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Making AI Art Personal: Resource Bundle - TheAppWhisperer

#artificialintelligence

TheAppWhisperer platform has been a pivotal cyberspace for mobile artists of all abilities to learn about, to explore, to celebrate and to share mobile artworks. Joanne's compassion, inclusivity, and humility are hallmarks in all that she does, and is particularly evident in the platform she has built. In her words, "We all have the potential to remove ourselves from the centre of any circle and to expand a sphere of compassion outward; to include everyone interested in mobile art, ensuring every artist is within reach", she has said. Promotion of mobile artists and the art form as a primary medium in today's art world, has become her life's focus. She has presented lectures bolstering mobile artists and their art from as far away as the Museum of Art in Seoul, South Korea to closer to her home in the UK at Focus on Imaging.


Continuous Value Function Approximation for Sequential Bidding Policies

arXiv.org Artificial Intelligence

Market-based mechanisms such as auctions are being studied as an appropriate means for resource allocation in distributed and mulitagent decision problems. When agents value resources in combination rather than in isolation, they must often deliberate about appropriate bidding strategies for a sequence of auctions offering resources of interest. We briefly describe a discrete dynamic programming model for constructing appropriate bidding policies for resources exhibiting both complementarities and substitutability. We then introduce a continuous approximation of this model, assuming that money (or the numeraire good) is infinitely divisible. Though this has the potential to reduce the computational cost of computing policies, value functions in the transformed problem do not have a convenient closed form representation. We develop {em grid-based} approximation for such value functions, representing value functions using piecewise linear approximations. We show that these methods can offer significant computational savings with relatively small cost in solution quality.


Resource Allocation Among Agents with MDP-Induced Preferences

arXiv.org Artificial Intelligence

Allocating scarce resources among agents to maximize global utility is, in general, computationally challenging. We focus on problems where resources enable agents to execute actions in stochastic environments, modeled as Markov decision processes (MDPs), such that the value of a resource bundle is defined as the expected value of the optimal MDP policy realizable given these resources. We present an algorithm that simultaneously solves the resource-allocation and the policy-optimization problems. This allows us to avoid explicitly representing utilities over exponentially many resource bundles, leading to drastic (often exponential) reductions in computational complexity. We then use this algorithm in the context of self-interested agents to design a combinatorial auction for allocating resources. We empirically demonstrate the effectiveness of our approach by showing that it can, in minutes, optimally solve problems for which a straightforward combinatorial resource-allocation technique would require the agents to enumerate up to 2^100 resource bundles and the auctioneer to solve an NP-complete problem with an input of that size.


Resource Allocation Among Agents with MDP-Induced Preferences

Journal of Artificial Intelligence Research

Allocating scarce resources among agents to maximize global utility is, in general, computationally challenging. We focus on problems where resources enable agents to execute actions in stochastic environments, modeled as Markov decision processes (MDPs), such that the value of a resource bundle is defined as the expected value of the optimal MDP policy realizable given these resources. We present an algorithm that simultaneously solves the resource-allocation and the policy-optimization problems. This allows us to avoid explicitly representing utilities over exponentially many resource bundles, leading to drastic (often exponential) reductions in computational complexity. We then use this algorithm in the context of self-interested agents to design a combinatorial auction for allocating resources. We empirically demonstrate the effectiveness of our approach by showing that it can, in minutes, optimally solve problems for which a straightforward combinatorial resource-allocation technique would require the agents to enumerate up to 2^100 resource bundles and the auctioneer to solve an NP-complete problem with an input of that size.