A principled way to study limited forms of reasoning for expressive knowledge bases is to specify the reasoning problem within a suitable logic of limited belief. Ideally such a logic comes equipped with a perspicuous semantics, which provides insights into the nature of the belief model and facilitates the study of the reasoning problem. While a number of such logics were proposed in the past, none of them is able to deal with function symbols except perhaps for the special case of logical constants. In this paper we propose a logic of limited belief with arbitrary function symbols. Among other things, we demonstrate that this form of limited belief has desirable properties such as eventual completeness for a large class of formulas and that it serves as a specification of a form of decidable reasoning for very expressive knowledge bases.

SAT and #SAT are at the heart of many important problem formulations in AI, the most prominent being reasoning and learning in first-order and probabilistic knowledge bases. In practice, all contemporary systems resort to domain closure: objects in the universe are all and only the ones mentioned in the knowledge base. This is in stark contrast to the natural ability of human beings to infer things about sensory inputs and unforeseen data: they infer the existence of objects from their observations; no predefined list of objects is given or known in advance. In this paper, we introduce the formal foundations for reasoning in open universes in a general way, purely based on SAT and #SAT technology.

While founded on the situation calculus, current implementations of Golog are mainly based on the closed-world assumption or its dynamic versions or the domain closure assumption. Also, they are almost exclusively based on regression. In this paper, we propose a first-order interpreter for knowledge-based Golog with sensing based on exact progression and limited reasoning. We assume infinitely many unique names and handle first-order disjunctive information in the form of the so-called proper+ KBs. Our implementation is based on the progression and limited reasoning algorithms for proper+ KBs proposed by Liu, Lakemeyer and Levesque. To improve efficiency, we implement the two algorithms by grounding via a trick based on the unique name assumption. The interpreter is online but the programmer can use two operators to specify offline execution for parts of programs. The search operator returns a conditional plan, while the planning operator is used when local closed-world information is available and calls a modern planner to generate a sequence of actions.

This work develops an approach to efficient reasoning in first-order knowledge bases with incomplete information. We build on Levesque's proper knowledge bases approach, which supports limited incomplete knowledge in the form of a possibly infinite set of positive or negative ground facts. We propose a generalization which allows these facts to involve unknown individuals, as in the work on labeled null values in databases. Dealing with such unknown individuals has been shown to be a key feature in the database literature on data integration and data exchange. In this way, we obtain one of the most expressive first-order open-world settings for which reasoning can still be done efficiently by evaluation, as in relational databases. We show the soundness of the reasoning procedure and its completeness for queries in a certain normal form.

In a seminal paper, Lin and Reiter introduced the notion of progression of basic action theories. Unfortunately, progression is second-order in general. Recently, Liu and Lakemeyer improve on earlier results and show that for the local-effect and normal actions case, progression is computable but may lead to an exponential blow-up. Nevertheless, they show that for certain kinds of expressive first-order knowledge bases with disjunctive information, called proper+, it is efficient. However, answering queries about the resulting state is still undecidable. In this paper, we continue this line of research and extend proper+ to include functions. We prove that their progression wrt local-effect, normal actions, and range-restricted theories, is first-order definable and efficiently computable. We then provide a new logically sound and complete decision procedure for certain kinds of queries.

In a seminal paper, Lin and Reiter introduced the notion of progression for basic action theories in the situation calculus. Unfortunately, progression is not first-order definable in general. Recently, Vassos, Lakemeyer, and Levesque showed that in case actions have only local effects, progression is first-order representable. However, they could show computability of the first-order representation only for a restricted class. Also, their proofs were quite involved. In this paper, we present a result stronger than theirs that for local-effect actions, progression is always first-order definable and computable. We give a very simple proof for this via the concept of forgetting. We also show first-order definability and computability results for a class of knowledge bases and actions with non-local effects. Moreover, for a certain class of local-effect actions and knowledge bases for representing disjunctive information, we show that progression is not only first-order definable but also efficiently computable.

Levesque proposed a generalization of a database called a proper knowledge base (KB), which is equivalent to a possibly infinite consistent set of ground literals. In contrast to databases, proper KBs do not make the closed-world assumption and hence the entailment problem becomes undecidable. Levesque then proposed a limited but efficient inference method V for proper KBs, which is sound and, when the query is in a certain normal form, also logically complete. He conjectured that for every first-order query there is an equivalent one in normal form. In this note, we show that this conjecture is false. In fact, we show that any class of formulas for which V is complete must be strictly less expressive than full first-order logic. Moreover, in the propositional case it is very unlikely that a formula always has a polynomial-size normal form.