We develop a framework that leverages the smoothed complexity analysis by Spielman and Teng to circumvent paradoxes and impossibility theorems in social choice, motivated by modern applications of social choice powered by AI and ML. For Condrocet's paradox, we prove that the smoothed likelihood of the paradox either vanishes at an exponential rate as the number of agents increases, or does not vanish at all. For the ANR impossibility on the non-existence of voting rules that simultaneously satisfy anonymity, neutrality, and resolvability, we characterize the rate for the impossibility to vanish, to be either polynomially fast or exponentially fast. We also propose a novel easy-to-compute tie-breaking mechanism that optimally preserves anonymity and neutrality for even number of alternatives in natural settings. Our results illustrate the smoothed possibility of social choice--even though the paradox and the impossibility theorem hold in the worst case, they may not be a big concern in practice.

This paper bridges two perspectives: it studies the multi-secretary problem through the fairness lens of social choice, and examines multi-winner elections from the viewpoint of online decision making. After identifying the limitations of the prominent proportionality notion of Extended Justified Representation (EJR) in the online domain, the work proposes a set of mechanisms that merge techniques from online algorithms with rules from social choice -- such as the Method of Equal Shares and the Nash Rule -- and supports them through both theoretical analysis and extensive experimental evaluation.

In the context of reinforcement learning from human feedback (RLHF), the reward function is generally derived from maximum likelihood estimation of a random utility model based on pairwise comparisons made by humans. The problem of learning a reward function is one of preference aggregation that, we argue, largely falls within the scope of social choice theory. From this perspective, we can evaluate different aggregation methods via established axioms, examining whether these methods meet or fail well-known standards. We demonstrate that both the Bradley-Terry-Luce Model and its broad generalizations fail to meet basic axioms. In response, we develop novel rules for learning reward functions with strong axiomatic guarantees. A key innovation from the standpoint of social choice is that our problem has a linear structure, which greatly restricts the space of feasible rules and leads to a new paradigm that we call linear social choice .

"Is Approval V oting Optimal Given Approval V otes?" NeurIPS-2015. The reviewer points to a paper about "threshold voting," but this is a very different idea.

In most social choice settings, the participating agents express their preferences over the different alternatives in the form of linear orderings.

We thank all reviewers for their helpful comments and suggestions! We will address all minor issues. We will add references in the revision. UMG ( π) has cycles. We havn't thought about checking it from data, which is an interesting statistical Theorem 1 is effectively known.

Social choice theory offers a wealth of approaches for selecting a candidate on behalf of voters based on their reported preference rankings over options. When voters have underlying utilities for these options, however, using preference rankings may lead to suboptimal outcomes vis-à-vis utilitarian social welfare. Distortion is a measure of this suboptimality, and provides a worst-case approach for developing and analyzing voting rules when utilities have minimal structure. However in many settings, such as common paradigms for value alignment, alternatives admit a vector representation, and it is natural to suppose that utilities are parametric functions thereof. We undertake the first study of distortion for linear utility functions. Specifically, we investigate the distortion of linear social choice for deterministic and randomized voting rules. We obtain bounds that depend only on the dimension of the candidate embedding, and are independent of the numbers of candidates or voters. Additionally, we introduce poly-time instance-optimal algorithms for minimizing distortion given a collection of candidates and votes. We empirically evaluate these in two real-world domains: recommendation systems using collaborative filtering embeddings, and opinion surveys utilizing language model embeddings, benchmarking several standard rules against our instance-optimal algorithms.

Current frameworks for consensus statement generation with large language models lack the inherent structure needed to provide provable fairness guarantees when aggregating diverse free-form opinions. We model the task as a multi-objective, token-level Markov Decision Process (MDP), where each objective corresponds to an agent's preference. Token-level rewards for each agent are derived from their policy (e.g., a personalized language model). This approach utilizes the finding that such policies implicitly define optimal Q-functions, providing a principled way to quantify rewards at each generation step without a value function (Rafailov et al., 2024). This MDP formulation creates a formal structure amenable to analysis using principles from social choice theory. We propose two approaches grounded in social choice theory. First, we propose a stochastic generation policy guaranteed to be in the ex-ante core, extending core stability concepts from voting theory to text generation. This policy is derived from an underlying distribution over complete statements that maximizes proportional fairness (Nash Welfare). Second, for generating a single statement, we target the maximization of egalitarian welfare using search algorithms within the MDP framework. Empirically, experiments using language models to instantiate agent policies show that search guided by the egalitarian objective generates consensus statements with improved worst-case agent alignment compared to baseline methods, including the Habermas Machine (Tessler et al., 2024).

In the context of reinforcement learning from human feedback (RLHF), the reward function is generally derived from maximum likelihood estimation of a random utility model based on pairwise comparisons made by humans. The problem of learning a reward function is one of preference aggregation that, we argue, largely falls within the scope of social choice theory. From this perspective, we can evaluate different aggregation methods via established axioms, examining whether these methods meet or fail well-known standards. We demonstrate that both the Bradley-Terry-Luce Model and its broad generalizations fail to meet basic axioms. In response, we develop novel rules for learning reward functions with strong axiomatic guarantees. A key innovation from the standpoint of social choice is that our problem has a linear structure, which greatly restricts the space of feasible rules and leads to a new paradigm that we call linear social choice .