We first show that a unique optimal policy may not exist if preferences over trajectories are deterministic for PbRL.

Note that inthis simple example, the state transition functionT and the reward functionr stillsatisfy theMarkovproperty.

Consider a team of cooperative players that take actions in a networkedenvironment. At each turn, each player chooses an action and receives a reward that is an unknown function of all the players' actions. The goal of the team of players is to learn to play together the action profile that maximizes the sum of their rewards. However, players cannot observe the actions or rewards of other players, and can only get this information by communicating with their neighbors.

Preference-based Reinforcement Learning (PbRL) replaces reward values in traditional reinforcement learning by preferences to better elicit human opinion on the target objective, especially when numerical reward values are hard to design or interpret. Despite promising results in applications, the theoretical understanding of PbRL is still in its infancy. In this paper, we present the first finite-time analysis for general PbRL problems. We first show that a unique optimal policy may not exist if preferences over trajectories are deterministic for PbRL. If preferences are stochastic, and the preference probability relates to the hidden reward values, we present algorithms for PbRL, both with and without a simulator, that are able to identify the best policy up to accuracy $\varepsilon$ with high probability. Our method explores the state space by navigating to under-explored states, and solves PbRL using a combination of dueling bandits and policy search. Experiments show the efficacy of our method when it is applied to real-world problems.

This "small" difference requires the agent to change the planning strategy significantly because the

In collaborative data sharing and machine learning, multiple parties aggregate their data resources to train a machine learning model with better model performance. However, as the parties incur data collection costs, they are only willing to do so when guaranteed incentives, such as fairness and individual rationality. Existing frameworks assume that all parties join the collaboration simultaneously, which does not hold in many real-world scenarios. Due to the long processing time for data cleaning, difficulty in overcoming legal barriers, or unawareness, the parties may join the collaboration at different times. In this work, we propose the following perspective: As a party who joins earlier incurs higher risk and encourages the contribution from other wait-and-see parties, that party should receive a reward of higher value for sharing data earlier. To this end, we propose a fair and time-aware data sharing framework, including novel time-aware incentives. We develop new methods for deciding reward values to satisfy these incentives. We further illustrate how to generate model rewards that realize the reward values and empirically demonstrate the properties of our methods on synthetic and real-world datasets.