The law draws a sharp distinction between objects and persons, and between two kinds of persons, the ''fictional'' kind (i.e. corporations), and the ''non-fictional'' kind (individual or ''natural'' persons). This paper will assess whether we maximize overall long-term legal coherence by (A) maintaining an object classification for all future AI systems, (B) creating fictional legal persons associated with suitably advanced, individuated AI systems (giving these fictional legal persons derogable rights and duties associated with certified groups of existing persons, potentially including free speech, contract rights, and standing to sue ''on behalf of'' the AI system), or (C) recognizing non-fictional legal personhood through legal identity for suitably advanced, individuated AI systems (recognizing them as entities meriting legal standing with non-derogable rights which for the human case include life, due process, habeas corpus, freedom from slavery, and freedom of conscience). We will clarify the meaning and implications of each option along the way, considering liability, copyright, family law, fundamental rights, civil rights, citizenship, and AI safety regulation. We will tentatively find that the non-fictional personhood approach may be best from a coherence perspective, for at least some advanced AI systems. An object approach may prove untenable for sufficiently humanoid advanced systems, though we suggest that it is adequate for currently existing systems as of 2025. While fictional personhood would resolve some coherence issues for future systems, it would create others and provide solutions that are neither durable nor fit for purpose. Finally, our review will suggest that ''hybrid'' approaches are likely to fail and lead to further incoherence: the choice between object, fictional person and non-fictional person is unavoidable.

In ethics, individual responsibility is often defined through Frankfurt's principle of alternative possibilities. This definition is not adequate in a group decision-making setting because it often results in the lack of a responsible party or "responsibility gap''. One of the existing approaches to address this problem is to consider group responsibility. Another, recently proposed, approach is "higher-order'' responsibility. The paper considers the problem of deciding if higher-order responsibility up to degree $d$ is enough to close the responsibility gap. The main technical result is that this problem is $Π_{2d+1}$-complete.

Responsibility has long been a subject of study in law and philosophy. More recently, it became a focus of AI literature. The article investigates the computational complexity of two important properties of responsibility in collective decision-making: diffusion and gap. It shows that the sets of diffusion-free and gap-free decision-making mechanisms are $Π_2$-complete and $Π_3$-complete, respectively. At the same time, the intersection of these classes is $Π_2$-complete.

The responsibility gap is a set of outcomes of a collective decision-making mechanism in which no single agent is individually responsible. In general, when designing a decision-making process, it is desirable to minimise the gap. The paper proposes a concept of an elected dictatorship. It shows that, in a perfect information setting, the gap is empty if and only if the mechanism is an elected dictatorship. It also proves that in an imperfect information setting, the class of gap-free mechanisms is positioned strictly between two variations of the class of elected dictatorships.

Existing network paradigms have achieved lower downtime as well as a higher Quality of Experience (QoE) through the use of Artificial Intelligence (AI)-based network management tools. These AI management systems, allow for automatic responses to changes in network conditions, lowering operation costs for operators, and improving overall performance. While adopting AI-based management tools enhance the overall network performance, it also introduce challenges such as removing human supervision, privacy violations, algorithmic bias, and model inaccuracies. Furthermore, AI-based agents that fail to address these challenges should be culpable themselves rather than the network as a whole. To address this accountability gap, a framework consisting of a Deep Reinforcement Learning (DRL) model and a Machine Learning (ML) model is proposed to identify and assign numerical values of responsibility to the AI-based management agents involved in any decision-making regarding the network conditions, which eventually affects the end-user. A simulation environment was created for the framework to be trained using simulated network operation parameters. The DRL model had a 96% accuracy during testing for identifying the AI-based management agents, while the ML model using gradient descent learned the network conditions at an 83% accuracy during testing.

AI-Based Safety-Critical Systems (AI-SCS) are being increasingly deployed in the real world. These can pose a risk of harm to people and the environment. Reducing that risk is an overarching priority during development and operation. As more AI-SCS become autonomous, a layer of risk management via human intervention has been removed. Following an accident it will be important to identify causal contributions and the different responsible actors behind those to learn from mistakes and prevent similar future events. Many authors have commented on the "responsibility gap" where it is difficult for developers and manufacturers to be held responsible for harmful behaviour of an AI-SCS. This is due to the complex development cycle for AI, uncertainty in AI performance, and dynamic operating environment. A human operator can become a "liability sink" absorbing blame for the consequences of AI-SCS outputs they weren't responsible for creating, and may not have understanding of. This cross-disciplinary paper considers different senses of responsibility (role, moral, legal and causal), and how they apply in the context of AI-SCS safety. We use a core concept (Actor(A) is responsible for Occurrence(O)) to create role responsibility models, producing a practical method to capture responsibility relationships and provide clarity on the previously identified responsibility issues. Our paper demonstrates the approach with two examples: a retrospective analysis of the Tempe Arizona fatal collision involving an autonomous vehicle, and a safety focused predictive role-responsibility analysis for an AI-based diabetes co-morbidity predictor. In both examples our primary focus is on safety, aiming to reduce unfair or disproportionate blame being placed on operators or developers. We present a discussion and avenues for future research.

Two different forms of responsibility, counterfactual and seeing-to-it, have been extensively discussed in the philosophy and AI in the context of a single agent or multiple agents acting simultaneously. Although the generalisation of counterfactual responsibility to a setting where multiple agents act in some order is relatively straightforward, the same cannot be said about seeing-to-it responsibility. Two versions of seeing-to-it modality applicable to such settings have been proposed in the literature. Neither of them perfectly captures the intuition of responsibility. This paper proposes a definition of seeing-to-it responsibility for such settings that amalgamate the two modalities. This paper shows that the newly proposed notion of responsibility and counterfactual responsibility are not definable through each other and studies the responsibility gap for these two forms of responsibility. It shows that although these two forms of responsibility are not enough to ascribe responsibility in each possible situation, this gap does not exist if higher-order responsibility is taken into account.

It all started with an obscure article in an obscure journal, published just as the last AI winter was beginning to thaw. In 2004, Andreas Matthias wrote an article with the enigmatic title, "The responsibility gap: Ascribing responsibility for the actions of learning automata." In it, he highlighted a new problem with modern AI systems based on machine learning principles. Once, it made sense to hold the manufacturer or operator of a machine responsible if the machine caused harm, but with the advent of machines that could learn from their interactions with the world, this practice made less sense. Learning automata (to use Matthias' terminology) could do things that were neither predictable nor reasonably foreseeable by their human overseers.

The concept of meaningful human control has been proposed to address responsibility gaps and mitigate them by establishing conditions that enable a proper attribution of responsibility for humans (e.g., users, designers and developers, manufacturers, legislators). However, the relevant discussions around meaningful human control have so far not resulted in clear requirements for researchers, designers, and engineers. As a result, there is no consensus on how to assess whether a designed AI system is under meaningful human control, making the practical development of AI-based systems that remain under meaningful human control challenging. In this paper, we address the gap between philosophical theory and engineering practice by identifying four actionable properties which AI-based systems must have to be under meaningful human control. First, a system in which humans and AI algorithms interact should have an explicitly defined domain of morally loaded situations within which the system ought to operate. Second, humans and AI agents within the system should have appropriate and mutually compatible representations. Third, responsibility attributed to a human should be commensurate with that human's ability and authority to control the system. Fourth, there should be explicit links between the actions of the AI agents and actions of humans who are aware of their moral responsibility. We argue these four properties are necessary for AI systems under meaningful human control, and provide possible directions to incorporate them into practice. We illustrate these properties with two use cases, automated vehicle and AI-based hiring. We believe these four properties will support practically-minded professionals to take concrete steps toward designing and engineering for AI systems that facilitate meaningful human control and responsibility.

As we start to encounter AI systems in various morally and legally salient environments, some have begun to explore how the current responsibility ascription practices might be adapted to meet such new technologies [19, 33]. A critical viewpoint today is that autonomous and self-learning AI systems pose a so-called responsibility gap [27]. These systems' autonomy challenges human control over them [13], while their adaptability leads to unpredictability. Hence, it might infeasible to trace back responsibility to a specific entity if these systems cause any harm. Considering responsibility practices as the adoption of certain attitudes towards an agent [40], scholarly work has also posed the question of whether AI systems are appropriate subjects of such practices [15, 29, 37] -- e.g., they might "have a body to kick," yet they "have no soul to damn" [4].