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Impact of Dataset Properties on Membership Inference Vulnerability of Deep Transfer Learning

Neural Information Processing Systems

Membership inference attacks (MIAs) are used to test practical privacy of machine learning models. MIAs complement formal guarantees from differential privacy (DP) under a more realistic adversary model. We analyze MIA vulnerability of fine-tuned neural networks both empirically and theoretically, the latter using a simplified model of fine-tuning. We show that the vulnerability of non-DP models when measured as the attacker advantage at a fixed false positive rate reduces according to a simple power law as the number of examples per class increases. A similar power-law applies even for the most vulnerable points, but the dataset size needed for adequate protection of the most vulnerable points is very large.


Can We Infer Confidential Properties of Training Data from LLMs?

Neural Information Processing Systems

Large language models (LLMs) are increasingly fine-tuned on domain-specific datasets to support applications in fields such as healthcare, finance, and law. These fine-tuning datasets often have sensitive and confidential dataset-level properties -- such as patient demographics or disease prevalence--that are not intended to be revealed. While prior work has studied property inference attacks on discriminative models (e.g., image classification models) and generative models (e.g., GANs for image data), it remains unclear if such attacks transfer to LLMs. In this work, we introduce PropInfer, a benchmark task for evaluating property inference in LLMs under two fine-tuning paradigms: question-answering and chat-completion. Built on the ChatDoctor dataset, our benchmark includes a range of property types and task configurations. We further propose two tailored attacks: a prompt-based generation attack and a shadow-model attack leveraging word frequency signals.


Practical Bayes-Optimal Membership Inference Attacks

Neural Information Processing Systems

We develop practical and theoretically grounded membership inference attacks (MIAs) against both independent and identically distributed (i.i.d.) data and graphstructured data. Building on the Bayesian decision-theoretic framework of [1], we derive the Bayes-optimal membership inference rule for node-level MIAs against graph neural networks, addressing key open questions about optimal query strategies in the graph setting. We introduce BASE and G-BASE, tractable approximations of the Bayes-optimal membership inference. G-BASE achieves superior performance compared to previously proposed classifier-based node-level MIA attacks. BASE, which is also applicable to non-graph data, matches or exceeds the performance of prior state-of-the-art MIAs, such as LiRA and RMIA, at a significantly lower computational cost. Finally, we show that BASE and RMIA are equivalent under a specific hyperparameter setting, providing a principled, Bayes-optimal justification for the RMIA attack.


_NeurIPS2023_CR__Certified_Backdoor_Detection.pdf

Neural Information Processing Systems

The main purpose of this research is to provide the user of DNN classifiers with a method to detect if the model is backdoor attacked without access to the training set. All attacks used to evaluate our detection method in this paper are created by published backdoor attack strategies on public datasets. Thus, we did not create new threats to society. Moreover, our work provides a new perspective on backdoor defense, as it is the first to address the certification of backdoor detection. It helps other researchers to understand the behavior of deep learning systems facing malicious activities. While existing backdoor detectors are all empirical [67, 20, 75, 41, 69, 6, 56, 13], our work initiates a new research direction - backdoor detection with certification. Moreover, we first exposed that certified backdoor detectors and certified robustness against backdoor attacks complement each other [86, 71, 27, 53].




Scalable Membership Inference Attacks via Quantile Regression

Neural Information Processing Systems

Membership inference attacks are designed to determine, using black box access to trained models, whether a particular example was used in training or not. Membership inference can be formalized as a hypothesis testing problem. The most effective existing attacks estimate the distribution of some test statistic (usually the model's confidence on the true label) on points that were (and were not) used in training by training many shadow models--i.e.