We show that several striking differences in memory performance between recognition and recall tasks are explained by an ecological bias endemic in classic memory experiments - that such experiments universally involve more stimuli than retrieval cues. We show that while it is sensible to think of recall as simply retrieving items when probed with a cue - typically the item list itself - it is better to think of recognition as retrieving cues when probed with items. To test this theory, by manipulating the number of items and cues in a memory experiment, we show a crossover effect in memory performance within subjects such that recognition performance is superior to recall performance when the number of items is greater than the number of cues and recall performance is better than recognition when the converse holds. We build a simple computational model around this theory, using sampling to approximate an ideal Bayesian observer encoding and retrieving situational co-occurrence frequencies of stimuli and retrieval cues. This model robustly reproduces a number of dissociations in recognition and recall previously used to argue for dual-process accounts of declarative memory.

We show that while it is sensible to think of recall as simply retrieving items when probed with a cue - typically the item list itself - it is better to think of recognition as retrieving cues when probed with items.

Memory traces--changes in the memory system that result from the perception and encoding of an event--were measured in pioneering studies by Endel Tulving and Michael J. Watkins in 1975. These and further experiments informed the maturation of Tulving's memory model, from the GAPS (General Abstract Processing System} to the SPI (Serial-Parallel Independent) model. Having current top of the line LLMs revisit the original Tulving-Watkins tests may help in assessing whether foundation models completely instantiate or not this class of psychological models.

We show that several striking differences in memory performance between recognition and recall tasks are explained by an ecological bias endemic in classic memory experiments - that such experiments universally involve more stimuli than retrieval cues. We show that while it is sensible to think of recall as simply retrieving items when probed with a cue - typically the item list itself - it is better to think of recognition as retrieving cues when probed with items. To test this theory, by manipulating the number of items and cues in a memory experiment, we show a crossover effect in memory performance within subjects such that recognition performance is superior to recall performance when the number of items is greater than the number of cues and recall performance is better than recognition when the converse holds. We build a simple computational model around this theory, using sampling to approximate an ideal Bayesian observer encoding and retrieving situational co-occurrence frequencies of stimuli and retrieval cues. This model robustly reproduces a number of dissociations in recognition and recall previously used to argue for dual-process accounts of declarative memory.

Drawing from memory the face of a friend you have not seen in years is a difficult task. However, if you happen to cross paths, you would easily recognize each other. The biological memory is equipped with an impressive compression algorithm that can store the essential, and then infer the details to match perception. The Willshaw Memory is a simple abstract model for cortical computations which implements mechanisms of biological memories. Using our recently proposed sparse coding prescription for visual patterns, this model can store and retrieve an impressive amount of real-world data in a fault-tolerant manner. In this paper, we extend the capabilities of the basic Associative Memory Model by using a Multiple-Modality framework. In this setting, the memory stores several modalities (e.g., visual, or textual) of each pattern simultaneously. After training, the memory can be used to infer missing modalities when just a subset is perceived. Using a simple encoder-memory-decoder architecture, and a newly proposed iterative retrieval algorithm for the Willshaw Model, we perform experiments on the MNIST dataset. By storing both the images and labels as modalities, a single Memory can be used not only to retrieve and complete patterns but also to classify and generate new ones. We further discuss how this model could be used for other learning tasks, thus serving as a biologically-inspired framework for learning.

We show that several striking differences in memory performance between recognition and recall tasks are explained by an ecological bias endemic in classic memory experiments - that such experiments universally involve more stimuli than retrieval cues. We show that while it is sensible to think of recall as simply retrieving items when probed with a cue - typically the item list itself - it is better to think of recognition as retrieving cues when probed with items. To test this theory, by manipulating the number of items and cues in a memory experiment, we show a crossover effect in memory performance within subjects such that recognition performance is superior to recall performance when the number of items is greater than the number of cues and recall performance is better than recognition when the converse holds. We build a simple computational model around this theory, using sampling to approximate an ideal Bayesian observer encoding and retrieving situational co-occurrence frequencies of stimuli and retrieval cues. This model robustly reproduces a number of dissociations in recognition and recall previously used to argue for dual-process accounts of declarative memory.

We show that several striking differences in memory performance between recognition and recall tasks are explained by an ecological bias endemic in classic memory experiments - that such experiments universally involve more stimuli than retrieval cues. We show that while it is sensible to think of recall as simply retrieving items when probed with a cue - typically the item list itself - it is better to think of recognition as retrieving cues when probed with items. To test this theory, by manipulating the number of items and cues in a memory experiment, we show a crossover effect in memory performance within subjects such that recognition performance is superior to recall performance when the number of items is greater than the number of cues and recall performance is better than recognition when the converse holds. We build a simple computational model around this theory, using sampling to approximate an ideal Bayesian observer encoding and retrieving situational co-occurrence frequencies of stimuli and retrieval cues. This model robustly reproduces a number of dissociations in recognition and recall previously used to argue for dual-process accounts of declarative memory.

JD.odel [18] to fit data collected.

JD.odel [18] to fit data collected.

' 1idazolam causes dense,but temporary anterograde amnesia, similar to that produced by-hippocampal