis of Stackelberg planning. We show that in general Stackelberg planning is actually no harder than classical planning. Under a polynomial plan-length restriction, however, Stackelberg planning is a level higher up in the polynomial complexity hierarchy, suggesting that compilations into classical planning come with a worst-case exponential plan-length increase. In attempts to identify tractable fragments, we further study its complexity under various planning task restrictions, showing that Stackelberg planning remains intractable where classical planning is not. We finally inspect the complexity of meta-operator verification, a problem that has been recently connected to Stackelberg planning.


Stackelberg Planning: Towards Effective Leader-Follower State Space Search

AAAI Conferences

Inspired by work on Stackelberg security games, we introduce Stackelberg planning, where a leader player in a classical planning task chooses a minimum-cost action sequence aimed at maximizing the plan cost of a follower player in the same task. Such Stackelberg planning can provide useful analyses not only in planning-based security applications like network penetration testing, but also to measure robustness against perturbances in more traditional planning applications (e. g. with a leader sabotaging road network connections in transportation-type domains). To identify all equilibria---exhibiting the leader’s own-cost-vs.-follower-cost trade-off---we design leader-follower search, a state space search at the leader level which calls in each state an optimal planner at the follower level. We devise simple heuristic guidance, branch-and-bound style pruning, and partial-order reduction techniques for this setting. We run experiments on Stackelberg variants of IPC and pentesting benchmarks. In several domains, Stackelberg planning is quite feasible in practice.