spoofed sample
ArFake: A Multi-Dialect Benchmark and Baselines for Arabic Spoof-Speech Detection
Maged, Mohamed, Ehab, Alhassan, Mekky, Ali, Hassan, Besher, Shehata, Shady
With the rise of generative text-to-speech models, distinguishing between real and synthetic speech has become challenging, especially for Arabic that have received limited research attention. Most spoof detection efforts have focused on English, leaving a significant gap for Arabic and its many dialects. In this work, we introduce the first multi-dialect Arabic spoofed speech dataset. To evaluate the difficulty of the synthesized audio from each model and determine which produces the most challenging samples, we aimed to guide the construction of our final dataset either by merging audios from multiple models or by selecting the best-performing model, we conducted an evaluation pipeline that included training classifiers using two approaches: modern embedding-based methods combined with classifier heads; classical machine learning algorithms applied to MFCC features; and the RawNet2 architecture. The pipeline further incorporated the calculation of Mean Opinion Score based on human ratings, as well as processing both original and synthesized datasets through an Automatic Speech Recognition model to measure the Word Error Rate. Our results demonstrate that FishSpeech outperforms other TTS models in Arabic voice cloning on the Casablanca corpus, producing more realistic and challenging synthetic speech samples. However, relying on a single TTS for dataset creation may limit generalizability.
Quantum-Classical Hybrid Framework for Zero-Day Time-Push GNSS Spoofing Detection
Enan, Abyad, Chowdhury, Mashrur, Dasgupta, Sagar, Rahman, Mizanur
Global Navigation Satellite Systems (GNSS) are critical for Positioning, Navigation, and Timing (PNT) applications. However, GNSS are highly vulnerable to spoofing attacks, where adversaries transmit counterfeit signals to mislead receivers. Such attacks can lead to severe consequences, including misdirected navigation, compromised data integrity, and operational disruptions. Most existing spoofing detection methods depend on supervised learning techniques and struggle to detect novel, evolved, and unseen attacks. To overcome this limitation, we develop a zero-day spoofing detection method using a Hybrid Quantum-Classical Autoencoder (HQC-AE), trained solely on authentic GNSS signals without exposure to spoofed data. By leveraging features extracted during the tracking stage, our method enables proactive detection before PNT solutions are computed. We focus on spoofing detection in static GNSS receivers, which are particularly susceptible to time-push spoofing attacks, where attackers manipulate timing information to induce incorrect time computations at the receiver. We evaluate our model against different unseen time-push spoofing attack scenarios: simplistic, intermediate, and sophisticated. Our analysis demonstrates that the HQC-AE consistently outperforms its classical counterpart, traditional supervised learning-based models, and existing unsupervised learning-based methods in detecting zero-day, unseen GNSS time-push spoofing attacks, achieving an average detection accuracy of 97.71% with an average false negative rate of 0.62% (when an attack occurs but is not detected). For sophisticated spoofing attacks, the HQC-AE attains an accuracy of 98.23% with a false negative rate of 1.85%. These findings highlight the effectiveness of our method in proactively detecting zero-day GNSS time-push spoofing attacks across various stationary GNSS receiver platforms.
How Do Neural Spoofing Countermeasures Detect Partially Spoofed Audio?
Liu, Tianchi, Zhang, Lin, Das, Rohan Kumar, Ma, Yi, Tao, Ruijie, Li, Haizhou
Partially manipulating a sentence can greatly change its meaning. Recent work shows that countermeasures (CMs) trained on partially spoofed audio can effectively detect such spoofing. However, the current understanding of the decision-making process of CMs is limited. We utilize Grad-CAM and introduce a quantitative analysis metric to interpret CMs' decisions. We find that CMs prioritize the artifacts of transition regions created when concatenating bona fide and spoofed audio. This focus differs from that of CMs trained on fully spoofed audio, which concentrate on the pattern differences between bona fide and spoofed parts. Our further investigation explains the varying nature of CMs' focus while making correct or incorrect predictions. These insights provide a basis for the design of CM models and the creation of datasets. Moreover, this work lays a foundation of interpretability in the field of partial spoofed audio detection that has not been well explored previously.
Contactless Fingerprint Biometric Anti-Spoofing: An Unsupervised Deep Learning Approach
Adami, Banafsheh, Karimian, Nima
Contactless fingerprint recognition offers a higher level of user comfort and addresses hygiene concerns more effectively. However, it is also more vulnerable to presentation attacks such as photo paper, paper-printout, and various display attacks, which makes it more challenging to implement in biometric systems compared to contact-based modalities. Limited research has been conducted on presentation attacks in contactless fingerprint systems, and these studies have encountered challenges in terms of generalization and scalability since both bonafide samples and presentation attacks are utilized during training model. Although this approach appears promising, it lacks the ability to handle unseen attacks, which is a crucial factor for developing PAD methods that can generalize effectively. We introduced an innovative anti-spoofing approach that combines an unsupervised autoencoder with a convolutional block attention module to address the limitations of existing methods. Our model is exclusively trained on bonafide images without exposure to any spoofed samples during the training phase. It is then evaluated against various types of presentation attack images in the testing phase. The scheme we proposed has achieved an average BPCER of 0.96\% with an APCER of 1.6\% for presentation attacks involving various types of spoofed samples.