We study a setting where agents use no-regret learning algorithms to participate in repeated auctions. Recently, Kolumbus and Nisan [2022a] showed, rather surprisingly, that when bidders participate in second-price auctions using no-regret bidding algorithms, no matter how large the number of interactions $T$ is, the runner-up bidder may not converge to bidding truthfully. Our first result shows that this holds forall deterministictruthful auctions. We also show that the ratio of the learning rates of different bidders can qualitatively affect the convergence of the bidders. Next, we consider the problem of revenue maximization in this environment. In the setting with fully rational bidders, the seminal result of Myerson [1981] showed that revenue can be maximized by using a second-price auction with reserves.

Product ranking is the core problem for revenue-maximizing online retailers. To design proper product ranking algorithms, various consumer choice models are proposed to characterize the consumers' behaviors when they are provided with a list of products. However, existing works assume that each consumer purchases at most one product or will keep viewing the product list after purchasing a product, which does not agree with the common practice in real scenarios. In this paper, we assume that each consumer can purchase multiple products at will. To model consumers' willingness to view and purchase, we set a random attention span and purchase budget, which determines the maximal amount of products that he/she views and purchases, respectively. Under this setting, we first design an optimal ranking policy when the online retailer can precisely model consumers' behaviors. Based on the policy, we further develop the Multiple-Purchase-with-Budget UCB (MPB-UCB) algorithms with $\tilde{O}(\sqrt{T})$ regret that estimate consumers' behaviors and maximize revenue simultaneously in online settings. Experiments on both synthetic and semi-synthetic datasets prove the effectiveness of the proposed algorithms.

We consider online bandit learning in which at every time step, an algorithm has to make a decision and then observe only its reward. The goal is to design efficient (polynomial-time) algorithms that achieve a total reward approximately close to that of the best fixed decision in hindsight. In this paper, we introduce a new notion of $(\lambda,\mu)$-concave functions and present a bandit learning algorithm that achieves a performance guarantee which is characterized as a function of the concavity parameters $\lambda$ and $\mu$. The algorithm is based on the mirror descent algorithm in which the update directions follow the gradient of the multilinear extensions of the reward functions. The regret bound induced by our algorithm is $\widetilde{O}(\sqrt{T})$ which is nearly optimal.

Increasingly, copious amounts of consumer data are used to learn high-revenue mechanisms via machine learning. Existing research on mechanism design via machine learning assumes that there is a distribution over the buyers' values for the items for sale and that the learning algorithm's input is a training set sampled from this distribution. This setup makes the strong assumption that no noise is introduced during data collection. In order to help place mechanism design via machine learning on firm foundations, we investigate the extent to which this learning process is robust to noise. Optimizing revenue using noisy data is challenging because revenue functions are extremely volatile: an infinitesimal change in the buyers' values can cause a steep drop in revenue. Nonetheless, we provide guarantees when arbitrarily correlated noise is added to the training set; we only require that the noise has bounded magnitude or is sub-Gaussian. We conclude with an application of our guarantees to multi-task mechanism design, where there are multiple distributions over buyers' values and the goal is to learn a high-revenue mechanism per distribution. To our knowledge, we are the first to study mechanism design via machine learning with noisy data as well as multi-task mechanism design.

So, the above multiplicative requirement is too strong to hold in general.

This paper investigates how many samples are needed from buyers'