Neural Information Processing Systems http://nips.cc/

We consider stable and popular matching problems in arbitrary graphs, which are referred to as stable roommates instances. We extend the 3/2-approximation algorithm for the maximum size weakly stable matching problem to the roommates case, which solves a more than 20 year old open question of Irving and Manlove about the approximability of maximum size weakly stable matchings in roommates instances with ties [Irving and Manlove 2002] and has nice applications for the problem of matching residents to hospitals in the presence of couples. We also extend the algorithm that finds a maximum size popular matching in bipartite graphs in the case of strict preferences and the algorithm to find a popular matching among maximum weight matchings. While previous attempts to extend the idea of promoting the agents or duplicating the edges from bipartite instances to arbitrary ones failed, these results show that with the help of a simple observation, we can indeed bridge the gap and extend these algorithms

The stable marriage problem with incomplete lists and ties (SMTI) and the hospitals/residents problem with ties (HRT) are important in matching theory with broad practical applications. In this paper, we introduce a tie-breaking based local search algorithm (TBLS) designed to achieve a weakly stable matching of maximum size for both the SMTI and HRT problems. TBLS begins by arbitrarily resolving all ties and iteratively refines the tie-breaking strategy by adjusting the relative order within ties based on preference ranks and the current stable matching. Additionally, we introduce TBLS-E, an equity-focused variant of TBLS, specifically designed for the SMTI problem. This variant maintains the objective of maximizing matching size, while enhancing equity through two simple modifications. In comparison with ten other approximation and local search algorithms, TBLS achieves the highest matching size, while TBLS-E exhibits the lowest sex equality cost. Significantly, TBLS-E preserves a matching size comparable to that of TBLS. Both our algorithms demonstrate faster computational speed than other local search algorithms in solving large-sized instances.

We give a simple approximation algorithm for a common generalization of many previously studied extensions of the stable matching problem with ties. These generalizations include the existence of critical vertices in the graph, amongst whom we must match as much as possible, free edges, that cannot be blocking edges and $\Delta$-stabilities, which mean that for an edge to block, the improvement should be large enough on one or both sides. We also introduce other notions to generalize these even further, which allows our framework to capture many existing and future applications. We show that our edge duplicating technique allows us to treat these different types of generalizations simultaneously, while also making the algorithm, the proofs and the analysis much simpler and shorter then in previous approaches. In particular, we answer an open question by Askalidis et al. (2013) about the existence of a $\frac{3}{2}$-approximation algorithm for the Max-SMTI problem with free edges. This demonstrates well that this technique can grasp the underlying essence of these problems quite well and have the potential to be able to solve countless future applications as well.

We study a variation of the Stable Marriage problem, where every man and every woman express their preferences as preference lists which may be incomplete and contain ties. This problem is called the Stable Marriage problem with Ties and Incomplete preferences (SMTI). We consider three optimization variants of SMTI, Max Cardinality, Sex-Equal and Egalitarian, and empirically compare the following methods to solve them: Answer Set Programming, Constraint Programming, Integer Linear Programming. For Max Cardinality, we compare these methods with Local Search methods as well. We also empirically compare Answer Set Programming with Propositional Satisfiability, for SMTI instances. This paper is under consideration for acceptance in Theory and Practice of Logic Programming (TPLP).

In many labor markets, workers and firms are connected via affiliative relationships. A management consulting firm wishes to both accept the best new workers but also place its current affiliated workers at strong firms. Similarly, a research university wishes to hire strong job market candidates while also placing its own candidates at strong peer universities. We model this affiliate matching problem in a generalization of the classic stable marriage setting by permitting firms to state preferences over not just which workers to whom they are matched, but also to which firms their affiliated workers are matched. Based on results from a human survey, we find that participants (acting as firms) give preference to their own affiliate workers in surprising ways that violate some assumptions of the classical stable marriage problem. This motivates a nuanced discussion of how stability could be defined in affiliate matching problems; we give an example of a marketplace which admits a stable match under one natural definition of stability, and does not for that same marketplace under a different, but still natural, definition. We conclude by setting a research agenda toward the creation of a centralized clearing mechanism in this general setting.

Stable matching problems have several practical applications. If preference lists are truncated and contain ties, finding a stable matching with maximal size is computationally difficult. We address this problem using a local search technique, based on Adaptive Search and present experimental evidence that this approach is much more efficient than state-of-the-art exact and approximate methods. Moreover, parallel versions (particularly versions with communication) improve performance so much that very large and hard instances can be solved quickly.

We study the computational complexity of finding the next most preferred solution in some common formalisms for representing constraints and preferences. The problem is computationally intractable for CSPs, but is polynomial for tree-shaped CSPs and tree-shaped fuzzy CSPs. On the other hand, it is intractable for weighted CSPs, even under restrictions on the constraint graph. For CP-nets, the problem is polynomial when the CP-net is acyclic. This remains so if we add (soft) constraints that are tree-shaped and topologically compatible with the CP-net.

The stable marriage problem is a well-known problem of matching men to women so that no man and woman, who are not married to each other, both prefer each other. Such a problem has a wide variety of practical applications, ranging from matching resident doctors to hospitals, to matching students to schools or more generally to any two-sided market. In the classical stable marriage problem, both men and women express a strict preference order over the members of the other sex, in a qualitative way. Here we consider stable marriage problems with quantitative preferences: each man (resp., woman) provides a score for each woman (resp., man). Such problems are more expressive than the classical stable marriage problems. Moreover, in some real-life situations it is more natural to express scores (to model, for example, profits or costs) rather than a qualitative preference ordering. In this context, we define new notions of stability and optimality, and we provide algorithms to find marriages which are stable and/or optimal according to these notions. While expressivity greatly increases by adopting quantitative preferences, we show that in most cases the desired solutions can be found by adapting existing algorithms for the classical stable marriage problem.

The stable marriage (SM) problem has a wide variety of practical applications, ranging from matching resident doctors to hospitals, to matching students to schools, or more generally to any two-sided market. In the classical formulation, n men and n women express their preferences (via a strict total order) over the members of the other sex. Solving a SM problem means finding a stable marriage where stability is an envy-free notion: no man and woman who are not married to each other would both prefer each other to their partners or to being single. We consider both the classical stable marriage problem and one of its useful variations (denoted SMTI) where the men and women express their preferences in the form of an incomplete preference list with ties over a subset of the members of the other sex. Matchings are permitted only with people who appear in these lists, an we try to find a stable matching that marries as many people as possible. Whilst the SM problem is polynomial to solve, the SMTI problem is NP-hard. We propose to tackle both problems via a local search approach, which exploits properties of the problems to reduce the size of the neighborhood and to make local moves efficiently. We evaluate empirically our algorithm for SM problems by measuring its runtime behaviour and its ability to sample the lattice of all possible stable marriages. We evaluate our algorithm for SMTI problems in terms of both its runtime behaviour and its ability to find a maximum cardinality stable marriage.For SM problems, the number of steps of our algorithm grows only as O(nlog(n)), and that it samples very well the set of all stable marriages. It is thus a fair and efficient approach to generate stable marriages.Furthermore, our approach for SMTI problems is able to solve large problems, quickly returning stable matchings of large and often optimal size despite the NP-hardness of this problem.