Collaborative privacy-preserving planning (CPPP) is a multi-agent planning task in which agents need to achieve a common set of goals without revealing certain private information. In many CPPP algorithms the individual agents reason about a projection of the multiagent problem onto a single-agent classical planning problem. For example, an agent can plan as if it controls the public actions of other agents, ignoring their unknown private preconditions and effects, and use the cost of this plan as a heuristic for the cost of the full, multi-agent plan. Using such a projection, however, ignores some dependencies between agents' public actions. In particular, it does not contain dependencies between actions of other agents caused by their private facts.

In collaborative privacy preserving planning (CPPP), a group of agents jointly creates a plan to achieve a set of goals while preserving each others' privacy. During planning, agents often reveal the private dependencies between their public actions to other agents, that is, which public action facilitates the preconditions of another public action. Previous work in CPPP does not limit the disclosure of such dependencies. In this paper, we explicitly limit the amount of disclosed dependencies, allowing agents to publish only a part of their private dependencies. We investigate different strategies for deciding which dependencies to publish, and how they affect the ability to find solutions. We evaluate the ability of two solvers -- distribute forward search and centralized planning based on a single-agent projection -- to produce plans under this constraint. Experiments over standard CPPP domains show that the proposed dependency-sharing strategies enable generating plans while sharing only a small fraction of all private dependencies.

Dynamic Epistemic Logic (DEL) is a logical framework in which one can describe in great detail how actions are perceived by the agents, and how they affect the world. DEL games were recently introduced as a way to define classes of games with imperfect information where the actions available to the players are described very precisely. This framework makes it possible to define easily, for instance, classes of games where players can only use public actions or public announcements. These games have been studied for reachability objectives, where the aim is to reach a situation satisfying some epistemic property expressed in epistemic logic; several (un)decidability results have been established. In this work we show that the decidability results obtained for reachability objectives extend to a much more general class of winning conditions, namely those expressible in the epistemic temporal logic LTLK. To do so we establish that the infinite game structures generated by DEL public actions are regular, and we describe how to obtain finite representations on which we rely to solve them.

UK media coverage of artificial intelligence is dominated by industry products, announcements and research, according to a new study by the Reuters Institute for the Study of Journalism. The factsheet, An Industry-Led Debate: How UK Media Cover Artificial Intelligence, is based on an analysis of eight months of reporting on AI, in six mainstream UK news outlets. The report's lead author, J. Scott Brennen, said AI coverage has been developing against a background of economic disruption in the media industry, with cuts to speciality reporting, including science and technology journalism. "Despite these challenges, mainstream news outlets remain a key space for, and influence on, public discussion. "However, by amplifying industry's self-interested claims about AI, media coverage presents AI as a solution to a range of problems that will disrupt nearly all areas of our lives, often without acknowledging ongoing debates concerning AI's potential effects.

In privacy-preserving multi-agent planning, a group of agents attempt to cooperatively solve a multi-agent planning problem while maintaining private their data and actions. Although much work was carried out in this area in past years, its theoretical foundations have not been fully worked out. Specifically, although algorithms with precise privacy guarantees exist, even their most efficient implementations are not fast enough on realistic instances, whereas for practical algorithms no meaningful privacy guarantees exist. Secure-MAFS, a variant of the multi-agent forward search algorithm (MAFS) is the only practical algorithm to attempt to offer more precise guarantees, but only in very limited settings and with proof sketches only. In this paper we formulate a precise notion of secure computation for search-based algorithms and prove that Secure MAFS has this property in all domains.

Multi-agent forward search (MAFS) is a state-of-the-art privacy-preserving planning algorithm. We describe a new variant of MAFS, called multi-agent forward-backward search (MAFBS) that uses both forward and backward messages to reduce the number of messages sent and obtain new privacy properties. While MAFS requires agents to send a state s produced by an action a to all agents that can apply any action in s, MAFBS sends such messages forward only to agents that have an action that requires one of the effects of a. To achieve completeness, it sends messages backward to agents that can supply a missing precondition. This more focused message passing scheme reduces states exchanged, and requires that agents be aware only of other agents that they directly interact with, leading to agent privacy.

To engage diverse agents in cooperative behavior, it is important, even necessary, to provide algorithms that do not reveal information that is private or proprietary.A number of recent planning algorithms enable agents to plan together for shared goals without disclosing information about their private state and actions. But these algorithms lack clear and formal privacy guarantees: the fact that they do not require agents to explicitly reveal private information, does not imply that such information cannot be deduced. The main contribution of this paper is an enhanced version of the distributed forward-search planning framework of Nissim and Brafman that reveals less information than the original algorithm, and the first, to our knowledge, discussion and formal proof of privacy guarantees for distributed planning and search algorithms.

This paper deals with the problem of classical planning for multiple cooperative agents who have private information about their local state and capabilities they do not want to reveal. Two main approaches have recently been proposed to solve this type of problem -- one is based on reduction to distributed constraint satisfaction, and the other on partial-order planning techniques. In classical single-agent planning, constraint-based and partial-order planning techniques are currently dominated by heuristic forward search. The question arises whether it is possible to formulate a distributed heuristic forward search algorithm for privacy-preserving classical multi-agent planning. Our work provides a positive answer to this question in the form of a general approach to distributed state-space search in which each agent performs only the part of the state expansion relevant to it. The resulting algorithms are simple and efficient -- outperforming previous algorithms by orders of magnitude -- while offering similar flexibility to that of forward-search algorithms for single-agent planning. Furthermore, one particular variant of our general approach yields a distributed version of the A* algorithm that is the first cost-optimal distributed algorithm for privacy-preserving planning.

It is a well known fact that in extensive form games with perfect information, there is a Nash equilibrium with support of size one. This doesn't hold for games with imperfect information, where the size of minimal support can be larger. We present a dependency between the level of uncertainty and the minimum support size. For many games, there is a big disproportion between the game uncertainty and the number of actions available. In Bayesian extensive games with perfect information, the only uncertainty is about the type of players. In card games, the uncertainty comes from dealing the deck. In these games, we can significantly reduce the support size. Our result applies to general-sum extensive form games with any finite number of players.

As our world becomes better connected and autonomous agents no longer appear to be science fiction, a natural need arises for enabling groups of selfish agents to cooperate in generating plans for diverse tasks that none of them can perform alone in a cost-effective manner. While most work on planning for/by selfish agents revolves around finding stable solutions (e.g., Nash Equilibrium), this work combines techniques from mechanism design with a recently introduced method for distributed planning, in order to find cost optimal (and, thus, social welfare maximizing) solutions. Based on the Vickrey-Clarke-Groves mechanisms, we present both a centralized, and a privacy-preserving distributed mechanism.