We analyze statistical discrimination using a multi-armed bandit model where myopic firms face candidate workers arriving with heterogeneous observable characteristics. The association between the worker's skill and characteristics is unknown ex ante; thus, firms need to learn it. In such an environment, laissez-faire may result in a highly unfair and inefficient outcome---myopic firms are reluctant to hire minority workers because the lack of data about minority workers prevents accurate estimation of their performance. Consequently, minority groups could be perpetually underestimated---they are never hired, and therefore, data about them is never accumulated. We proved that this problem becomes more serious when the population ratio is imbalanced, as is the case in many extant discrimination problems. We consider two affirmative-action policies for solving this dilemma: One is a subsidy rule that is based on the popular upper confidence bound algorithm, and another is the Rooney Rule, which requires firms to interview at least one minority worker for each hiring opportunity. Our results indicate temporary affirmative actions are effective for statistical discrimination caused by data insufficiency.

A robust body of evidence demonstrates the adverse effects of implicit bias in various contexts--from hiring to health care. The Rooney Rule is an intervention developed to counter implicit bias and has been implemented in the private and public sectors. The Rooney Rule requires that a selection panel include at least one candidate from an underrepresented group in their shortlist of candidates. Recently, Kleinberg and Raghavan proposed a model of implicit bias and studied the effectiveness of the Rooney Rule when applied to a single selection decision. However, selection decisions often occur repeatedly over time. Further, it has been observed that, given consistent counterstereotypical feedback, implicit biases against underrepresented candidates can change. We consider a model of how a selection panel's implicit bias changes over time given their hiring decisions either with or without the Rooney Rule in place. Our main result is that, when the panel is constrained by the Rooney Rule, their implicit bias roughly reduces at a rate that is the inverse of the size of the shortlist--independent of the number of candidates, whereas without the Rooney Rule, the rate is inversely proportional to the number of candidates. Thus, when the number of candidates is much larger than the size of the shortlist, the Rooney Rule enables a faster reduction in implicit bias, providing an additional reason in favor of using it as a strategy to mitigate implicit bias. Towards empirically evaluating the long-term effect of the Rooney Rule in repeated selection decisions, we conduct an iterative candidate selection experiment on Amazon MTurk. We observe that, indeed, decision-makers subject to the Rooney Rule select more minority candidates in addition to those required by the rule itself than they would if no rule is in effect, and do so without considerably decreasing the utility of candidates selected.

It is well understood that implicit bias is a factor in adverse effects against subpopulations in many societal contexts [1,6,42] as also highlighted by recent events in the popular press [22,38,61]. For instance, in employment decisions, men are perceived as more competent and given a higher starting salary even when qualifications are the same [52], and in managerial jobs, it was observed that women had to show roughly twice as much evidence of competence as men to be seen as equally competent [37,59]. In education, implicit biases have been shown to exist in ways that exacerbate the achievement gap for racial and ethnic minorities [53] and female students [41], and add to the large racial disparities in school discipline which particularly affect black students' school performance and future prospects [45]. Beyond negatively impacting social opportunities, implicit biases have been shown to put lives at stake as they are a factor in police decisions to shoot, negatively impacting people who are black [20] and of other racial or ethnic minorities [48]. Furthermore, decision making that relies on biased measures of quantities such as utility can not only adversely impact those perceived more negatively, but can also lead to sub-optimal outcomes for those harboring these unconscious biases. To combat this, a significant effort has been placed in developing anti-bias training with the goal of eliminating or reducing implicit biases [24, 39, 64].

Over the past two decades, the notion of implicit bias has come to serve as an important component in our understanding of discrimination in activities such as hiring, promotion, and school admissions. Research on implicit bias posits that when people evaluate others -- for example, in a hiring context -- their unconscious biases about membership in particular groups can have an effect on their decision-making, even when they have no deliberate intention to discriminate against members of these groups. A growing body of experimental work has pointed to the effect that implicit bias can have in producing adverse outcomes. Here we propose a theoretical model for studying the effects of implicit bias on selection decisions, and a way of analyzing possible procedural remedies for implicit bias within this model. A canonical situation represented by our model is a hiring setting: a recruiting committee is trying to choose a set of finalists to interview among the applicants for a job, evaluating these applicants based on their future potential, but their estimates of potential are skewed by implicit bias against members of one group. In this model, we show that measures such as the Rooney Rule, a requirement that at least one of the finalists be chosen from the affected group, can not only improve the representation of this affected group, but also lead to higher payoffs in absolute terms for the organization performing the recruiting. However, identifying the conditions under which such measures can lead to improved payoffs involves subtle trade-offs between the extent of the bias and the underlying distribution of applicant characteristics, leading to novel theoretical questions about order statistics in the presence of probabilistic side information.