To find out how the representations of structured visual objects depend on the co-occurrence statistics of their constituents, we exposed subjects to a set of composite images with tight control exerted over (1) the condi- tional probabilities of the constituent fragments, and (2) the value of Bar- low's criterion of "suspicious coincidence" (the ratio of joint probability to the product of marginals). We then compared the part verification re- sponse times for various probe/target combinations before and after the exposure. For composite probes, the speedup was much larger for tar- gets that contained pairs of fragments perfectly predictive of each other, compared to those that did not. This effect was modulated by the sig- nificance of their co-occurrence as estimated by Barlow's criterion. For lone-fragment probes, the speedup in all conditions was generally lower than for composites.

Before the age of 4 months, infants make inductive inferences about the motions of physical objects. Developmental psychologists have provided verbal accounts of the knowledge that supports these inferences, but often these accounts focus on categorical rather than probabilistic principles. We propose that infant object perception is guided in part by probabilistic principles like persistence: things tend to remain the same, and when they change they do so gradually. To illustrate this idea, we develop an ideal observer model that includes probabilistic formulations of rigidity and inertia. Like previous researchers, we suggest that rigid motions are expected from an early age, but we challenge the previous claim that expectations consistent with inertia are relatively slow to develop (Spelke et al., 1992).

Before the age of 4 months, infants make inductive inferences about the motions of physical objects. Developmental psychologists have provided verbal accounts of the knowledge that supports these inferences, but often these accounts focus on categorical rather than probabilistic principles. We propose that infant object perception is guided in part by probabilistic principles like persistence: things tend to remain the same, and when they change they do so gradually. To illustrate this idea, we develop an ideal observer model that includes probabilistic formulations of rigidity and inertia. Like previous researchers, we suggest that rigid motions are expected from an early age, but we challenge the previous claim that expectations consistent with inertia are relatively slow to develop (Spelke et al., 1992).

Before the age of 4 months, infants make inductive inferences about the motions of physical objects. Developmental psychologists have provided verbal accounts of the knowledge that supports these inferences, but often these accounts focus on categorical rather than probabilistic principles. We propose that infant object perception is guided in part by probabilistic principles like persistence: things tend to remain the same, and when they change they do so gradually. To illustrate this idea, we develop an ideal observer model that includes probabilistic formulations of rigidity and inertia. Like previous researchers, we suggest that rigid motions are expected from an early age, but we challenge the previous claim that expectations consistent with inertia are relatively slow to develop (Spelke et al., 1992). We support these arguments by modeling four experiments from the developmental literature.